118 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. Oldhamgreen2 sentences2013This court has recently held that “[t]o warrant the submission of an instruction on sudden emergency, there must be evidence that: (1) an emergency situation arose suddenly and unexpectedly, (2) the emergency situation was not caused by the defendant’s negligence, and (3) after the emergency situation arose, the defendant acted as a person of ordinary prudence would have acted.” Benham v. Lynch, No. 04-09-00606-CV, 2011 WL 381665 , at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 7 “The court shall submit the questions, instruct 2011Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); Jordan v. Sava, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). | 8 | 8 |
Madden v. Stategreen2 sentences2025According to Smith, his counsel failed to request the instruction even though Smith met the requirements for the submission of the instruction under Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. 2019A defendant’s right to the submission of an instruction under Article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 12 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 43-44 (Tex.2007); State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. 2012See Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 , 43–44 (Tex. 2007); State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. | 3 | 3 |
McDonald Transit, Inc. v. Mooregreen2 sentences2009Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); McDonald Transit, Inc. v. Moore, 565 S.W.2d 43 , 44–45 (Tex. 1978). 2009Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); McDonald Transit, Inc. v. Moore , 565 S.W.2d 43 , 44–45 (Tex. 1978). | 2 | 4 |
Thota v. Younggreen2 sentences2015In Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 689-91 (Tex. 2012), the Texas Supreme Court held that: (1) a no evidence objection is all that is necessary to preserve a complaint regarding the submission of a claim that is not supported by the evidence, and (2) a party is not required to point out to the trial court the problems that submitting a unsupported claim creates, which are discussed in Crown Life Ins. 2015An appellate court will not reverse a judgment for charge error unless that error was harmful because it “.probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the [appellant] from properly presenting - the case to - the appellate courts.” See Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex.2012) (quoting Tex. R. | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2015A defendant’s right to the submission of an instruction under article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Jones v. State, 338 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (quoting Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. 2011A defendant’s right to the submission of an instruction under article 38.23(a) “is limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Jones v. State , 338 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (quoting Madden v. State , 242 S.W.3d 504 , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2011See Davis v. Campbell , 572 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. 1978). [24] Cotton Valley relies on three answers by Gouge in cross-examination by Cotton Valley, in which Gouge (1) acknowledged that he had an agreement with Reliant that it would “take” whatever gas he could aggregate; and (2) answered “Yes” to the follow-up question, as to whether he “had the authority from Reliant to go out and get this gas; you negotiate a price and terms for gas that was to be delivered to Reliant? 2011See Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex.1978). 24 . | 2 | 2 |
Jordan v. Sava, Inc.green2 sentences2011Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); Jordan v. Sava, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). 2011Thomas v. Oldham , 895 S.W.2d 352, 360 (Tex. 1995); Jordan v. Sava, Inc ., 222 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Clemons v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). 1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); demons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). | 2 | 2 |
Paprskar v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). 1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); demons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). | 2 | 2 |
McCullough v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). 1987See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); demons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). | 2 | 2 |
Rorie v. Goodwingreen2 sentences2015See Rorie v. Goodwin, 171 S.W.3d 579, 583-84 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.) (holding that “[w]ithout establishing a specific submission or hearing date, the trial court could not enter a summary judgment that complied with either the local rules of Smith County or Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).”); accord, In re Estate of Valdez, 406 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (stating that “[g]enerally, a trial court errs when it fails to give notice of the submission date for a motion for summary judgment.”). 3 2015The court of appeals explained that the “indefinite language” in the motion did not inform Rorie “of a specific submission or hearing date.” Id. at 584 . | 1 | 3 |
Crown Life Insurance Company v. Casteelgreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex. 2000). 2002EPRI’s objections thus fail to implicate Casteel because objection to the evidentiary basis for the submission of an instruction presupposes that the issue is properly placed before a jury. *387 Waiver issues aside, our second and most compelling basis for rejecting the application of Casteel’s mandate to remand stems from its assertion that remand is only appropriate “when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted invalid theory.” Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388 . | 1 | 2 |
| Ex Parte Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
Mervyn Lopez Aldaba v. Stategreen1 sentence2025PROC. art. 38.22, § 6); see Aldaba v. State, 382 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); Miller v. State, 666 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref’d). 10 Although a factual dispute is not necessary to justify the submission of this instruction, “some evidence must have been presented to the jury that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176 n.59 (quoting Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen1 sentence2025PROC. art. 38.22, § 6); see Aldaba v. State, 382 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); Miller v. State, 666 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref’d). 10 Although a factual dispute is not necessary to justify the submission of this instruction, “some evidence must have been presented to the jury that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176 n.59 (quoting Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Stategreen1 sentence2025PROC. art. 38.22, § 6); see Aldaba v. State, 382 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); Miller v. State, 666 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref’d). 10 Although a factual dispute is not necessary to justify the submission of this instruction, “some evidence must have been presented to the jury that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176 n.59 (quoting Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Zamora, Jaime Arturogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drew Ryser v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanchez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Keller v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development & Research Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Allcat Claims Service, L.P. and John Weaklygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elbaor v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vast Construction, LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Easley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Larrlyon Deshun Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammaratagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Martha Jane Valdezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lane v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Golden v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Neesleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bennett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Hess v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trevino v. Ortega
