upheld instruction in Washington

2008Id. (recognizing that a cause of action for wrongful mutilation "applies as well to a case such as the one at bar where the wrong consists of the manner of burial"). ¶ 36 Later, in Gadbury , this court upheld a claim where an undertaker withheld a body from the mother of the deceased as collateral for payment of funeral expenses. 133 Wash. 134 , 233 P. 299 .

2008Id. (recognizing that a cause of action for wrongful mutilation “applies as well to a case such as the one at bar where the wrong consists of the manner of burial”). ¶36 Later, in Gadbury , this court upheld a claim where an undertaker withheld a body from the mother of the deceased as collateral for payment of funeral expenses. 133 Wash. 134 .

2007That case did not involve a challenge to jury instructions, but rather it considered whether the evidence of price paid was admissible and sufficient to prove market value. ¶ 36 And in Clark , the court upheld an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the purpose for which the owner intended the property in computing its value. 13 Wash.App. at 788-89 , 537 P.2d 820 .

2007That case did not involve a challenge to jury instructions, but rather it considered whether the evidence of price paid was admissible and sufficient to prove market value. ¶36 And in Clark , the court upheld an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the purpose for which the owner intended the property in computing its value. 13 Wn.

2003In State v. McNallie, 120 Wn.2d 925, 933 , 846 P.2d 1358 (1993), the court upheld an instruction identical to the one given here.

2003In State v. McNallie, 120 Wn.2d 925, 933 , 846 P.2d 1358 (1993), the court upheld an instruction identical to the one given here.

2002Id. at 455-56 , 601 P.2d 1297 .

2002Id. at 455-56 .

1998The title simply contains a bare *1275 numerical reference to the Interpreters Act, amending it merely by stating, "adding new sections to chapter 2.42 RCW...." As recent as last spring, this court upheld the principle that a "`mere reference to a section in the title of an act does not state a subject.'" Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 654-55 , 952 P.2d 601 (quoting State ex rel.

1998The title simply contains a bare numerical reference to the Interpreters Act, amending it merely by stating, “adding new sections to chapter 2.42 RCW . . . .” As recent as last spring, this court upheld the principle that a “ ‘mere reference to a section in the title of an act does not state a subject.’ ” Fray, 134 Wn.2d at 654 -55 (quoting State ex rel.

1995"Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case." Victor , ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1248 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 597 .

1995"Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case.” Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248 .

2014Id.

2010Id.

2008Id. (recognizing that a cause of action for wrongful mutilation “applies as well to a case such as the one at bar where the wrong consists of the manner of burial”). ¶36 Later, in Gadbury , this court upheld a claim where an undertaker withheld a body from the mother of the deceased as collateral for payment of funeral expenses. 133 Wash. 134 .

2008Id. (recognizing that a cause of action for wrongful mutilation "applies as well to a case such as the one at bar where the wrong consists of the manner of burial"). ¶ 36 Later, in Gadbury , this court upheld a claim where an undertaker withheld a body from the mother of the deceased as collateral for payment of funeral expenses. 133 Wash. 134 , 233 P. 299 .

1998The title simply contains a bare *1275 numerical reference to the Interpreters Act, amending it merely by stating, "adding new sections to chapter 2.42 RCW...." As recent as last spring, this court upheld the principle that a "`mere reference to a section in the title of an act does not state a subject.'" Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 654-55 , 952 P.2d 601 (quoting State ex rel.

1995"Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case." Victor , ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1248 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 597 .

1974In State v. Jamerson, 74 Wn.2d 146 , 443 P.2d 654 (1968), the court upheld an instruction using a hypothetical assumption that the vehicle was stolen, stating that the jury first had to determine whether the vehicle was or was not stolen before it would be necessary for them to consider the instruction which was attacked.

1974In State v. Jamerson, 74 Wn.2d 146 , 443 P.2d 654 (1968), the court upheld an instruction using a hypothetical assumption that the vehicle was stolen, stating that the jury first had to determine whether the vehicle was or was not stolen before it would be necessary for them to consider the instruction which was attacked.

1924Following the California decisions, the supreme court of Nevada held, in State v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 334 , and State v. Jones, 19 Nev. 365 , 11 Pac. 317 , that the giving of an instruction like that here complained of was not erroneous.

1924Following the California decisions, the supreme court of Nevada held, in State v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 334 , and State v. Jones, 19 Nev. 365 , 11 Pac. 317 , that the giving of an instruction like that here complained of was not erroneous.

1924Following the California decisions, the supreme court of Nevada held, in State v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 334 , and State v. Jones, 19 Nev. 365 , 11 Pac. 317 , that the giving of an instruction like that here complained of was not erroneous.

1924In People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 , the instruction was that “ . . . in order to convict, circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence. ’ ’ The court held that this was not error, saying: “It was but another mode of telling the jury that, although as a general rule, circumstantial evidence, in the nature of things, may not be so entirely satisfactory proof of the fact as the positive testimony of credible eye witnesses, yet they must convict if they were sat

1924In People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 , the instruction was that “ . . . in order to convict, circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence. ’ ’ The court held that this was not error, saying: “It was but another mode of telling the jury that, although as a general rule, circumstantial evidence, in the nature of things, may not be so entirely satisfactory proof of the fact as the positive testimony of credible eye witnesses, yet they must convict if they were sat

1924In People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 , the instruction was that “ . . . in order to convict, circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence. ’ ’ The court held that this was not error, saying: “It was but another mode of telling the jury that, although as a general rule, circumstantial evidence, in the nature of things, may not be so entirely satisfactory proof of the fact as the positive testimony of credible eye witnesses, yet they must convict if they were sat

1924In People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 , the instruction was that “ . . . in order to convict, circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of innocence. ’ ’ The court held that this was not error, saying: “It was but another mode of telling the jury that, although as a general rule, circumstantial evidence, in the nature of things, may not be so entirely satisfactory proof of the fact as the positive testimony of credible eye witnesses, yet they must convict if they were sat