120 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1998–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Andrews v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Because “the record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance[,] the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. 2024When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 39 | 42 |
Bone v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. at 898 (quoting Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. 2022“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. at 898 (quoting Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 17 | 25 |
Rylander v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (stating “[w]e have previously stated that the record on direct appeal .will generally -not -be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient- as to meet the -first part of -the *282 Strickland , standard as the reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record”). 2015OF THE VERDICT In the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal By his third issue, Appellant contends he was is simply inadequate to show that counsel's conduct fell prejudiced by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury below an objectively reasonable standard of performance. that their verdict required unanimous agreement as to the See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. prosecution event. | 10 | 10 |
Jaynes v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland.2 See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet, 65 S.W.3d at 67 ). 2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland . (2) See Jaynes , 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet , 65 S.W.3d at 67 ). | 9 | 11 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695–696, 104 S. Ct. at 2069 ; Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 . 7. 2009To overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly rooted in the record. Â Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Â In the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal is inadequate to show that counselÂs conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance. | 7 | 9 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); “[T]he record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance . . . .” Id. at 102; “But, when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as she did.” Id. (citing Str 2015App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); “[T]he record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance . . . .” Id. at 102; “But, when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as she did.” Id. (citing Str | 4 | 8 |
Mallett v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland.2 See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet, 65 S.W.3d at 67 ). 2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland . (2) See Jaynes , 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet , 65 S.W.3d at 67 ). | 4 | 6 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Bone , 77 S.W.3d at 833 ; Moore v. State , 140 S.W.3d 720, 728 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd). 2007Bone , 77 S.W.3d at 833 ; Moore v. State , 140 S.W.3d 720, 728 (Tex.App.–Austin 2004, pet. ref’d). | 4 | 4 |
Robertson v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Cf. Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex. Crim. 2015Cf. Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Josey v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St 2008See Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one . . . of the State’s primary witnesses is improper trial strategy or otherwise falls below the level of an objectively reasonable standard of conduct.”). | 2 | 3 |
Harrison v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2021See Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 2015See Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2020The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 4 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. 2018The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 , 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Villa v. Stategreen2 sentences2015App. 2005); there are cases in which it is plain from the Record on direct appeal that trial counsel made a prejudicial decision for which there is no "imaginable strategic motivation." Villa v. State, 417 S.W.3d 455,463 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2005); there are cases in which it is plain from the Record on direct appeal that trial counsel made a prejudicial decision for which there is no "imaginable strategic motivation." Villa v. State, 417 S.W.3d 455,463 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2007As explained by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a "record on direct appeal is generally inadequate to show that counsel's conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance, and the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings." Freeman v. State , 125 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. Crim. 2007As explained by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a “record on direct appeal is generally inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance, and the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.” Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642 . 2012Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642 . | 1 | 10 |
Wright v. Westgreen2 sentences2020The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 4 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. 2018The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 , 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
Loeffler v. Lytle Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence2024Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 92 ; see Loeffler, 211 S.W.3d at 348 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
Goodspeed v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 1 |
Blevins v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 1 |
Frangias v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 1 |
| Hereford v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kenneth Ray Humphrey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pfeiffer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rahul K. Nath, M.D. v. Texas Children's Hospital and Baylor College of Medicinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Placegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Connorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whren v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ortizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerstein v. Pughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Chandlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crittenden v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rivera v. State
green
2 sentences2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ; Rivera, 123 S.W.3d at 32 . 2015Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ; Rivera, 123 S.W.3d at 32 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Terrence Mann and Evelyn Mann v. Kendall Home Builders Construction Partners I, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2024Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 92 . 2024Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 92 ; see Loeffler, 211 S.W.3d at 348 . 3. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Charles v. State
red
2 sentences2015App. 2007); Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 208 . 8 Strickland First Prong To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Lopez had the burden to demonstrate that his attorney’s professional services fell below an objectively reasonable standard. 2015App. 2007); Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 208 . 8 Strickland First Prong To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Lopez had the burden to demonstrate that his attorney’s professional services fell below an objectively reasonable standard. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Esaw Lampkin v. State
green
2 sentences2025“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. (quoting Lampkin, 470 S.W.3d at 898 ). 2025“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. (quoting Lampkin, 470 S.W.3d at 898 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re MS
green
1 sentence2023“In examining counsel’s performance under the first prong, ‘we must take into account all of the circumstances surrounding the case, and must primarily focus on whether counsel performed in a “reasonably effective” manner.’” In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 73–74 (quoting In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Parmer v. State
green
1 sentence2020“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Parmer v. State, 545 S.W.3d 724 , 727–28 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
James Howard Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hill v. State
green
1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Daugherty, Tonya Jean
green
1 sentence2019And appellant’s misplaced reliance on a theory based on Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 658-59 , does not change the result. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Lopez v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Starz v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tovar v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tennessee v. Garner green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Winston v. Lee green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.