objectively reasonable standard in Texas

2024Because “the record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance[,] the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2024When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2024“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. at 898 (quoting Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2022“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record ‘is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.’” Id. at 898 (quoting Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland.2 See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet, 65 S.W.3d at 67 ).

2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland . (2) See Jaynes , 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet , 65 S.W.3d at 67 ).

2015See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (stating “[w]e have previously stated that the record on direct appeal .will generally -not -be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient- as to meet the -first part of -the *282 Strickland , standard as the reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record”).

2015OF THE VERDICT In the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal By his third issue, Appellant contends he was is simply inadequate to show that counsel's conduct fell prejudiced by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury below an objectively reasonable standard of performance. that their verdict required unanimous agreement as to the See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. prosecution event.

2011See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ; Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 .

2011See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695–696, 104 S. Ct. at 2069 ; Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 . 7.

2015App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); • “[T]he record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance . . . .” Id. at 102; • “But, when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as she did.” Id. (citing Str

2015App. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)); • “[T]he record on direct appeal is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance . . . .” Id. at 102; • “But, when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as she did.” Id. (citing Str

2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland.2 See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet, 65 S.W.3d at 67 ).

2010Because Ortiz has not established that his counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, he has not met the first prong of Strickland . (2) See Jaynes , 216 S.W.3d at 855 (citing Mallet , 65 S.W.3d at 67 ).

2007Bone , 77 S.W.3d at 833 ; Moore v. State , 140 S.W.3d 720, 728 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd).

2007Bone , 77 S.W.3d at 833 ; Moore v. State , 140 S.W.3d 720, 728 (Tex.App.–Austin 2004, pet. ref’d).

2015Cf. Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex. Crim.

2015Cf. Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St

2008See Josey v. State , 97 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one . . . of the State’s primary witnesses is improper trial strategy or otherwise falls below the level of an objectively reasonable standard of conduct.”).

2021See Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2015See Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2020The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 4 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2018The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 , 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2005); there are cases in which it is plain from the Record on direct appeal that trial counsel made a prejudicial decision for which there is no "imaginable strategic motivation." Villa v. State, 417 S.W.3d 455,463 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2005); there are cases in which it is plain from the Record on direct appeal that trial counsel made a prejudicial decision for which there is no "imaginable strategic motivation." Villa v. State, 417 S.W.3d 455,463 (Tex. Crim.

2007As explained by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a "record on direct appeal is generally inadequate to show that counsel's conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance, and the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings." Freeman v. State , 125 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. Crim.

2007As explained by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a “record on direct appeal is generally inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance, and the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.” Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2020The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 4 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2018The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 , 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 18 When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 102 ; Caballero, 695 S.W.3d at 486.

2024Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 92 ; see Loeffler, 211 S.W.3d at 348 . 3.

2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St

2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St

2019See Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate ‘unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’”) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ); Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863 , 1 See, e.g., Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We cannot say attempting to discredit one or both of the St