13 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2019(People v. Quesada (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 525, 535-536 .) That is, unless counsel gave patently inaccurate advice (misadvice), the failure to discuss immigration consequences did not support an IAC claim because counsel’s performance did not fall below an objectively reasonable standard. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 691-692.) 2. 2003We conclude that if, on an appropriately expanded factual record on habeas corpus, Miller and Maple are shown to have acted within an objectively reasonable standard of representation ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) in refraining from presenting any argument to the jury consistent with what they reasonably believed were their client's wishes, it would be anomalous, in the face of such an informed finding, to fault the trial court for ultimately deferring to counsel's judgment and determining not to substitute new counsel in the eleventh hour of thi | 1 | 2 |
Marron v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant 2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leigh Raymond Tamuragreen2 sentences2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant 2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Garrisongreen1 sentence2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant | 1 | 1 |
People v. Larsengreen1 sentence2014(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 829 [instructional error is generally subject to “‘the Chapman[v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ] “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for assessing prejudice’”].) And, finally, an error that is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt precludes a finding of prejudice assuming Payne’s attorney performed below an objectively reasonable standard. | 1 | 1 |
Ballis v. Mobil Oil Corp.green1 sentence1997(Ibid, [in Keener , for example, the franchisor set a minimum acceptable price for the station of $547,000; a third party’s purchase offer of $1.2 million was implicitly deemed bona fide because the third party, a distributor, was able to buy cheaper gasoline that enabled it to bid a higher amount and still turn a profit at the high volume station]; see also Ballis, supra, 622 F.Supp. at p. 476 [under the PMPA, requiring a franchisor to eschew an actual higher offer from a third party in order to fulfill an offer from a franchisee is unrealistic].) Thus, the strategic value of Forty-Niner and | 1 | 1 |
Bill Sandlin v. Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc.green1 sentence1997(Ellis, supra, 969 F.2d at p. 787 ; Arnold, supra, 872 F.Supp. at p. 1500 ; Sandlin v. Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc. (10th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1479, 1481 (Sandlin).) The objective approach of Ellis is the most workable one for the term “bona fide offer” in section 20999.25(a). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 586974green2 sentences1997(Arnold, supra, 872 F.Supp. at p. 1500 ; Ellis, supra, 969 F.2d at p. 787 .) *1282 In instructing the jury in this case on whether the offers tendered by Unocal approached fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis, the trial court should instruct using the following four principles: (1) Fair market value, by definition, is the highest price a willing buyer would pay. 1997(Arnold, supra, 872 F.Supp. at p. 1500 ; Ellis, supra, 969 F.2d at p. 787 .) *1282 In instructing the jury in this case on whether the offers tendered by Unocal approached fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis, the trial court should instruct using the following four principles: (1) Fair market value, by definition, is the highest price a willing buyer would pay. | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Amoco Oil Co.green2 sentences1997(See Arnold v. Amoco Oil Co. (W.D.Va. 1995) 872 F.Supp. 1493, 1500 (Arnold); Ellis, supra, 969 F.2d at p. 787.) This objective fair market standard protects the franchisor’s legitimate property rights in selling its property. 1997(Arnold, supra, 872 F.Supp. at p. 1500 ; Ellis, supra, 969 F.2d at p. 787 .) *1282 In instructing the jury in this case on whether the offers tendered by Unocal approached fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis, the trial court should instruct using the following four principles: (1) Fair market value, by definition, is the highest price a willing buyer would pay. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mendozagreen1 sentence1988(United States v. Leon, supra, at pp. 915-921 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 693-697]; compare State v. Mendoza (1987) 71 Utah.Adv.Rep. 24 [ 748 P.2d 181, 185-186 ].) Here, the officer was acting on his own and his actions should be examined under the objectively reasonable standard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wadegreen2 sentences1982Aside from the fact we do not believe the evidence supported giving the involuntary manslaughter instruction, the theory Ibarra presents was by no means a principle of law commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before the court.’” (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 , quoting from People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 334 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) Not until November 1979, did the so-called unreasonable belief rule become a general principle having the effect of eliminating the malice element necessary to find any degree of a murder and thus leav 1982Aside from the fact we do not believe the evidence supported giving the involuntary manslaughter instruction, the theory Ibarra presents was by no means a principle of law commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before the court.’” (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 , quoting from People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 334 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) Not until November 1979, did the so-called unreasonable belief rule become a general principle having the effect of eliminating the malice element necessary to find any degree of a murder and thus leav | 1 | 1 |
