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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Twiggs v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi 2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi | 5 | 5 |
People v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi 2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin, | 5 | 5 |
In Re Bowergreen2 sentences2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi 2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi | 4 | 5 |
Blackledge v. Perrygreen2 sentences2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca 2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Goodwingreen2 sentences2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin, 2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin, | 4 | 4 |
Caldwell v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 977 (Caldwell).) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under 5 After judgment was entered and before K.C. filed this appeal, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 452 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 558 (2023- 2024 Reg. Sess.). 2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell); Esparza, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 452 .) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When the law grants an immunity, it does not mean that the defendant’s conduct is not tortious, | 2 | 3 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi 2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca | 2 | 3 |
Robinson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 (Bower); accord, Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness].) “In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which leg 2021(In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 (Bower); accord, Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness].) “In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which leg | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jan Dil Khangreen2 sentences2020(Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 873 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial resulting from impermissible testimony by prosecution witness]; Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are 26. increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness]; U.S. v. Khan (2d Cir. 1986) 787 F.2d 28, 32-33 [no realistic likelihood of 2020(Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 873 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial resulting from impermissible testimony by prosecution witness]; Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are 26. increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness]; U.S. v. Khan (2d Cir. 1986) 787 F.2d 28, 32-33 [no realistic likelihood of | 2 | 2 |
CPS v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.green1 sentence2026Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 192, 197-198 ; see also Code Civ. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Paulgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ; People v. Fitzgerald (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 932, 936 .) A defective pleading will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely affected. (§ 1404 [“Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right.”]; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 44 (Paul); People v. Massey (1957) 151 2016(Paul, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 42 ; Schoeller, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 62 .) Count eleven charged defendant with violating section 288, subdivision (a), in that defendant “did willfully, unlawfully, and lewdly commit a lewd and lascivious act, to wit: defendant asking victim to use massager on his groin area, upon and with the body and certain parts and members thereof of [K.], a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, and gratifying the lust, passions, and sexual desires of the said defendant and the said child.” Defendant says count eleven does | 1 | 1 |
| Westbrook v. Mihalygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2021(In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 (Bower); accord, Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness].) “In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which leg 2021(In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 (Bower); accord, Twiggs, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 368-370 [finding reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness where charges are increased following mistrial due to deadlocked jury]; but see U.S. v. Thomas (10th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 1235, 1247 [addition of charges due to mistrial following a hung jury does not raise presumption of vindictiveness].) “In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which leg | 4 | 4 |
In Re Bowergreen2 sentences2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi 2022(North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725 ; Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 876 ; Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371 (Twiggs).) “‘A vindictive prosecution claim may be established “‘by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.’”’ [Citations.] In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a ‘reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.’ [Citations.]” (Sanchez, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982-983.) 11 A presumption of unconstitutional vi | 2 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jurado
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin, 2021(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘“by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.”’” (Short v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 905 , 915 (Short); accord, 17 United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 373 (Twiggs); accord, Goodwin, | 4 | 2020–2021 |
Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP
green
2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell); Esparza, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 452 .) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When the law grants an immunity, it does not mean that the defendant’s conduct is not tortious, 2015(See, e.g., Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623 ; Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell).) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability ….’ [Citation.] It ‘“avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability….” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 378 .) “When the law | 2 | 2015–2025 |
United States v. Bud Brown
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca 2020(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98 .) “A vindictive prosecution claim may be established ‘ “by producing direct evidence of the prosecutor’s punitive motivation.” ’ ” (Short, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 915, quoting U.S. v. Brown (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3d 1235, 1240 ; accord, United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 380-381, 384 (Goodwin).) In the absence of such direct evidence, a defendant may raise a presumption of vindictiveness by making a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s actions raise a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” (Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Ca | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Murgia v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1979The trial court granted the majority of the requests for discovery, whereupon the People successfully sought a writ of mandate in the superior court directing the municipal court to vacate its order on grounds that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction. 4 A stay was granted in the municipal court proceedings pending this appeal. *745 Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 540 P.2d 44 ], established, and the People do not dispute, that a defendant may raise a claim of intentional and purposeful invidious discrimination in the enforcement of all laws, includ 1979The trial court granted the majority of the requests for discovery, whereupon the People successfully sought a writ of mandate in the superior court directing the municipal court to vacate its order on grounds that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction. 4 A stay was granted in the municipal court proceedings pending this appeal. *745 Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 540 P.2d 44 ], established, and the People do not dispute, that a defendant may raise a claim of intentional and purposeful invidious discrimination in the enforcement of all laws, includ | 2 | 1979–1991 |