green
2 sentences2015Spoliation Instruction as a Remedy Having laid out the general framework governing spoliation findings and remedies, we turn to the particular remedy at issue in this case—the submission of an instruction to the jury to presume that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator. [**30] HN21 Though we have generally described the purpose of a spoliation remedy in remedial rather than punitive terms, see Wal-Mart Stores, 106 S.W.3d at 721 , a spoliation instruction is still inherently a sanction, [*23] see Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 .13 Further, it is among the harshest sanct 2014Though we have generally described the purpose of a spoliation remedy in remedial rather than punitive terms, see Wal-Mart Stores, 106 S.W.3d at 721 , a spoliation instruction is still inherently a sanction, see Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 . 13 Further, it is among the harshest sanctions a trial court may utilize to remedy an act of spoliation. | 4 | 2014–2015 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015Spoliation Instruction as a Remedy Having laid out the general framework governing spoliation findings and remedies, we turn to the particular remedy at issue in this case—the submission of an instruction to the jury to presume that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator. [**30] HN21 Though we have generally described the purpose of a spoliation remedy in remedial rather than punitive terms, see Wal-Mart Stores, 106 S.W.3d at 721 , a spoliation instruction is still inherently a sanction, [*23] see Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 .13 Further, it is among the harshest sanct 2014Though we have generally described the purpose of a spoliation remedy in remedial rather than punitive terms, see Wal-Mart Stores, 106 S.W.3d at 721 , a spoliation instruction is still inherently a sanction, see Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 . 13 Further, it is among the harshest sanctions a trial court may utilize to remedy an act of spoliation. | 4 | 2014–2015 |
Crawford v. Hope
green
2 sentences2002Crawford, 898 S.W.2d at 941-42 . 2001Crawford, 898 S.W.2d at 941-42 . | 4 | 2001–2002 |
Willis v. State
green
2 sentences2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis , 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez , 775 S.W.2d at 647 . 2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis, 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 647 . | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Vasquez v. State
green
2 sentences2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis , 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez , 775 S.W.2d at 647 . 2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis, 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 647 . | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Martinez v. State
green
2 sentences2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis , 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez , 775 S.W.2d at 647 . 2003Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 ; Willis, 790 S.W.2d at 314 ; Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 647 . | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Almanza v. State
green
2 sentences2021Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 . 1988See Bellamy, 742 S.W.2d at 685 (where defendant objects at trial, Rose v. Clark harm analysis applies; where no objection, analyze harm according to Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)). | 2 | 1988–2021 |
Juarez v. State
green
2 sentences2015Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 404 - 05. 2015Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 404 - 05. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2002Id. | 2 | 2002–2010 |
Bennett v. State
green
2 sentences2008The court rejected appellant's contention that the trial court should have been aware of her complaint because defense counsel used the words "in this case" and because evidence at trial existed that would have supported the submission of an instruction on defense of a third person. [2] Id. 2008The court rejected appellant’s contention that the trial court should have been aware of her complaint because defense counsel used the words “in this case” and because evidence at trial existed that would have supported the submission of an instruction on defense of a third person. 2 Id. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Flanagan v. State
green
2 sentences2007The court concluded, “Where the defendant kills another person with a deadly weapon per se, more than speculation of this sort is required before the submission of an instruction on ... criminally negligent homicide is necessary.” Id. 2007The court concluded, “Where the defendant kills another person with a deadly weapon per se, more than speculation of this sort is required before the submission of an instruction on . . . criminally negligent homicide is necessary.” Id. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Haddock v. Arnspiger
green
2 sentences2002Because the jury was entitled to consider the radiation burn along with the other evidence in determining the question of the doctor’s negligence, and the instruction did not tell them that, the appellate court held that it was “an improper statement of the law as applied to this case.” Id. at 559 . 2001Because the jury was entitled to consider the radiation burn along with the other evidence in determining the question of the doctor's negligence, and the instruction did not tell them that, the appellate court held that it was "an improper statement of the law as applied to this case." Id. at 559 . | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Texas Department of Human Services v. Green
green
2 sentences1994Green , 855 S.W.2d at 150 . 1994Green, 855 S.W.2d at 150 . | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Oursbourn v. State
green
1 sentence2025PROC. art. 38.22, § 6); see Aldaba v. State, 382 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); Miller v. State, 666 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref’d). 10 Although a factual dispute is not necessary to justify the submission of this instruction, “some evidence must have been presented to the jury that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176 n.59 (quoting Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Beltran, Ricardo v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Wooten, Codiem Renoir green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Freeman, Corey Thomas green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Arteaga v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Bowen, Deborah green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| 4901 Main, Inc. v. TAS Automotive, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Mills v. State green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Robinson, Timothy Lee green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Finance Commission v. Norwood green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Gage Michael Spiers v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Jackson v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Navarro v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| San Miguel v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Masterson v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Jerry Aldridge green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Ford v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Posey v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Abdnor v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.