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18 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallasgreen2 sentences2025“Therefore, it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances” governmental immunity “exists in the first instance.” Id. 2020“Therefore, it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.” Reata Constr., 197 S.W.3d at 375 . | 7 | 14 |
Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Bros., Inc.green2 sentences2018See Engelman, 514 S.W.3d at 753 (“[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine.”); Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting “the doctrine’s judicial origins”); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“[I]t remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”). 2018See Engelman , 514 S.W.3d at 753 ("[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine."); Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc. v. Olivares , 461 S.W.3d 117 , 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting "the doctrine's judicial origins"); Reata , 197 S.W.3d at 375 ("[I]t remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance."). | 2 | 2 |
Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, Texasgreen2 sentences2018The judiciary "has historically been, and is now, entrusted with 'defin[ing] the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and ... determin[ing] under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.' " Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427 , 432 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W.3d 371 , 375 (Tex. 2006) ). 2018That being so, the judiciary "has historically been, and is now, entrusted with 'defin[ing] the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and ... determin[ing] under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.' " Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427 , 432 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W.3d 371 , 375 (Tex. 2006) ). | 1 | 4 |
Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivaresgreen2 sentences2018See Engelman, 514 S.W.3d at 753 (“[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine.”); Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting “the doctrine’s judicial origins”); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“[I]t remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”). 2018See Engelman , 514 S.W.3d at 753 ("[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine."); Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc. v. Olivares , 461 S.W.3d 117 , 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting "the doctrine's judicial origins"); Reata , 197 S.W.3d at 375 ("[I]t remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance."). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lueckgreen1 sentence2026State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Energy Service Co. of Bowie, Inc. v. Superior Snubbing Services, Inc.green1 sentence2020Co. of Bowie v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. 2007))). 20 Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. | 1 | 1 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen1 sentence2020Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine, “initially developed without any legislative or constitutional enactment.”17 It therefore “remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”18 15 Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006) (“In Texas, governmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars suit against the entity altogether.” ( | 1 | 1 |
Geoffrey Dugger v. Mary Ann Arredondo, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Joel Martinezgreen1 sentence2020Namely, as the arbiter of the common law, the judiciary has historically been, and is now, entrusted with ‘defin[ing] the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and . . . determin[ing] under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 )). 6 Though the courts determine governmental immunity’s boundaries, the legislature informs that determination.19 Thus, “where the governing statutory authority demonstrates legislative intent to grant an entity the ‘nature, purposes, and powers’ of an ‘arm of the State governm | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Millergreen1 sentence2016Namely, as the arbiter of the common law, the judiciary has historically been, and is now, entrusted with “definfing] the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and ... determining] under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.” See Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 ; see also Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154 n.1 (Tex.2016); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 592 (Tex.2001) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“The common-law rule of immunity in Texas was the judiciary’s to recognize, and it is ours to disregard.”). | 1 | 1 |
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., Bnsf Railway Co., and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Houston, Texas and Daniel Krueger, in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineeringgreen1 sentence2016Namely, as the arbiter of the common law, the judiciary has historically been, and is now, entrusted with “definfing] the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and ... determining] under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.” See Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 ; see also Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154 n.1 (Tex.2016); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 592 (Tex.2001) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“The common-law rule of immunity in Texas was the judiciary’s to recognize, and it is ours to disregard.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2018But courts have deferred to the Legislature regarding waiver of immunity because "the Legislature is better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues associated with waiving immunity." Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692 , 695-96 (Tex. 2003). 2018On the other hand, courts have consistently deferred to the Legislature to decide if and when immunity should be waived because "the Legislature is better suited to balance the conflicting policy issues *79 associated with waiving immunity." Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692 , 695-96 (Tex. 2003). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006) (“Sovereign immunity encompasses immunity from suit, which bars a suit unless the state has consented, and immunity from liability, which protects the state from judgments even if it has consented to the suit.”). 16 See LTTS Charter Sch., Inc. v. C2 Constr., Inc., 342 S.W.3d 73 , 78 n.44 (Tex. 2011) (leaving “undecided” whether an open enrollment charter school was immune from suit); see also Neighborhood Ctrs. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.