83 California opinions name it 4 courts 1914–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mickeygreen2 sentences2015(Id. at pp. 1200-1201; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649 [questions of fact subject to review for substantial evidence is equivalent to federal "clearly erroneous" scrutiny].) What standard of review operates when reviewing a trial court's application of the law to the facts is more troublesome. 2015(Id. at pp. 1200-1201; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649 [questions of fact subject to review for substantial evidence is equivalent to federal "clearly erroneous" scrutiny].) What standard of review operates when reviewing a trial court's application of the law to the facts is more troublesome. | 3 | 3 |
Arno v. HELINET CORP.green2 sentences2019Although courts should evaluate the totality of the facts ( Arno v. Helinet Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1019 , 1026, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 669 ( Arno ) ), we conclude that *80 three factors are especially pertinent: (1) how far into the litigation the 998 offer was made; (2) the information available to the offeree prior to the 998 offer's expiration; and (3) whether the offeree let the offeror know it lacked sufficient information to evaluate the offer, and how the offeror responded. 2019Although courts should evaluate the totality of the facts ( Arno v. Helinet Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1019 , 1026, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 669 ( Arno ) ), we conclude that *80 three factors are especially pertinent: (1) how far into the litigation the 998 offer was made; (2) the information available to the offeree prior to the 998 offer's expiration; and (3) whether the offeree let the offeror know it lacked sufficient information to evaluate the offer, and how the offeror responded. | 2 | 3 |
Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc.green2 sentences2019Code, § 3291 ; Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692 , 698, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ( Elrod ).) A 998 offer is valid only if, among other things, the offeror knew that the offeree had reasonable access to the facts necessary to "intelligently evaluate the offer." ( Id. at pp. 699-700, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ; Najera v. Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872 , 878, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ( Najera ).) What factors are relevant in deciding whether the offeree had enough facts to evaluate the offer? 2019Code, § 3291 ; Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692 , 698, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ( Elrod ).) A 998 offer is valid only if, among other things, the offeror knew that the offeree had reasonable access to the facts necessary to "intelligently evaluate the offer." ( Id. at pp. 699-700, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ; Najera v. Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872 , 878, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ( Najera ).) What factors are relevant in deciding whether the offeree had enough facts to evaluate the offer? | 2 | 3 |
Najera v. Huertagreen2 sentences2019Code, § 3291 ; Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692 , 698, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ( Elrod ).) A 998 offer is valid only if, among other things, the offeror knew that the offeree had reasonable access to the facts necessary to "intelligently evaluate the offer." ( Id. at pp. 699-700, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ; Najera v. Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872 , 878, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ( Najera ).) What factors are relevant in deciding whether the offeree had enough facts to evaluate the offer? 2019Code, § 3291 ; Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692 , 698, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ( Elrod ).) A 998 offer is valid only if, among other things, the offeror knew that the offeree had reasonable access to the facts necessary to "intelligently evaluate the offer." ( Id. at pp. 699-700, 241 Cal.Rptr. 108 ; Najera v. Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872 , 878, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ( Najera ).) What factors are relevant in deciding whether the offeree had enough facts to evaluate the offer? | 2 | 3 |
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2020(See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957 (Cahill) [“there is no abuse of discretion requiring reversal if there exists a reasonable or fairly debatable justification under the law for the trial court’s decision or, alternatively stated, if that decision falls within the permissible range of options set by the applicable legal criteria”].) The order under review here meets that test. 2020(See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957 (Cahill) [“there is no abuse of discretion requiring reversal if there exists a reasonable or fairly debatable justification under the law for the trial court’s decision or, alternatively stated, if that decision falls within the permissible range of options set by the applicable legal criteria”].) The order under review here meets that test. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Sassouniangreen2 sentences2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. 2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. Texasgreen2 sentences2018This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States "; in its view, "[n]othing could be less fruitful" than "formulating a constitutional rule." ( Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514 , 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 , italics added ( Powell ).) Given this view, recently echoed in Clark v. Arizona , supra , 548 U.S. at pages 752 through 753, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , due process cannot possibly compel the use of irresistible impulse as the test for sanity of juveniles since it is not part of any consensus on the elements within the concept of ordered liberty. 2018This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States "; in its view, "[n]othing could be less fruitful" than "formulating a constitutional rule." ( Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514 , 536, 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 , italics added ( Powell ).) Given this view, recently echoed in Clark v. Arizona , supra , 548 U.S. at pages 752 through 753, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , due process cannot possibly compel the use of irresistible impulse as the test for sanity of juveniles since it is not part of any consensus on the elements within the concept of ordered liberty. | 1 | 2 |
