firearm specification violation in Ohio

2015The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). {¶ 33} Appellant was convicted of felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which states: 15.

2007The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weights heavily against conviction.'" Id., quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 . {¶ 13} Appellant was convicted of felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11 (A)(2) and 2941.145 .

2009State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 , 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶20} Here, Sanders was indicted with the following four counts: count one, aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; count two, aggravated burglary with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a felony of the first degree; count three, abduction with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; and count four, having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony o

2009State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 , 227 N.E.2d 212 . {¶20} Here, Sanders was indicted with the following four counts: count one, aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; count two, aggravated burglary with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a felony of the first degree; count three, abduction with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; and count four, having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony o

2016Trumbull No. 2014-T-0004, 2015-Ohio-715 , ¶39, citing State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 447 (1997), citing Jenks, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶31} In this case, appellant is challenging his conviction for aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and 2941.145. {¶32} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), aggravated robbery, states in part: “No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense * * * or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control and e

2006State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as recognized in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . {¶ 17} As noted above, Gibson was charged with and convicted of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.11 (A)(2), a felony of the first degree; aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.01 (A)(1), a felony of the first degree; and, felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11 (A)(2), a felony of the secon

2015The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). {¶ 33} Appellant was convicted of felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which states: 15.

2015The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). {¶ 33} Appellant was convicted of felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which states: 15.

2020In State v. Carson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104998, 2017-Ohio-7243 , the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.141, which imposes an additional one- year prison term when “the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing the offense.” The defendant asserted there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because even though a firearm was discovered in the car he was driving when he was arrested, the gun was not found on his person and w

2019Oil Co., 135 Ohio App.3d 242 , 248, 733 N.E.2d 645 (6th Dist.1999) ("Judgments are to be construed like other written instruments by giving the language of the instrument its ordinary meaning"). {¶ 8} Irrespective of the presence of the phrase "before any other time is served" in the firearm-specification clause, the way in which the trial court crafted the sentence-by reducing the maximum term in the first count to arrive at a total of ten years on Count 1 and then requiring all other sentences to run concurrently-strongly suggests that the court intended for Collins to receive a 10-year aggr

2019Oil Co., 135 Ohio App.3d 242 , 248, 733 N.E.2d 645 (6th Dist.1999) ("Judgments are to be construed like other written instruments by giving the language of the instrument its ordinary meaning"). {¶ 8} Irrespective of the presence of the phrase "before any other time is served" in the firearm-specification clause, the way in which the trial court crafted the sentence-by reducing the maximum term in the first count to arrive at a total of ten years on Count 1 and then requiring all other sentences to run concurrently-strongly suggests that the court intended for Collins to receive a 10-year aggr

2013As stated in the indictment, the firearm specification stated that appellant “had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that he possessed the firearm or used it to facilitate the offense.” {¶32} In support of his position, appellant relies on State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213 , 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).

2013As stated in the indictment, the firearm specification stated that appellant “had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that he possessed the firearm or used it to facilitate the offense.” {¶32} In support of his position, appellant relies on State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213 , 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).

2011BY: LEWIS GUARNIERI Suite 808 110 Central Plaza S., Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702 Canton, OH 44702 [Cite as State v. Backie, 2011-Ohio-5801 .] Gwin, P.J. {¶ 1} Defendant–appellant Travonce Backie appeals from his convictions and sentences in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on one count of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and R.C. 2941.145.

2011Canton, Ohio 44702 Cambridge, Ohio 43725 [Cite as State v. McClain, 2011-Ohio-1623 .] Delaney, J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Douglas McClain appeals the judgment of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of one count of murder, an unclassified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145. {¶2} In August, 2008, Appellant met Candace O’Neill.

2009If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Cóbrales at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 , 526 N.E.2d 816 . {¶ 16} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.10(A)(1) and robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). {¶ 17} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) provides: {¶ 18} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in [R.C. 2913.01], or in fleeing im

2009If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Cóbrales at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 , 526 N.E.2d 816 . {¶ 16} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.10(A)(1) and robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). {¶ 17} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) provides: {¶ 18} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in [R.C. 2913.01], or in fleeing im

2009If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Cóbrales at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 , 526 N.E.2d 816 . {¶ 16} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.10(A)(1) and robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). {¶ 17} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) provides: {¶ 18} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in [R.C. 2913.01], or in fleeing im

2009If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Cóbrales at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 , 526 N.E.2d 816 . {¶ 16} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.10(A)(1) and robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). {¶ 17} R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) provides: {¶ 18} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in [R.C. 2913.01], or in fleeing im

2008State v. Murphy (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 206 , 551 N.E.2d 932 .

2008State v. Murphy (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 206 , 551 N.E.2d 932 .

2007He was sentenced to thirteen years in prison in a sentencing hearing held June 6, 2005. {¶ 4} On May 8, 2006, the trial court held a re-sentencing hearing in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Foster (2006), 109 Ohio St.3d 1 .

2006State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as recognized in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . {¶ 17} As noted above, Gibson was charged with and convicted of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.11 (A)(2), a felony of the first degree; aggravated robbery with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2911.01 (A)(1), a felony of the first degree; and, felonious assault with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11 (A)(2), a felony of the secon

2006However, to "reverse a judgment of a trial court on the weight of the evidence, when the judgment results from a trial by jury, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel reviewing the case is required." Id., paragraph four of the syllabus; State v. Miller (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 at ¶ 38 , 775 N.E.2d 498 . {¶ 81} In the case at bar, appellant was convicted of the offense of murder, with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.02 (A), which states: "No person shall purposely cause the death of another * * *." {¶ 82} Appellant was also

2006State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160 , 168 , 555 N.E.2d 293 , 302 .

2006State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160 , 168 , 555 N.E.2d 293 , 302 .

2006However, to "reverse a judgment of a trial court on the weight of the evidence, when the judgment results from a trial by jury, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel reviewing the case is required." Id., paragraph four of the syllabus; State v. Miller (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 384 , 2002-Ohio-4931 at ¶ 38 , 775 N.E.2d 498 . {¶ 81} In the case at bar, appellant was convicted of the offense of murder, with a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2903.02 (A), which states: "No person shall purposely cause the death of another * * *." {¶ 82} Appellant was also

2002State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 , 728 N.E.2d 1059 ; R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b). {¶ 32} Jeremiah was charged with and entered an admission to aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01 and a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145 and R.C. 2151.355. {¶ 33} R.C. 2151.26 governed the relinquishment of jurisdiction by the juvenile court when the court adjudicated Jeremiah delinquent and committed him to the Department of Youth Services. 1 It read: {¶ 34} “(B) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing an act that would be a

2002State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 , 728 N.E.2d 1059 ; R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b). {¶ 32} Jeremiah was charged with and entered an admission to aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01 and a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145 and R.C. 2151.355. {¶ 33} R.C. 2151.26 governed the relinquishment of jurisdiction by the juvenile court when the court adjudicated Jeremiah delinquent and committed him to the Department of Youth Services. 1 It read: {¶ 34} “(B) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing an act that would be a

2002Appointed counsel, Stephen Long, has submitted a request to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738 .