People v. Flannelred2 sentences1982Aside from the fact we do not believe the evidence supported giving the involuntary manslaughter instruction, the theory Ibarra presents was by no means a principle of law commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before the court.’” (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 , quoting from People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 334 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) Not until November 1979, did the so-called unreasonable belief rule become a general principle having the effect of eliminating the malice element necessary to find any degree of a murder and thus leav 1982Aside from the fact we do not believe the evidence supported giving the involuntary manslaughter instruction, the theory Ibarra presents was by no means a principle of law commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before the court.’” (People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 , quoting from People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 334 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 348 P.2d 116 ].) Not until November 1979, did the so-called unreasonable belief rule become a general principle having the effect of eliminating the malice element necessary to find any degree of a murder and thus leav | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Humphrey
green
2 sentences2022(Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087 .) The reasonable person standard takes into account what would appear necessary to a reasonable person in defendant’s position, considering all the facts and circumstances known to defendant. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) This includes facts and circumstances that create a heightened sensitivity and increased ability to accurately predict impending violence, such as intimate partner battering (id. at pp. 1083- 1086 [defendant’s intimate knowledge of, and experiences with, the batterer may make them better able to predict whether force 2022(Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087 .) The reasonable person standard takes into account what would appear necessary to a reasonable person in defendant’s position, considering all the facts and circumstances known to defendant. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) This includes facts and circumstances that create a heightened sensitivity and increased ability to accurately predict impending violence, such as intimate partner battering (id. at pp. 1083- 1086 [defendant’s intimate knowledge of, and experiences with, the batterer may make them better able to predict whether force | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Sotelo-Urena
green
2 sentences2022(Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087 .) The reasonable person standard takes into account what would appear necessary to a reasonable person in defendant’s position, considering all the facts and circumstances known to defendant. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) This includes facts and circumstances that create a heightened sensitivity and increased ability to accurately predict impending violence, such as intimate partner battering (id. at pp. 1083- 1086 [defendant’s intimate knowledge of, and experiences with, the batterer may make them better able to predict whether force 2022(Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087 .) The reasonable person standard takes into account what would appear necessary to a reasonable person in defendant’s position, considering all the facts and circumstances known to defendant. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) This includes facts and circumstances that create a heightened sensitivity and increased ability to accurately predict impending violence, such as intimate partner battering (id. at pp. 1083- 1086 [defendant’s intimate knowledge of, and experiences with, the batterer may make them better able to predict whether force | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2025Defendant’s reference to speculative new evidence does not fulfill his obligation to show prejudice. “[T]o be entitled to reversal of a judgment on grounds that counsel did not provide constitutionally adequate assistance, the petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.’” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 .) Defendant has failed to show Ojo’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, and he has failed to show prejudice. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bucur v. Ahmad
green
1 sentence2024(See Bucur, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 189-191.) When an attorney files a lawsuit grounded in allegations that were factually or legally dispelled or disposed of in prior litigation related proceedings in which they were involved, a reasonable conclusion to draw is that the attorney has buried their head in the sand and failed to make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for the allegations. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Nguyen
green
1 sentence2024However, the objectively reasonable standard “ ‘ “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” ’ ” ( Nguyen, supra, 12 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586–587) and any “ ‘mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87, fn. 11 .) Acevedo’s decision to heed Cellebrite’s advice to set time filters in accordance with the search warrant’s temporal parameters but also select an option that includes items with no date-and-time-specific metadata is neither sensible nor compliant | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Quesada
red
