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6 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brewer v. Melegreen2 sentences2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant 2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant | 2 | 2 |
Roe v. Flores-Ortegagreen1 sentence2025“In making this determination, courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Woodson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2005See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search of shack on another’s property); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex.App.2003) (holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1997) (finding that trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from which he had been barred). 2005See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search of shack on another’s property); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex.App.2003) (holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1997) (finding that trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from which he had been barred). | 1 | 1 |
Zimmerman v. Bishop Estategreen1 sentence2005See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search of shack on another’s property); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex.App.2003) (holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1997) (finding that trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from which he had been barred). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa 2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sumlingreen2 sentences2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa 2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cruzgreen2 sentences2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa 2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Zimmerman v. Bishop, 25 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that Fourth Amendment rights of guest of squatter were not violated by search of shack on another’s property); Davis v. State, 119 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex.App.2003) (holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 621, 491 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1997) (finding that trespasser lacked standing to claim protection of the Fourth Amendment in premises from which he had been barred). | 1 | 1 |
Pedro Amezquita v. Rafael Hernandez Colongreen1 sentence2005See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that squatters on public land could not avail themselves of Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Gilmore, 324 Mont. 488 , 104 P.3d 1051, 1055 (2004) (holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave); State v. Cruz, 15 Kan.App.2d 476 , 809 P.2d 1233, 1240 (1991) (finding that Fourth Amendment was not applicable to trespasser in house); People v. Sumlin, 105 Misc.2d 134 , 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (determining that guest of squa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adler v. Robert Portner Brewing Co.
neutral
2 sentences2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant 2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul
green
2 sentences2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant 2024First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Ferris v. State
green
1 sentence2026Moreover, the conduct the officers observed in this case was unquestionably not “out of the ordinary” and, to the contrary, was “too common place to be probative in tending to show criminal activity.” Ferris, 355 Md. at 386 -87 (Quoting Karnes, 62 F.3d 493 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2025In other words, where the evidence permits a finding that an attorney making reasonable choices in a similar situation would have consulted with a defendant about filing a motion for modification of sentence and counsel failed to do so and did not file a motion, a defendant has demonstrated deficient performance under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Robert Driscoll v. Paul Delo, Robert Driscoll v. Paul Delo
green
2 sentences2014Id. 2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.