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17 California opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.green2 sentences2013(Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-824 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ] (Richards).) In Richards , a disabled employee asked for accommodation over a five-year period, and was given “mixed signals on her accommodation requests throughout the period.” (Id. at p. 824.) The employer argued the limitations period was. triggered the first time the employer refused to accommodate the employee’s disability and because the employee did not file her DFEH claim at this time, the claim was barred for any employer actions occurring more than one year before she filed the DFEH comp 2013(Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 811-824 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ] (Richards).) In Richards , a disabled employee asked for accommodation over a five-year period, and was given “mixed signals on her accommodation requests throughout the period.” (Id. at p. 824.) The employer argued the limitations period was. triggered the first time the employer refused to accommodate the employee’s disability and because the employee did not file her DFEH claim at this time, the claim was barred for any employer actions occurring more than one year before she filed the DFEH comp | 2 | 3 |
Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.green2 sentences2013(Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 ] (Romano).) The Romano court explained that because the FEHA defines an improper “ ‘discharge’ as among the statute’s unlawful employment practices,” and because the FEHA provides that DFEH complaints must be filed within one year from the date the “unlawful practice ‘occurred,’ ” the limitations period for a claim alleging a termination in violation of FEHA begins to run at the time of the termination, even if the employee knew or should have known before that time that the employer was intendi 2013(Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 , 926 P.2d 1114 ] (Romano).) The Romano court explained that because the FEHA defines an improper “ ‘discharge’ as among the statute’s unlawful employment practices,” and because the FEHA provides that DFEH complaints must be filed within one year from the date the “unlawful practice ‘occurred,’ ” the limitations period for a claim alleging a termination in violation of FEHA begins to run at the time of the termination, even if the employee knew or should have known before that time that the employer was intendi | 2 | 2 |
Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co.green2 sentences2020(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1613 .) “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim [was] barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1617, italics added.) Similarly, in Martin, the plaintiff’s “theories of recovery other than age discrimination were vitiated by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies under California law.” (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1723 .) The DFEH “never did learn of Martin’s assertion 2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see | 1 | 3 |
Robert Rodriguez v. Airborne Expressgreen2 sentences2020Thus, . . . the DFEH never received the opportunity, with respect to these additional theories of violation of [FEHA], to pursue the ‘vital policy interests embodied in [FEHA], i.e., the resolution of 8 disputes and elimination of unlawful employment practices by conciliation. [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at p. 1728.) Likewise, in Rodriguez, supra, 265 F.3d at page 897 , the Ninth Circuit held that a DFEH charge alleging racial discrimination did not permit plaintiff to proceed with a cause of action for disability discrimination. 2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see | 1 | 2 |
Yurick v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospitalgreen2 sentences2007The court ruled that, under Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 842 ], the January 2003 DFEH claim was too remote in time to support her retaliation claims and therefore only her August 11, 2003, complaint to the KPCC hotline could potentially support her claim. 2007The court ruled that, under Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 842 ], the January 2003 DFEH claim was too remote in time to support her retaliation claims and therefore only her August 11, 2003, complaint to the KPCC hotline could potentially support her claim. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl 2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.green2 sentences2001(Gardner-Denver, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 42 [94 S.Ct. at pp. 1016-1017, 39 L.Ed.2d at pp. 154-155].) Next, defendants assert that the arbitrator made no express finding as to discrimination. 2001(Gardner-Denver, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 42 [94 S.Ct. at pp. 1016-1017, 39 L.Ed.2d at pp. 154-155].) Next, defendants assert that the arbitrator made no express finding as to discrimination. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wills v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025As stated by the trial court, “[a] reader comes away from review of [Jaimes’] DFEH claim not knowing what it is that [the City] did that is alleged to have been discriminatory.” Relying on Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 143 , Jaimes urges that “checking the right box on the [DFEH] intake [form]” is sufficient to meet the administrative exhaustion requirement. 2025The question on this appeal is whether he can maintain his retaliation claim in spite of his failure to enumerate that claim in his charge before the DFEH.” (Id. at p. 1613.) The Okoli court concluded “the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made.” (Id. at p. 1617.) In sum, “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim is | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
green
2 sentences2020(Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1613 .) “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation, his retaliation claim [was] barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.” (Id. at p. 1617, italics added.) Similarly, in Martin, the plaintiff’s “theories of recovery other than age discrimination were vitiated by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies under California law.” (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1723 .) The DFEH “never did learn of Martin’s assertion 2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see | 2 | 2014–2020 |
Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017Finding the case "analogous to the failure to qualify for tenure in Ricks ," the appellate court concluded that as the plaintiff was aware her failure to qualify for fourth year residency would result in the termination of her employment at the close of the next year, "termination of employment was a 'delayed, but inevitable, consequence' of ... not repeating a year in ... the residency *990 program." ( Regents , supra , at p. 1717, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 919 .) Accordingly, under the reasoning of Ricks , the statute of limitations for filing her DFEH complaint ran from the date she was told she would 2017Finding the case "analogous to the failure to qualify for tenure in Ricks ," the appellate court concluded that as the plaintiff was aware her failure to qualify for fourth year residency would result in the termination of her employment at the close of the next year, "termination of employment was a 'delayed, but inevitable, consequence' of ... not repeating a year in ... the residency *990 program." ( Regents , supra , at p. 1717, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 919 .) Accordingly, under the reasoning of Ricks , the statute of limitations for filing her DFEH complaint ran from the date she was told she would | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
green
