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18 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1874–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence1985The appellant relies on Davis v. State, 684 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. filed), which stated: Only in Tex.Code Crim.P. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp.1984) do we find mention of an affirmative finding as to the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense or during immediate flight therefrom. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence1982“Any error in admission of evidence is waived if the same evidence is admitted elsewhere in trial without objection.” Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685, 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Kirvin v. State, 575 S.W.2d 301, 302-303 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Koah v. Stategreen1 sentence1982It is asserted that the statutory language on which the indictment is based is “unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in that it does not sufficiently define the terms ‘presents or uses’,” thereby making it impossible for one to determine whether what is denounced is presenting and using a revoked or cancelled credit card “for the purpose of payment or for the purpose of identification in connection with the issuance of a sight draft or check or for any other purpose.” 8 For its part, the State correctly points out that a statute will not be found vague and indefinite merely because the words | 1 | 1 |
Kirvin v. Stategreen1 sentence1982“Any error in admission of evidence is waived if the same evidence is admitted elsewhere in trial without objection.” Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685, 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Kirvin v. State, 575 S.W.2d 301, 302-303 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Zillender v. Stategreen2 sentences1981See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). [4] They were then and there in the throes of examining the veniremember for purposes of Witherspoon when matters reached the point that prompted the prosecution to "make a motion" —a motion whose grounds and desired relief were not stated but whose thrust was patently directed toward excusal of Grace as a prospective juror on account of her scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty. 1981See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 4 They were then and there in the throes of examining the veniremember for purposes of Witherspoon when matters reached the point that prompted the prosecution to “make a motion” — a motion whose grounds and desired relief were not stated but whose thrust was patently directed toward excusal of Grace as a prospective juror on account of her scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty. | 1 | 1 |
Webster v. Stategreen1 sentence1972See and compare Webster v. State, 455 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 1920); Crye v. State, 391 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Sikes v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 257 , 312 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1958) and 1 Branch’s Ann.P. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles Freemangreen1 sentence1970He cites United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622, 624 (2nd Cir. 1966), which criticizes the rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2011Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835 , 837–38 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 1986, pet. granted), rev’d on other grounds, 736 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. 2011Williams v. State , 712 S.W.2d 835 , 837–38 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 1986, pet. granted), rev’d on other grounds , 736 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2011Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835 , 837–38 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 1986, pet. granted), rev’d on other grounds, 736 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. 2011Williams v. State , 712 S.W.2d 835 , 837–38 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 1986, pet. granted), rev’d on other grounds , 736 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Henry v. State
green
2 sentences1994Henry, 433 S.W.2d at 432-33 . 1994Henry, 433 S.W.2d at 432-33 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex Parte Reagan
green
1 sentence1982Huff v. State, 576 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Killion v. State, 503 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hardon v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Craven v. State
red
2 sentences1982In these circumstances we are impelled by Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) to overrule the first four grounds of error, for “the record before us will not shed any light on the ultimate issue of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant, though there be error in denying the motion to quash,” id., at 490 ; Article 21.19, V.A.C.C.P. 7 The fifth ground of error, however, challenges the indictment on a matter of substance, and that must be addressed. 1982In these circumstances we are impelled by Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) to overrule the first four grounds of error, for “the record before us will not shed any light on the ultimate issue of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant, though there be error in denying the motion to quash,” id., at 490 ; Article 21.19, V.A.C.C.P. 7 The fifth ground of error, however, challenges the indictment on a matter of substance, and that must be addressed. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Huff v. State
green
1 sentence1982Huff v. State, 576 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Killion v. State, 503 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hardon v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Harden v. State
green
1 sentence1982Huff v. State, 576 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Killion v. State, 503 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hardon v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Killion v. State
green
1 sentence1982Huff v. State, 576 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex parte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Killion v. State, 503 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hardon v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gauthier v. State
