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17 California opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Searsgreen2 sentences1988Given that trial counsel skillfully obtained an overly generous ruling excluding the taped statement from the People's case-in-chief, it can be inferred that, had there been a Miranda violation, counsel would have challenged the statement on such ground. (27) Lastly, there is no merit to defendant's claim that counsel's failure to request a pinpoint Sears instruction ( People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ]) relating specific evidence to his "lack of motive to kill" prejudiced the verdict. 1988Given that trial counsel skillfully obtained an overly generous ruling excluding the taped statement from the People's case-in-chief, it can be inferred that, had there been a Miranda violation, counsel would have challenged the statement on such ground. (27) Lastly, there is no merit to defendant's claim that counsel's failure to request a pinpoint Sears instruction ( People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ]) relating specific evidence to his "lack of motive to kill" prejudiced the verdict. | 2 | 7 |
Retail Property Trust v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Americagreen2 sentences2016Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. (9th Cir.2014) 768 F.3d 938 , 953 ( Retail Prop. ) [High Court reduced factors warranting a departure from general preemption guidelines in local interest cases to a single test].) Applying this test to Sears's challenge to the union's peaceful trespassory conduct, the Court concluded the controversy Sears could have presented to the NLRB was not the same as that presented to the state court. 2016For it is only in the former situation that a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid.” (Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 197 , fn. omitted; see Retail Property Trust v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 938, 953 (Retail Property) [high court reduced factors warranting a departure from general preemption guidelines in local interest cases to a single test].) Applying this te | 2 | 3 |
Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020Five years after Sears, the Supreme Court in Jones restated the local interest exception test in what “amount[ed] to a substantial reformulation of the Sears requirement that state and federal controversies be identical.” (Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 688 (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) Because the facts of Jones are the most closely analogous to this case and it is the most recent Supreme Court precedent, it is worth examining Jones in detail. 1996Sears’s challenge was addressed solely to the location of the picketing, which was “completely unrelated” to questions the NLRB would have been called upon to determine. ( 436 U.S. at p. 198 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 226-227].) “Accordingly, permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears’ trespass claim would create *1815 no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board’s primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” (Ibid.; cf. Operating Engineers v. Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 683 [ 75 L.Ed.2d at p. 380 ] [discharged supervisor’s state action agai | 2 | 2 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpentersgreen2 sentences2016For it is only in the former situation that a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid.” (Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 197 , fn. omitted; see Retail Property Trust v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 938, 953 (Retail Property) [high court reduced factors warranting a departure from general preemption guidelines in local interest cases to a single test].) Applying this te 1996Sears’s challenge was addressed solely to the location of the picketing, which was “completely unrelated” to questions the NLRB would have been called upon to determine. ( 436 U.S. at p. 198 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 226-227].) “Accordingly, permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears’ trespass claim would create *1815 no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board’s primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” (Ibid.; cf. Operating Engineers v. Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 683 [ 75 L.Ed.2d at p. 380 ] [discharged supervisor’s state action agai | 1 | 4 |
Roden v. AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2014The superior court rejected all of those claims, so Dougherty was the prevailing party. 5 Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1580 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ], repeats Sears’s error on this point. 2014The superior court rejected all of those claims, so Dougherty was the prevailing party. 5 Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1580 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ], repeats Sears’s error on this point. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Whittakergreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 2 |
Bolamperti v. Larco Manufacturinggreen2 sentences2001Although Sears predated enactment of sections 877 and 877.6, Wilshire cites Bolamperti v. Larco Manufacturing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 249, 255 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 155 ], as holding the Sears rule remains applicable after enactment of the statutes. 2001Although Sears predated enactment of sections 877 and 877.6, Wilshire cites Bolamperti v. Larco Manufacturing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 249, 255 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 155 ], as holding the Sears rule remains applicable after enactment of the statutes. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Granadosgreen2 sentences1988But the quoted instruction was not intended to serve as a model; indeed, we warned in Sears that the instruction is "defective in form in some respects" and emphasized that on retrial the court should give " appropriate instructions, if they are requested." ( Id., at p. 190, italics added; see People v. Whittaker, supra, 41 Cal. App.3d at p. 308.) In addition, defendant mistakenly argues that Sears supports his position by its statement that a defendant "has a right to an instruction that directs *1137 attention to evidence from a consideration of which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be 1988But the quoted instruction was not intended to serve as a model; indeed, we warned in Sears that the instruction is "defective in form in some respects" and emphasized that on retrial the court should give " appropriate instructions, if they are requested." ( Id., at p. 190, italics added; see People v. Whittaker, supra, 41 Cal. App.3d at p. 308.) In addition, defendant mistakenly argues that Sears supports his position by its statement that a defendant "has a right to an instruction that directs *1137 attention to evidence from a consideration of which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cruzgreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1 |
People v. Richardsongreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1 |
People v. Saddlergreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1 |
People v. Prestongreen2 sentences1983(See People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 319 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 508 P.2d 300 ].) The judgment is affirmed. 1983(See People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 319 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 508 P.2d 300 ].) The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermoregreen2 sentences1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." ( Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its pr 1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." ( Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its pr | 1 | 1 |
Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." ( Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its pr 1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a “real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.” (Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its prem | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Board of Public Works of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." ( Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its pr 1979A statute is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only if it lacks a "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." ( Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 604 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 , 92 A.L.R.3d 1038 ]; see Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392, 409-410 .) The Moscone Act, although held to deny Sears the right to enjoin picketing on its pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015There is nothing remotely similar in this case. *1064 In Dailey, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 974 , in a “brief order, the trial court granted Sears’s motion to preclude and denied Dailey’s motion to certify the class, concluding that ‘the individual facts and issues unique to each member of the alleged class and requiring separate adjudication are more numerous and significant than the common issues.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.) In Dailey , the trial court “did state its reasons, i.e., the predominance of individual issues and the ability to bring individual claims before the court.” (Id. at p. 986.) Furthe | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
1 sentence2015There is nothing remotely similar in this case. *1064 In Dailey, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 974 , in a “brief order, the trial court granted Sears’s motion to preclude and denied Dailey’s motion to certify the class, concluding that ‘the individual facts and issues unique to each member of the alleged class and requiring separate adjudication are more numerous and significant than the common issues.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.) In Dailey , the trial court “did state its reasons, i.e., the predominance of individual issues and the ability to bring individual claims before the court.” (Id. at p. 986.) Furthe | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Lyons
green
2 sentences1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop 1983And contrary to settled law, the so-called Sears instruction would have singled out Walker’s testimony, charging the jury “how his evidence should be considered.” (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245 , 271 *901 [ 324 P.2d 556 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 865 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 120 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 597 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 45, 47 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]; Peop | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences1979(See People v. Whittaker (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 303 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 845 ]; People v. Hernandez (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Castellano (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 844 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) These cases hold generally that instructions which are argumentative and call upon the jury to consider specific evidence concerning which there was a factual dispute should not be given. 1979(See People v. Whittaker (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 303 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 845 ]; People v. Hernandez (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Castellano (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 844 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) These cases hold generally that instructions which are argumentative and call upon the jury to consider specific evidence concerning which there was a factual dispute should not be given. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Castellano
green
2 sentences1979(See People v. Whittaker (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 303 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 845 ]; People v. Hernandez (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Castellano (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 844 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) These cases hold generally that instructions which are argumentative and call upon the jury to consider specific evidence concerning which there was a factual dispute should not be given. 1979(See People v. Whittaker (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 303 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 845 ]; People v. Hernandez (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 71 ]; People v. Castellano (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 844 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) These cases hold generally that instructions which are argumentative and call upon the jury to consider specific evidence concerning which there was a factual dispute should not be given. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Foster v. California
green
2 sentences1978(See People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 436 P.2d 336 ]; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) “Defendant assigns as error the court’s refusal to give a requested instruction which his brief denominates a ‘Sears instruction.’ That characterization derives from certain language in People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], which some members of the criminal bar have interpreted as authorizing defense counsel to devise a form of so-called instruction on the law tailored to present judicial comment upon testimony favorable 1978(See People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 436 P.2d 336 ]; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) “Defendant assigns as error the court’s refusal to give a requested instruction which his brief denominates a ‘Sears instruction.’ That characterization derives from certain language in People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], which some members of the criminal bar have interpreted as authorizing defense counsel to devise a form of so-called instruction on the law tailored to present judicial comment upon testimony favorable | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Caruso
green
2 sentences1978(See People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 436 P.2d 336 ]; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) “Defendant assigns as error the court’s refusal to give a requested instruction which his brief denominates a ‘Sears instruction.’ That characterization derives from certain language in People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], which some members of the criminal bar have interpreted as authorizing defense counsel to devise a form of so-called instruction on the law tailored to present judicial comment upon testimony favorable 1978(See People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 436 P.2d 336 ]; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) “Defendant assigns as error the court’s refusal to give a requested instruction which his brief denominates a ‘Sears instruction.’ That characterization derives from certain language in People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], which some members of the criminal bar have interpreted as authorizing defense counsel to devise a form of so-called instruction on the law tailored to present judicial comment upon testimony favorable | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.