Mapp v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2018Admissibility of Evidence Defendant claims he has a constitutional right to object to the use of illegally obtained evidence at a misdemeanor probable cause hearing, citing *13 in support Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ["We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court"] and U.S. v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 , 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 [under the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a cr 2018Admissibility of Evidence Defendant claims he has a constitutional right to object to the use of illegally obtained evidence at a misdemeanor probable cause hearing, citing *13 in support Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ["We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court"] and U.S. v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 , 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 [under the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a cr | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Calandragreen2 sentences2018Admissibility of Evidence Defendant claims he has a constitutional right to object to the use of illegally obtained evidence at a misdemeanor probable cause hearing, citing *13 in support Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ["We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court"] and U.S. v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 , 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 [under the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a cr 2018Admissibility of Evidence Defendant claims he has a constitutional right to object to the use of illegally obtained evidence at a misdemeanor probable cause hearing, citing *13 in support Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ["We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court"] and U.S. v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 , 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 [under the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a cr | 1 | 2 |
People v. Tobiasgreen2 sentences2017I don't think accomplice applies to it." "A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense .... [¶] An accomplice is *510 hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant ...." (§ 1111.) What defendant's argument completely ignores, however, are the grounds the trial court relied upon when refusing the requested instruction. " 'It has long been settled that where a penal statute expressly outlaws cond 2017I don't think accomplice applies to it." "A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense .... [¶] An accomplice is *510 hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant ...." (§ 1111.) What defendant's argument completely ignores, however, are the grounds the trial court relied upon when refusing the requested instruction. " 'It has long been settled that where a penal statute expressly outlaws cond | 1 | 2 |
Alabama v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024(People v. Flores (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420 , 450, fn. 15; see also Alabama v. Smith (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 795, 799 [holding that “no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the first sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the second sentence follows a trial,” absent circumstances showing a “ ‘reasonable likelihood’ ” of actual vindictiveness by sentencing authority].) “[T]he double jeopardy clause forbids the imposition of a more severe penalty on retrial. [¶] … What defendant faces here as a result of his choice to withdraw his [no contest] plea is allowed by both the California and Uni | 1 | 1 |
In Re Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2023(Compare People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 724-726 [upholding 15-year-to-life sentence for adult uncle who molested and orally copulated six-year-old niece, and made no showing of low IQ or sexual inadequacy] with In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 653-655 [finding the youthful age, frustrations brought on by intellectual and sexual inadequacy, and inability to cope made lengthy imprisonment excessive].) Nor does defendant address the level of cunning, callousness, or sophistication employed by defendant in 5 selecting as his victims the young children who were entrusted to his car | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dillongreen1 sentence2023(Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 496 .) Similarly, with respect to the offender, we focus “on the particular person before the court, and ask[] whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.” (Dillon, at p. 479.) Here, defendant relies on his lack of any prior or subsequent criminal history and the probation officer’s risk assessment indicating a below average risk of recidivism to suggest his offense is an aberration and unlikely to reoccur, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bakergreen1 sentence2023(Compare People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 724-726 [upholding 15-year-to-life sentence for adult uncle who molested and orally copulated six-year-old niece, and made no showing of low IQ or sexual inadequacy] with In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 653-655 [finding the youthful age, frustrations brought on by intellectual and sexual inadequacy, and inability to cope made lengthy imprisonment excessive].) Nor does defendant address the level of cunning, callousness, or sophistication employed by defendant in 5 selecting as his victims the young children who were entrusted to his car | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vargasgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 824 [“What defendant manufactures is essentially a list of evidence that would buttress the prosecution’s case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mendezgreen1 sentence2022To treat this as dispositive would be to ignore the full range of evidence the jury actually considered”]; People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 59 [concluding victims’ failure to positively identify defendant in court was not fatal to true finding on firearm enhancement, noting “[w]eaknesses in the testimony of eyewitnesses are to be evaluated by the jury”].) Rather, for the reasons stated, we conclude sufficient evidence supports defendants’ convictions on count 2. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ortizgreen1 sentence2021The evidence was admissible to prove implied malice.” (Id. at p. 340.) In People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111 (Ortiz), the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for driving at a high rate of speed, crossing the center line, and crashing into another car. | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. E.A.green1 sentence2021Assuming the argument was not forfeited by counsel’s failure to raise the statutory exception (see In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court,” although forfeiture is not “automatic”]; In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790 [“General objections are insufficient to preserve issues for review. [Citation.] The objection must state the ground or grounds upon which the objection is based”]), it was not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have ap | 1 | 1 |