green
2 sentences1978The appellant's requested instruction No. 2 states: "If you find from the evidence, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that booth No. 18 in Mr. Peeper's Book Store at 213 E. 6th Street, as shown by the evidence, was not a `Public Place' as that term has been defined herein, then you shall acquit the Defendant and say by your verdict `Not Guilty.'" It is well settled that when any defensive theory is raised by the evidence, the trial judge must charge the jury on that defensive theory, regardless of "whether the evidence is produced by the State or by the defense, whether it is strong o 1978The appellant’s requested instruction No. 2 states: “If you find from the evidence, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that booth No. 18 in Mr. Peeper’s Book Store at 213 E. 6th Street, as shown by the evidence, was not a ‘Public Place’ as that term has been defined herein, then you shall acquit the Defendant and say by your verdict ‘Not Guilty.’ ” It is well settled that when any defensive theory is raised by the evidence, the trial judge must charge the jury on that defensive theory, regardless of “whether the evidence is produced by the State or by the defense, whether it is strong | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Nilsson v. State
green
1 sentence1975The fifth ground of error is as follows : “The Appellant was denied due process of law, a fair and impartial trial and effective assistance of counsel, by virtue of the requirements of Article 46.02, Section 1 et seq., V.A.C.C.P., and Article 34 of the Texas Penal Code, which procedure requires the issue of insanity to be tried contemporaneously with the issue of guilt or innocence.” If appellant is contending he is entitled to a hearing on the defensive issue of sanity at the time of the offense, separate from the trial on guilt or innocence, such contention was decided adversely to him in Ni | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Buster v. State
green
1 sentence1973Buster v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 887 ; Nash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 467 S.W.2d 414 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Nash v. State
green
1 sentence1973Buster v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 887 ; Nash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 467 S.W.2d 414 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Moon v. State
green
1 sentence1972Moon v. State, 465 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Goad v. State, 464 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Sikes v. State
green
2 sentences1972See and compare Webster v. State, 455 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 1920); Crye v. State, 391 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Sikes v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 257 , 312 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1958) and 1 Branch’s Ann.P. 1972See and compare Webster v. State, 455 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 1920); Crye v. State, 391 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Sikes v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 257 , 312 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1958) and 1 Branch’s Ann.P. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Crye v. State
green
1 sentence1972See and compare Webster v. State, 455 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 1920); Crye v. State, 391 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Sikes v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 257 , 312 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1958) and 1 Branch’s Ann.P. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Goad v. State
green
1 sentence1972Moon v. State, 465 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Goad v. State, 464 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Reyna v. State
green
1 sentence1971The contention raised in the fifth ground of error that Article 725b, V.A.P.C., is unconstitutional because it classifies marihuana as a narcotic drug is overruled as it has been in Reyna v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 434 S.W.2d 362 , and other cases. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Moore v. State
green
2 sentences1971Appellant recognizes that only in capital cases where the State has made it known it will seek the death penalty does a defendant have the right to a separate examination of each juror under Article 35.17-1, V.A.C.C.P., and Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 424 S.W.2d 443 . 1971Appellant recognizes that only in capital cases where the State has made it known it will seek the death penalty does a defendant have the right to a separate examination of each juror under Article 35.17-1, V.A.C.C.P., and Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 424 S.W.2d 443 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences1969The fifth ground of error is as follows: “The Trial Court committed fundamental error in requiring the appellant’s co-defendant, Zane Leonard Evans, to appear in a lineup by himself with State’s Exhibit No. One and Two (the hat and coat) on his person, and then having the *358 State’s main witness identify him as the robber and testify to such facts.” Appellant cites United States v. Wade, supra, and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , which hold that one under indictment is entitled to his counsel at a lineup, as authority for his contention that Burton’s consti 1969The fifth ground of error is as follows: “The Trial Court committed fundamental error in requiring the appellant’s co-defendant, Zane Leonard Evans, to appear in a lineup by himself with State’s Exhibit No. One and Two (the hat and coat) on his person, and then having the *358 State’s main witness identify him as the robber and testify to such facts.” Appellant cites United States v. Wade, supra, and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , which hold that one under indictment is entitled to his counsel at a lineup, as authority for his contention that Burton’s consti | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Parker County v. Sewell
green
1 sentence1874(Parker County v. Sewell, 24 Texas, 238 .) The fifth ground of error is, that the court erred in rendering judgment by default upon a petition upon which service was accepted, and which was not filed the first day of the term. | 1 | 1874–1874 |