approximation doctrine in Connecticut

1970One of the leading Connecticut cases on the subject is Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 86 , wherein the court approved the application of the doctrine of approximation in an appropriate case: “The Bestatement summarizes the general rule of law under which courts in this country apply a modified cy pres *473 doctrine, or the doctrine of approximation, as follows : ‘If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to

1936Mary’s Hospital, or the Waterbury Hospital, both located in said Waterbury, or within their own homes, the homes of others, or other institutions.” It appears from the memorandum of decision that the trial court regarded Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77 , 179 Atl. 479 , as decisive of the crucial question—applicability of the doctrine of approximation,—and that case is clearly determinative unless distinguishable because of differences in operative facts so material as to vitiate its authority as pertains to the present case.

1971Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 324 ; Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 89 .” The fact that at any particular time there are only a few, or even no, persons qualified to receive the benefit intended by a charitable bequest is not necessarily a reason for holding that it has failed, and, if no other disposition of the income is provided, it may be permitted to accumulate to await the time when proper beneficiaries are to be found.

1959Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 324 ; Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 89 .

1997See Lockwood v. Killian, 179 Conn. 62 , 425 A.2d 909 (1979); Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., 139 Conn. 435 , F 94 A.2d 917 (1953); Second Ecclesiastical Society v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89 , 94 , 48 A.2d 266 (1946); Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77 , 88 , 179 A. 479 (1935).

1974Further, with regard to the nature of the condition necessary to invoke the power of the court, “[i]t is not required that the accomplishment of the intent of the testator in the way he planned shall be impossible; proof of the proper facts may be held to constitute an impracticability within the doctrine of approximation.” Second Ecclesiastical Society v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89, 94 .

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1997See Lockwood v. Killian, 179 Conn. 62 , 425 A.2d 909 (1979); Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., 139 Conn. 435 , F 94 A.2d 917 (1953); Second Ecclesiastical Society v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89 , 94 , 48 A.2d 266 (1946); Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77 , 88 , 179 A. 479 (1935).

1997See Lockwood v. Killian, 179 Conn. 62 , 425 A.2d 909 (1979); Ministers Benefit Board v. Meriden Trust Co., 139 Conn. 435 , F 94 A.2d 917 (1953); Second Ecclesiastical Society v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89 , 94 , 48 A.2d 266 (1946); Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77 , 88 , 179 A. 479 (1935).

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1970In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : ‘It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1935In a number of cases we have approved the application of the doctrine thus generally stated where after the administration of a trust has begun, circumstances have arisen such that the method by which the testator sought to accomplish the charitable purpose intended cannot be carried out and, speaking of such a situation, we said in Newton v. Healy, Attorney General, 100 Conn. 5, 10 , 122 Atl. 654 : “It is now certain that the Superior Court, as a court of equity, possesses the power to carry out the general intent of the donor of a testamentary charitable trust, when clearly manifested, thoug

1990Our Supreme Court recognizes the doctrine of approximation (see, for example, Lockwood v. Killian, supra.) and vests exclusively the Superior Court, as a court of equity, with the power to apply the doctrine.

1977Town of Milton v. Attorney General, 314 Mass. 234, 240 , 49 N.E.2d 909 .

1977Town of Milton v. Attorney General, 314 Mass. 234, 240 , 49 N.E.2d 909 .

1974They cite Bristol Baptist Church v. Connecticut Baptist Convention, 98 Conn. 677, 683 , as authority for their position.

1974That case also indicates the law’s purpose as being designed to serve the testator’s “dominant purpose.” The defendants assert that the plaintiff trustees, by not pursuing financial assistance from outside sources, have failed to prove that the continuance of the Grundy is impracticable, citing Ludorf v. Hadden, 16 Conn. Sup. 312 .

1971Bacon Memorial Home v. Bracken, supra, 220 . *166 It has been suggested that, even if the situation did not meet the basic requirements of the application of the doctrine of approximation, a deviation might be permissible.