| In Re SBred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bivertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheelergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Earpgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dat Tan Nguyengreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 795230green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cruzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Salinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lanpheargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Crittendengreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Bakersfield v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Syverson v. Heitmanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pirkig v. Dennisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Raisola v. Flower Street Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. . Minifie
green
2 sentences2024It is, therefore, reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.” (Id. at p. 1072.) What defendant here overlooks is that in Minifie the high court said the evidence of third-party threats was admissible “to support a claim of self- defense if there is also evidence from which the jury may find that the defendant reasonably associated the victim with those threats.” (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1060 , italics added.) In other words, in that case, there was a nexus between the proffered evidence and the defense. 2024It is, therefore, reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.” (Id. at p. 1072.) What defendant here overlooks is that in Minifie the high court said the evidence of third-party threats was admissible “to support a claim of self- defense if there is also evidence from which the jury may find that the defendant reasonably associated the victim with those threats.” (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1060 , italics added.) In other words, in that case, there was a nexus between the proffered evidence and the defense. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
IT Corp. v. County of Imperial
green
2 sentences2020What defendants overlook is that, in the final analysis under IT Corp., “if it appears fairly clear that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits”—as it does in this case—“a trial court might legitimately decide that an injunction should issue even though the plaintiff is unable to prevail in a balancing of the probable harms.” (IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 72–73, italics added.) We do not underestimate the difficulty of the trial court’s task at this stage of the IT Corp. analysis, but so long as it properly understood its discretion as a legal matter, as we believe it did, we must defer 2020What defendants overlook is that, in the final analysis under IT Corp., “if it appears fairly clear that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits”—as it does in this case—“a trial court might legitimately decide that an injunction should issue even though the plaintiff is unable to prevail in a balancing of the probable harms.” (IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 72–73, italics added.) We do not underestimate the difficulty of the trial court’s task at this stage of the IT Corp. analysis, but so long as it properly understood its discretion as a legal matter, as we believe it did, we must defer | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Morris
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. 2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Massie
green
2 sentences2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. 2016(See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 , overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545, fn. 6 .) And speculation “cannot rise to the dignity of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 .) The only substantial evidence of what occurred during the last five or so minutes came from Flores and Lopez. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
2 sentences2013Ineffective Assistance of Defense Counsel A. Background As noted, defense counsel unsuccessfully argued, in a Romero motion ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 ), that defendant did not deserve a three-strike life sentence; counsel asked the trial court to “strike” one of defendant’s two prior strike convictions—his 1993 conviction for attempted armed robbery—as to the two current felony convictions sentenced upon (police evasion and felon firearm possession), “in the interest of justice in an effort to provide a [two-strike] determinate [rather than a three-strike life] sentence.” (Italics added. 2013Ineffective Assistance of Defense Counsel A. Background As noted, defense counsel unsuccessfully argued, in a Romero motion ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 ), that defendant did not deserve a three-strike life sentence; counsel asked the trial court to “strike” one of defendant’s two prior strike convictions—his 1993 conviction for attempted armed robbery—as to the two current felony convictions sentenced upon (police evasion and felon firearm possession), “in the interest of justice in an effort to provide a [two-strike] determinate [rather than a three-strike life] sentence.” (Italics added. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2013Ineffective Assistance of Defense Counsel A. Background As noted, defense counsel unsuccessfully argued, in a Romero motion ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 ), that defendant did not deserve a three-strike life sentence; counsel asked the trial court to “strike” one of defendant’s two prior strike convictions—his 1993 conviction for attempted armed robbery—as to the two current felony convictions sentenced upon (police evasion and felon firearm possession), “in the interest of justice in an effort to provide a [two-strike] determinate [rather than a three-strike life] sentence.” (Italics added. 2013Ineffective Assistance of Defense Counsel A. Background As noted, defense counsel unsuccessfully argued, in a Romero motion ( Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 ), that defendant did not deserve a three-strike life sentence; counsel asked the trial court to “strike” one of defendant’s two prior strike convictions—his 1993 conviction for attempted armed robbery—as to the two current felony convictions sentenced upon (police evasion and felon firearm possession), “in the interest of justice in an effort to provide a [two-strike] determinate [rather than a three-strike life] sentence.” (Italics added. