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18 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.green2 sentences2025See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 169 . 2015In PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 168-69 (Tex. 2007) (internal citations omitted), the Texas Supreme Court explained that courts can evaluate general jurisdiction by “construct[ing] a hypothetical claim without any forum connection ‘to insure that any related forum activities of the defendant are not improperly infiltrating the dispute-blind inquiry.’”3 In this case, for example, the Court might consider whether it would exercise jurisdiction over each of the Vitol Defendants if each of them were defending a case in Texas brought by a New York resident regarding a 3 | 7 | 7 |
State Ex Rel. Lykos v. Finegreen1 sentence2022Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 912 (“Nor is it sufficient to show that a statute may operate 8 unconstitutionally against the challenger . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Estate of McDaniel, Matter Ofgreen1 sentence2021CODE § 22.018(1). 22 ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2019) (mem. op.). 23 803 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). 24 935 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied). 8 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to determine whether the beneficiary would receive greater benefits than those he had accepted either under an alternative will or intestate laws. 25 As the dissent observed, however, even the pursuit of pre-suit discovery was inconsistent with the beneficiary’s acceptance of benefits under the will because he treated the will as “both valid (by accepting its bene | 1 | 1 |
Holcomb v. Holcombgreen1 sentence2021CODE § 22.018(1). 22 ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas, 2019) (mem. op.). 23 803 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). 24 935 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied). 8 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to determine whether the beneficiary would receive greater benefits than those he had accepted either under an alternative will or intestate laws. 25 As the dissent observed, however, even the pursuit of pre-suit discovery was inconsistent with the beneficiary’s acceptance of benefits under the will because he treated the will as “both valid (by accepting its bene | 1 | 1 |
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.green1 sentence2020See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 169 . 2 As an example of an “exceptional case,” the U.S. Supreme Court has twice pointed to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), a case in which a Filipino corporation temporarily moved its operations to Ohio during World War II. | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Curry v. State, 222 S.W.3d 745, 753 (Tex.App.--Waco 2007, pet. ref’d)(noting that courts presume that juries follow the general unanimity instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Clinton v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2009See Pena , 191 S.W.3d at 136 (following U.S. Supreme Court practice A not > to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied = @ (quoting Clinton , 520 U.S. at 690 )); Tex. Dep = t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets , 274 S.W.3d 150 , 155 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( A Facial invalidity cannot be premised on > hypothetical facts that have not yet arisen. = @ (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tex. 1997))); Valero Refining B Tex. L.P. v. State , | 1 | 1 |
Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellengreen1 sentence2009See Pena , 191 S.W.3d at 136 (following U.S. Supreme Court practice A not > to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied = @ (quoting Clinton , 520 U.S. at 690 )); Tex. Dep = t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets , 274 S.W.3d 150 , 155 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( A Facial invalidity cannot be premised on > hypothetical facts that have not yet arisen. = @ (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tex. 1997))); Valero Refining B Tex. L.P. v. State , | 1 | 1 |
Valero Refining-Texas L.P. v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Pena , 191 S.W.3d at 136 (following U.S. Supreme Court practice A not > to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied = @ (quoting Clinton , 520 U.S. at 690 )); Tex. Dep = t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets , 274 S.W.3d 150 , 155 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( A Facial invalidity cannot be premised on > hypothetical facts that have not yet arisen. = @ (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tex. 1997))); Valero Refining B Tex. L.P. v. State , | 1 | 1 |
Pena v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Pena , 191 S.W.3d at 136 (following U.S. Supreme Court practice A not > to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied = @ (quoting Clinton , 520 U.S. at 690 )); Tex. Dep = t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets , 274 S.W.3d 150 , 155 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( A Facial invalidity cannot be premised on > hypothetical facts that have not yet arisen. = @ (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tex. 1997))); Valero Refining B Tex. L.P. v. State , | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mokie Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 802 . 2009Id. at 802 . | 2 | 2009–2015 |
Sturgeon v. Frost
green
1 sentence2020Sturgeon v. Frost, — U.S.—, 139 S. Ct. 1066 , 1087–88 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Bernard W. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Blue v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oliphant Financial, LLC v. Galaviz
green
1 sentence2014Second, we note that in failing to respond to Citibank’s first set of requests for admissions, Hirczy was deemed to have admitted that he received all applicable notices. 7 Galaviz, 299 S.W.3d at 838 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
DEPT. FAMILY, PROT. SERV. v. Dickensheets
green
1 sentence2009See Pena , 191 S.W.3d at 136 (following U.S. Supreme Court practice A not > to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied = @ (quoting Clinton , 520 U.S. at 690 )); Tex. Dep = t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Dickensheets , 274 S.W.3d 150 , 155 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ( A Facial invalidity cannot be premised on > hypothetical facts that have not yet arisen. = @ (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen , 952 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tex. 1997))); Valero Refining B Tex. L.P. v. State , | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2005We join Justice Scalia in expressing our distrust of hypothetical assumptions to measure the proper reach of the Dormant Commerce Clause: “It seems to me that we should adhere to our long tradition of judging state taxes on their own terms, and that there is even less justification for striking them down on the basis of assumptions as to what other States might do than there is for striking them down on the basis of what other States in fact do.” Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 259 , 107 S.Ct. 2810 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 2005We join Justice Scalia in expressing our distrust of hypothetical assumptions to measure the proper reach of the Dormant Commerce Clause: "It seems to me that we should adhere to our long tradition of judging state taxes on their own terms, and that there is even less justification for striking them down on the basis of assumptions as to what other States might do than there is for striking them down on the basis of what other States in fact do." Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 259 , 107 S.Ct. 2810 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Esquivel v. State
green
2 sentences1989In support of the contention that the State's repeated reliance on this hypothetical was error, appellant cites Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1989In support of the contention that the State’s repeated reliance on this hypothetical was error, appellant cites Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.