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18 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rothermel v. Duncangreen2 sentences2018“In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors’ minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence.” Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no pet.) (citing Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex. 1990)); see Rothermel 2015Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974); Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963).” Appellant’s Brief 06-15-00030-CV Page 21 While there may not be enough evidence to prove undue influence, there is certainly evidence that Appellant York was under stress at the time that the deed was executed and that her daughter Gwendolyn Boatman was applying pressure for Appellant to get the property out of her name in order to protect it from the government to satisfy nursing home costs. | 3 | 3 |
Dulak v. Dulakgreen2 sentences2018“In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors’ minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence.” Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no pet.) (citing Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex. 1990)); see Rothermel 2015Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974); Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963).” Appellant’s Brief 06-15-00030-CV Page 21 While there may not be enough evidence to prove undue influence, there is certainly evidence that Appellant York was under stress at the time that the deed was executed and that her daughter Gwendolyn Boatman was applying pressure for Appellant to get the property out of her name in order to protect it from the government to satisfy nursing home costs. | 3 | 3 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2015See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 . 2015See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04. | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.green2 sentences2021To determine whether a law is unconstitutionally retroactive, a court considers three factors: “(1) ‘the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature’s factual findings;’ (2) ‘the nature of the prior right impaired by the statute;’ and (3) ‘the extent of the impairment.’” Id. at 188 (quoting Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010)). 2021To resolve that issue, a court considers three factors in light of the prohibition’s objectives of protecting reasonable, settled expectations and of preventing legislative abuses: (1) “the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature’s factual findings;” (2) “the nature of the prior right impaired by the statute;” and (3) “the extent of the impairment.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
Molnari v. Palmergreen2 sentences2018“In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors’ minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence.” Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no pet.) (citing Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex. 1990)); see Rothermel 2015In the case of Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994) the Court stated, “In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors' minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence. | 1 | 2 |
State of Texas v. Mazuca, Alvarogreen1 sentence2024See State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294 , 303–04 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Mosley v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Stauffer v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2018“In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors’ minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence.” Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no pet.) (citing Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex. 1990)); see Rothermel | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Gardner v. State, 745 S.W.2d 955, 958-59 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis
green
2 sentences2004Id. 2004Id. | 3 | 2004–2004 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzik
green
1 sentence2026To resolve the issue, a court considers three factors in light of the prohibition’s objective of protecting reasonable, settled expectations and of preventing legislative abuses: (1) “the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature’s factual findings;” 20 (2) “the nature of the prior right impaired by the statute;” and (3) “the extent of the impairment.” Id. (citing Robinson, 355 S.W.3d at 145 ).18 For the first factor, the proposition that Cross Roads’s regulation of STRs serves no public interest as evidenced by the legislature’s factual f | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Archie v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 700 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell
green
1 sentence2006Campbell , 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore , 517 U.S. at 575 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
green
1 sentence2006Campbell , 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore , 517 U.S. at 575 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Freeman v. City of Pasadena
green
1 sentence1995Freeman, 744 S.W.2d at 924 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Collora v. Navarro
green
1 sentence1994Collora v. Navarro, supra. In deciding whether there was undue influence in executing a deed, the court considers three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantors’ minds when they executed the deed; and (3) whether the grantors would not have executed the deed but for the influence. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.