proximate result violation in California

2014(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 696 P.2d 134 ] (Wilkoff) [“[t]he act prohibited by [Vehicle Code] section 23153 is . . . the driving [of] a vehicle while intoxicated and, when so driving, violating any law relating to the driving of [the] vehicle”]; see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1279 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ] [“The gravamen of driving while under the influence is driving despite an impairment of capacity.”].) The inquiry into the conduct encompassed by a DUI with injury conviction becomes more complicated where, as here, more t

2014(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 696 P.2d 134 ] (Wilkoff) [“[t]he act prohibited by [Vehicle Code] section 23153 is . . . the driving [of] a vehicle while intoxicated and, when so driving, violating any law relating to the driving of [the] vehicle”]; see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1279 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ] [“The gravamen of driving while under the influence is driving despite an impairment of capacity.”].) The inquiry into the conduct encompassed by a DUI with injury conviction becomes more complicated where, as here, more t

2014(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 696 P.2d 134 ] (Wilkoff) [“[t]he act prohibited by [Vehicle Code] section 23153 is . . . the driving [of] a vehicle while intoxicated and, when so driving, violating any law relating to the driving of [the] vehicle”]; see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1279 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ] [“The gravamen of driving while under the influence is driving despite an impairment of capacity.”].) The inquiry into the conduct encompassed by a DUI with injury conviction becomes more complicated where, as here, more t

2014(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 696 P.2d 134 ] (Wilkoff) [“[t]he act prohibited by [Vehicle Code] section 23153 is . . . the driving [of] a vehicle while intoxicated and, when so driving, violating any law relating to the driving of [the] vehicle”]; see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1279 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 90 P.3d 1168 ] [“The gravamen of driving while under the influence is driving despite an impairment of capacity.”].) The inquiry into the conduct encompassed by a DUI with injury conviction becomes more complicated where, as here, more t

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2018The jury in Minor was instructed that "the elements of section 23153, subdivision (a), are as follows: (1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured." ( Minor, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 437-438, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 .) See footnote *, ante .)

2018The court instructed the jury regarding reckless driving as follows, “The defendant is charged in count two with felony reckless driving with great bodily in violation Vehicle Code 3 The jury in Minor was instructed that “the elements of section 23153, subdivision (a), are as follows: (1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.”

2014(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 ].) The elements of DUI causing injury are “(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage [or drug]; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159-1160 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) The first two elements define the conduct prohibited by this offense, while the third el

2014(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 ].) The elements of DUI causing injury are “(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage [or drug]; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159-1160 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) The first two elements define the conduct prohibited by this offense, while the third el

2014(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 ].) The elements of DUI causing injury are “(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage [or drug]; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159-1160 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) The first two elements define the conduct prohibited by this offense, while the third el

2014(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 765 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 ].) The elements of DUI causing injury are “(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage [or drug]; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159-1160 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) The first two elements define the conduct prohibited by this offense, while the third el

2015The elements necessary for conviction are as follows — for Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove: “ ‘(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured. [Citation.] [Vehicle Code s]ection 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having

2015The elements necessary for conviction are as follows — for Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove: “ ‘(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured. [Citation.] [Vehicle Code s]ection 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having

2015(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312-1313 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ]; People v. Butler (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 469, 474 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As in count 1, defendant’s subjective intent or belief about his level of impairment was not an element necessary for conviction on count 2 or count 3.

2015(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312-1313 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ]; People v. Butler (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 469, 474 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As in count 1, defendant’s subjective intent or belief about his level of impairment was not an element necessary for conviction on count 2 or count 3.

2015The elements necessary for conviction are as follows — for Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove: “ ‘(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured. [Citation.] [Vehicle Code s]ection 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having

2015The elements necessary for conviction are as follows — for Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove: “ ‘(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured. [Citation.] [Vehicle Code s]ection 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having

2015(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312-1313 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ]; People v. Butler (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 469, 474 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As in count 1, defendant’s subjective intent or belief about his level of impairment was not an element necessary for conviction on count 2 or count 3.

2015(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312-1313 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ]; People v. Butler (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 469, 474 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 103 ].) As in count 1, defendant’s subjective intent or belief about his level of impairment was not an element necessary for conviction on count 2 or count 3.

2008(Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 183 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 908 , 496 P.2d 1276 ]; Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 102 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 369 ]; Cade v. Mid-City Hosp.