1 sentence2019(People v. Quesada (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 525, 535-536 .) That is, unless counsel gave patently inaccurate advice (misadvice), the failure to discuss immigration consequences did not support an IAC claim because counsel’s performance did not fall below an objectively reasonable standard. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 691-692.) 2. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jae Lee v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Prong Two: Prejudice The United States Supreme Court recently examined the second prong of the Strickland analysis, prejudice, in the context of an immigration case in Lee v. United States (2017) --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1958 , 198 L.Ed.2d 476 ( Lee ). 2018Prong Two: Prejudice The United States Supreme Court recently examined the second prong of the Strickland analysis, prejudice, in the context of an immigration case in Lee v. United States (2017) --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1958 , 198 L.Ed.2d 476 ( Lee ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2018Because appellant’s trial counsel had no duty in this pre- Padilla case to research and advise appellant of the potential immigration consequences of his plea, appellant has failed to carry his burden of establishing the first prong of the Strickland test, that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard.5 5 The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885 does not alter this result. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2014(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 829 [instructional error is generally subject to “‘the Chapman[v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ] “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for assessing prejudice’”].) And, finally, an error that is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt precludes a finding of prejudice assuming Payne’s attorney performed below an objectively reasonable standard. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Stanley
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 954 , [reversal on ineffective assistance grounds proper only where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been more favorable to the defendant. [Citation.]”.) Thus, Payne’s claim of instructional error is meritless. c. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Lang
green
2 sentences2003If, on a fully developed factual record on habeas corpus, counsel's decision to refrain from making a penalty phase argument is shown to have fallen within that standard, then defendant may be estopped at the threshold from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1030-1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ), and as a consequence of his refusal to cooperate and reasonably communicate with counsel and their defense investigator, defendant would bear the ultimate responsibility for the irregularity of his penalty phase proceedings below. 2003If, on a fully developed factual record on habeas corpus, counsel's decision to refrain from making a penalty phase argument is shown to have fallen within that standard, then defendant may be estopped at the threshold from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1030-1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ), and as a consequence of his refusal to cooperate and reasonably communicate with counsel and their defense investigator, defendant would bear the ultimate responsibility for the irregularity of his penalty phase proceedings below. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Mendoza Tello
green
2 sentences2003The problem with this reasoning is that our precedents normally do not permit us to conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard of representation on a cold record on appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Telia, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264 , 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437 , 933 P.2d 1134 .) The circumstances related in Miller's, Maple's, and investigator Sickler's confidential declarations serve as a good example of the reason for the rule. 2003The problem with this reasoning is that our precedents normally do not permit us to conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard of representation on a cold record on appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Telia, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264 , 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437 , 933 P.2d 1134 .) The circumstances related in Miller's, Maple's, and investigator Sickler's confidential declarations serve as a good example of the reason for the rule. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Keener v. Exxon Company
green
1 sentence1997(Ibid.) This doesn’t make that third party’s offer for the particular site any less bona fide, so long as that offer is an actual one that approaches fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis; and (4) “An actual price, agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of the value the market places on a good.” *1283 (Keener, supra, 32 F.3d at p. 132 .) That price is a measure of what the station is worth to a purchaser in National’s position. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Slatky, John v. Amoco Oil Company, Service Station Dealers of America, Inc., Amicus Curiae
green
2 sentences1997(Slatky, supra, 830 F.2d at p. 485 ; LCA Corp., supra, 916 F.2d at p. 437 .) The prevalent federal view, and the one employed by the Ninth Circuit, focuses on whether the offer approaches fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis. 1997We conclude that an offer is bona fide under section 20999.25(a) if it approaches fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis (assuming that all of the conditions of sale are reasonable—see Slatky, supra, 830 F.2d at p. 485 , fia. 7). 11 d., e. * 2.-10. * Disposition That part of the judgment granting a nonsuit to National and Clipper on the plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy count is reversed. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lca Corporation, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Shell Oil Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant
green
1 sentence1997(Slatky, supra, 830 F.2d at p. 485 ; LCA Corp., supra, 916 F.2d at p. 437 .) The prevalent federal view, and the one employed by the Ninth Circuit, focuses on whether the offer approaches fair market value under an objectively reasonable analysis. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.