2 sentences2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see 2013(Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 859 , citing Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corporation (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 569, 571 .) Basically, if an investigation of a DFEH claim form would uncover a claim included in a subsequent complaint, the claim may be included in the complaint, notwithstanding that the claim was not pristinely stated in the DFEH claim. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank
green
2 sentences2018(Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 714, 720 .) Terris admitted that she had “no evidence” of sexual orientation discrimination within the year prior to filing the DFEH claim. 2018(Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 714, 720 .) Terris admitted that she had “no evidence” of sexual orientation discrimination within the year prior to filing the DFEH claim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wilson v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil 2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Holmes v. Lerner
green
2 sentences2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil 2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
green
2 sentences2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil 2014“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 .) Under this standard, “[a]ll conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a manner that upholds the verdict.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445 .) “[W]e do not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.’ ” (Escamil | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente International
green
2 sentences2014Her only contention on appeal regarding these two causes of action, separate and apart from her argument regarding her discrimination claim, is that “[t]he close timing between her EEOC filings and her termination is circumstantial evidence that she was terminated for exercising her public policy right to enforce state and federal anti discrimination [sic] laws.” Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 ] held that a prima facie showing of “temporal proximity, although sufficient to shift the burden to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory 2014Her only contention on appeal regarding these two causes of action, separate and apart from her argument regarding her discrimination claim, is that “[t]he close timing between her EEOC filings and her termination is circumstantial evidence that she was terminated for exercising her public policy right to enforce state and federal anti discrimination [sic] laws.” Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 ] held that a prima facie showing of “temporal proximity, although sufficient to shift the burden to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Stamatina Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals the Permanente Medical Group, Inc. Hospital & Institutional Workers Union, Local 250
green
1 sentence2014(See Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1615 [" 'complaint alleging race discrimination is neither "like or related to" nor likely 9 to be discovered in a "reasonable" investigation of a charge of sex discrimination' "]; Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1725, 1727 [exhaustion doctrine precluded gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims when DFEH claim alleged only age discrimination]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1123 [plaintiff could not pursue FEHA claim for age harassment because DFEH complaint included only gender discrimination allegations]; see | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013(See Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1614-1615 .) As explained in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 6 267: “„“The specific words of [a DFEH claim form] need not presage with literary exactitude the judicial pleadings which may follow.”‟” Here, Plaintiffs‟ DFEH claim forms showed they were claiming “termination” and “retaliation.” The DFEH claim forms stated that Plaintiffs‟ termination and retaliation claims were “based upon” a list of items, one of which was their complaint in Mack/Gossett I. 2013(See Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1614-1615 .) As explained in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 , 6 267: “„“The specific words of [a DFEH claim form] need not presage with literary exactitude the judicial pleadings which may follow.”‟” Here, Plaintiffs‟ DFEH claim forms showed they were claiming “termination” and “retaliation.” The DFEH claim forms stated that Plaintiffs‟ termination and retaliation claims were “based upon” a list of items, one of which was their complaint in Mack/Gossett I. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Saavedra v. ORANGE CTY. CONSOL. TRANSP. ETC.
green
2 sentences2013Agency (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 824 , 827.) Accordingly, California follows federal law standards which have adopted a “like or reasonably related” evaluation standard when juxtaposing a DFEH claim form and subsequent complaint, so as not to erect a “needless procedural barrier” to the complaint. 2013Agency (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 824 , 827.) Accordingly, California follows federal law standards which have adopted a “like or reasonably related” evaluation standard when juxtaposing a DFEH claim form and subsequent complaint, so as not to erect a “needless procedural barrier” to the complaint. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Steven OUBICHON, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION, Appellee
green
2 sentences2013(Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 859 , citing Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corporation (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 569, 571 .) Basically, if an investigation of a DFEH claim form would uncover a claim included in a subsequent complaint, the claim may be included in the complaint, notwithstanding that the claim was not pristinely stated in the DFEH claim. 2013(Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 859 , citing Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corporation (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 569, 571 .) Basically, if an investigation of a DFEH claim form would uncover a claim included in a subsequent complaint, the claim may be included in the complaint, notwithstanding that the claim was not pristinely stated in the DFEH claim. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
green
2 sentences2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl 2002(See § 12987.) Among the authorized forms of relief available to complainants, the Commission may award "actual damages." (§ 12987, subd. (a)(4).) Actual damages are "compensatory damages [that] include nonquantifiable general damages for emotional distress and pecuniarily measurable special damages for out-of-pocket losses." ( Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 255 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 814 P.2d 704 .) In Walnut Creek Manor , however, we held that the Commission's award of unlimited compensatory damages for emotional distress and other intangible injury violated the judicial powers cl | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jackson v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1999(See Jackson, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 178 .) Waste Management produced undisputed evidence that Kelsey failed to list on his bankruptcy schedules the claim he had against Waste Management, and that he filed a DFEH claim against Waste Management about one month before the bankruptcy filing. 1999(See Jackson, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 178 .) Waste Management produced undisputed evidence that Kelsey failed to list on his bankruptcy schedules the claim he had against Waste Management, and that he filed a DFEH claim against Waste Management about one month before the bankruptcy filing. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.