upheld waiver in South Dakota

2006Similarly, in Thwing, 84 S.D. 391 , 172 N.W.2d 277 , this Court upheld waiver of a right to a jury trial even though the underlying right, an alleged right to a court trial, did not exist.

2006Similarly, in Thwing, 84' S.D. 391, 172 N.W.2d 277 , this Court upheld waiver of a right to a jury trial even though the underlying right, an alleged right to a court trial, did not exist.

2006This Court did so because “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.” Id. at 395-96 , 172 N.W.2d at 279 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 , 85 S.Ct. 783 , 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965)). [¶ 64.] As was previously pointed out, the law is quite settled that even assuming Piper had no statutory right to a jury hearing at sentencing, his decision to waive that “nonexistent” statutory right and proceed with sentencing before the circuit court was a valid waiver of his constitutional right to jury sentenci

2006This Court did so because “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.” Id. at 395-96 , 172 N.W.2d at 279 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 , 85 S.Ct. 783 , 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965)). [¶ 64.] As was previously pointed out, the law is quite settled that even assuming Piper had no statutory right to a jury hearing at sentencing, his decision to waive that “nonexistent” statutory right and proceed with sentencing before the circuit court was a valid waiver of his constitutional right to jury sentenci

2011While factually distinguishable, this Court upheld this principle in First Dakota National Bank v. Performance Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc., 2004 S.D. 26 , 676 N.W.2d 395 .

2011While factually distinguishable, this Court upheld this principle in First Dakota National Bank v. Performance Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc., 2004 S.D. 26 , 676 N.W.2d 395 .

2002In Johnson v. Albertson’s, this Court upheld a hearing examiner’s determination that claimant’s testimony was incredible. 2000 SD 47, ¶¶ 24-27 , 610 N.W.2d 449, 455 .

2002In Johnson v. Albertson’s, this Court upheld a hearing examiner’s determination that claimant’s testimony was incredible. 2000 SD 47, ¶¶ 24-27 , 610 N.W.2d 449, 455 .

2000Id. at 334 . [¶ 21.] In Vakos v. Travelers Insurance, 691 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the court upheld a claim by an injured worker against his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier because the negligent acts “were committed subsequent to and independent of the original injury.” Id. at 503 .

2000Id. at 334 . [¶ 21.] In Vakos v. Travelers Insurance, 691 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the court upheld a claim by an injured worker against his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier because the negligent acts “were committed subsequent to and independent of the original injury.” Id. at 503 .

2000Id. at 334 . [¶ 21.] In Vakos v. Travelers Insurance, 691 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the court upheld a claim by an injured worker against his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier because the negligent acts “were committed subsequent to and independent of the original injury.” Id. at 503 .

1927In State v. Humphrey, 42 S. D. 512, 176 N. W. 39 , this court upheld an instruction, based on section 10318, that the finding of intoxicating liquors in the possession of accused, unless he is one legally authorized to sell or possess the same, shall be presumptive evidence that such liquors were kept contrary to law.