2008(Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 183 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 908 , 496 P.2d 1276 ]; Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 102 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 369 ]; Cade v. Mid-City Hosp.

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2008(Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 183 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 908 , 496 P.2d 1276 ]; Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 102 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 369 ]; Cade v. Mid-City Hosp.

2008(Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 183 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 908 , 496 P.2d 1276 ]; Hosking v. San Pedro Marine, Inc. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 98, 102 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 369 ]; Cade v. Mid-City Hosp.

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2008Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 336 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 753 ].) “Thus, under the negligence per se doctrine . . . codified in Evidence Code section 669, ‘violation of a statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence of justification or excuse, provided that the “person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” ’ (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 ].) In short, ‘for a statute . . . to be relevant to a determination of negligence, no

2002(People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036-1038 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 , 819 P.2d 849 ].) The elements of driving under the influence and causing injury are: (1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to *1160 perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.

2002(People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036-1038 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 , 819 P.2d 849 ].) The elements of driving under the influence and causing injury are: (1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or fails to *1160 perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured.

1994(People v. Capetillo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 216 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 250 ].) Section 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood . . . .” (§ 23153, subd. (b).) To satisfy die second element, the evidence must show an unlawful act or neglect of duty in addition to driving under the influence.

1994(People v. Capetillo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 216 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 250 ].) Section 23153, subdivision (b), has the same elements except the first element is expressed as driving a vehicle “while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood . . . .” (§ 23153, subd. (b).) To satisfy die second element, the evidence must show an unlawful act or neglect of duty in addition to driving under the influence.

1990(People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 667 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 243 ].) A. The First Element, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, Was Established by the Evidence.

1990(People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 667 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 243 ].) A. The First Element, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, Was Established by the Evidence.

1983In any event, the law is clear and well-settled that for a statute or ordinance—and, by analogy, an injunction or TRO 7 —to be relevant to a determination of negligence, not only must the injury be a proximate result of the violation, but the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or order was designed to protect, and the harm must have been one the statute or order was designed to prevent. (§ 669, subds. (a)(3), (4); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 151 ]; Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel (1950) 36 Cal.2d 493, 497 [ 225 P.2d 497 ].) Here, e

1983In any event, the law is clear and well-settled that for a statute or ordinance—and, by analogy, an injunction or TRO 7 —to be relevant to a determination of negligence, not only must the injury be a proximate result of the violation, but the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or order was designed to protect, and the harm must have been one the statute or order was designed to prevent. (§ 669, subds. (a)(3), (4); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 151 ]; Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel (1950) 36 Cal.2d 493, 497 [ 225 P.2d 497 ].) Here, e

1983In any event, the law is clear and well-settled that for a statute or ordinance—and, by analogy, an injunction or TRO 7 —to be relevant to a determination of negligence, not only must the injury be a proximate result of the violation, but the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or order was designed to protect, and the harm must have been one the statute or order was designed to prevent. (§ 669, subds. (a)(3), (4); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 151 ]; Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel (1950) 36 Cal.2d 493, 497 [ 225 P.2d 497 ].) Here, e

1983In any event, the law is clear and well-settled that for a statute or ordinance—and, by analogy, an injunction or TRO 7 —to be relevant to a determination of negligence, not only must the injury be a proximate result of the violation, but the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or order was designed to protect, and the harm must have been one the statute or order was designed to prevent. (§ 669, subds. (a)(3), (4); Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 486 P.2d 151 ]; Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel (1950) 36 Cal.2d 493, 497 [ 225 P.2d 497 ].) Here, e

1967(Lindsey v. DeVaux, 50 Cal.App.2d 445 [ 123 P.2d 144 ] ; Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 409, 424 ; Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Assn., 108 Cal.App. 591, 595 [ 291 P. 848 ].) In Lindsey v. DeVaux, supra, 50 Cal.App.2d 445, 454 , a like contention was rejected where a drowning occurred in a public swimming pool where no lifeguard service was provided.

1967(Lindsey v. DeVaux, 50 Cal.App.2d 445 [ 123 P.2d 144 ] ; Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 409, 424 ; Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Assn., 108 Cal.App. 591, 595 [ 291 P. 848 ].) In Lindsey v. DeVaux, supra, 50 Cal.App.2d 445, 454 , a like contention was rejected where a drowning occurred in a public swimming pool where no lifeguard service was provided.