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Barber v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2003In Barber v. Superior Court, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at page 1021 , 195 Cal.Rptr. 484 , citing to President's Commission, supra, at page 135, the Second Appellate District identified the following factors to be considered in determining whether to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from a previously competent adult who had become comatose: "the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained." Barber v. Superior Court emphasized that a court must consider the burdens treatment may cause to the patient in proporti 2003In Barber v. Superior Court, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at page 1021 , citing to President’s Commission, supra, at page 135, the Second Appellate District identified the following factors to be considered in determining whether to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from a previously competent adult who had become comatose: “the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained.” Barber v. Superior Court emphasized that a court must consider the burdens treatment may cause to the patient in proportion to the benefits i | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Price
green
2 sentences1998The appellate court, noting that the robbery term had neither been attacked on appeal nor criticized in its earlier opinion as unlawful, found the robbery term had been impermissibly increased by two years in violation of the bar of double jeopardy. ( People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1413 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 550 .) What defendant does not acknowledge about Price is that the case as a whole falls into the exception for unauthorized or unlawful sentences. 1998(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1413 .) What defendant does not acknowledge about Price is that the case as a whole falls into the exception for unauthorized or unlawful sentences. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Banks
green
1 sentence2026(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 .) In connection with his claim of insufficiency of evidence to support a finding he was a major participant, defendant argues the robbery was “‘garden variety,’” that the record demonstrates that the crime was committed at “spur of the moment,” that the “entire incident transpired in mere minutes,” and that the evidence establishes he did not intend for the robbery to have lethal consequences. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Superior Court (Garcia)
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Flores (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420 , 450, fn. 15; see also Alabama v. Smith (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 795, 799 [holding that “no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the first sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the second sentence follows a trial,” absent circumstances showing a “ ‘reasonable likelihood’ ” of actual vindictiveness by sentencing authority].) “[T]he double jeopardy clause forbids the imposition of a more severe penalty on retrial. [¶] … What defendant faces here as a result of his choice to withdraw his [no contest] plea is allowed by both the California and Uni 2024(People v. Flores (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420 , 450, fn. 15; see also Alabama v. Smith (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 795, 799 [holding that “no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the first sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the second sentence follows a trial,” absent circumstances showing a “ ‘reasonable likelihood’ ” of actual vindictiveness by sentencing authority].) “[T]he double jeopardy clause forbids the imposition of a more severe penalty on retrial. [¶] … What defendant faces here as a result of his choice to withdraw his [no contest] plea is allowed by both the California and Uni | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2023(Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 496 .) Similarly, with respect to the offender, we focus “on the particular person before the court, and ask[] whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.” (Dillon, at p. 479.) Here, defendant relies on his lack of any prior or subsequent criminal history and the probation officer’s risk assessment indicating a below average risk of recidivism to suggest his offense is an aberration and unlikely to reoccur, | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Our high court analyzed certain aspects of the wage order seating requirement in Kilby, supra. There, the court addressed three questions certified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) Does the “nature of the work” refer to individual tasks or the entire range of an employee’s duties? (2) What factors should courts consider to determine whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits” the use of a seat? (3) If an employer has not provided any seat, must an employee prove a suitable seat is 6Nothing in this opinion should be construed as adopting, or rejecting, such a rule. 16 availabl 2022(Kilby, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 8 .) Although the court did not directly consider what an employer must do to “provide” suitable seating, the nature of the court’s inquiry is of some assistance. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Jennings green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. A.W. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. DeLeon green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port District green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Centeno green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Clark v. Arizona green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Gerstein v. Pugh green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Ryan D. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Alexander green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Hodges v. Yarian green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Shokur green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Humphrey green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Anderson red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Kraft green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Hofsheier red | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Barrera green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Carrillo green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Fleetwood green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Finley v. Saturn of Roseville green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mansell v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Simon green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California, August 31 green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Shaeffer v. State of California green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Moore v. California State Board of Accountancy green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.