Esparza v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell); Esparza, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 452 .) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When the law grants an immunity, it does not mean that the defendant’s conduct is not tortious, 2025(See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell); Esparza, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 452 .) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability . . . .’ [Citation.] It ‘ “avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When the law grants an immunity, it does not mean that the defendant’s conduct is not tortious, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2021(See People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 991 .) Although a defendant may raise a claim that his substantial rights were affected by instructions to which he did not object (see § 1259; People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 ), as we explain, appellants fail to make such a showing here.10 10 Appellants fail to persuade us that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction in addition to the instructions it provided. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Kozel
green
1 sentence2021(See People v. Kozel (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 507 , 528–529.) The cases cited pertain to situations 34 In general, jurors need not unanimously agree on the theory underlying a first degree murder verdict (People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1048 ), but they must unanimously agree on the degree of murder. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. O'Malley
green
1 sentence2021(See People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 991 .) Although a defendant may raise a claim that his substantial rights were affected by instructions to which he did not object (see § 1259; People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927 ), as we explain, appellants fail to make such a showing here.10 10 Appellants fail to persuade us that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction in addition to the instructions it provided. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Potts
green
1 sentence2021(See People v. Kozel (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 507 , 528–529.) The cases cited pertain to situations 34 In general, jurors need not unanimously agree on the theory underlying a first degree murder verdict (People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1048 ), but they must unanimously agree on the degree of murder. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Fitzgerald
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ; People v. Fitzgerald (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 932, 936 .) A defective pleading will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely affected. (§ 1404 [“Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right.”]; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 44 (Paul); People v. Massey (1957) 151 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Schoeller
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ; People v. Fitzgerald (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 932, 936 .) A defective pleading will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely affected. (§ 1404 [“Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right.”]; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 44 (Paul); People v. Massey (1957) 151 2016(Paul, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 42 ; Schoeller, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 62 .) Count eleven charged defendant with violating section 288, subdivision (a), in that defendant “did willfully, unlawfully, and lewdly commit a lewd and lascivious act, to wit: defendant asking victim to use massager on his groin area, upon and with the body and certain parts and members thereof of [K.], a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, and gratifying the lust, passions, and sexual desires of the said defendant and the said child.” Defendant says count eleven does | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Stone
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ; People v. Fitzgerald (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 932, 936 .) A defective pleading will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely affected. (§ 1404 [“Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right.”]; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 44 (Paul); People v. Massey (1957) 151 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Robertson
green
1 sentence2016A defendant may raise a challenge to the imposition of an unauthorized protective order on appeal, notwithstanding the failure to object in the trial court. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 995 .) Where a trial court imposes such an unauthorized protective order, the appellate court must strike the unauthorized order. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Massey
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ; People v. Fitzgerald (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 932, 936 .) A defective pleading will not result in a reversal of the judgment unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely affected. (§ 1404 [“Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right.”]; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 44 (Paul); People v. Massey (1957) 151 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Vaughn v. LJ International, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015(Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 ; Vaughn v. LJ Internat., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 213, 219 .)2 A defendant may raise immunity as the basis for a demurrer. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Crandall
green
1 sentence2015(Brown v. Crandall (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 ; Vaughn v. LJ Internat., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 213, 219 .)2 A defendant may raise immunity as the basis for a demurrer. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Creason v. Department of Health Services
green
1 sentence2015(See, e.g., Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623 ; Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 (Caldwell).) “An ‘immunity’ is ‘[a]ny exemption from a duty [or] liability ….’ [Citation.] It ‘“avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but [rather] the resulting liability….” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 378 .) “When the law | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Mayberry
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153-155 .) A mistaken belief in consent is premised on mistake of fact, which is deemed to negate the basic requirement of wrongful intent that underlies criminal conduct. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Fosselman green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Younger v. Harris green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.