concludes claim in Connecticut

2002Sunbury v. Sunbury , 216 Conn. 673 , 677 (1990).

2002A waiver involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soares v. Max Services, Inc. , 42 Conn. App. 147 , 175 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 915 (1996).

2002The test in Williams for whether a deadline is jurisdictional is whether the legislature indicated a "strong showing . . . that, in the event of noncompliance, . . . a subject matter jurisdictional bar [was to be imposed] . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 267 ; see also Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757 , 764 (1993). 4 Following Williams, the court concludes that the requirement in the regulation that the department set up a hearing within thirty days of an appeal by an municipality is not jurisdictional.

2002The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings Lockwood v. Gray, 26 Conn. App. 293 , 296-97 , 600 A.2d 1040 (1991)." ISSUES: CT Page 982 The Court concludes that the defense of laches has no merit in view of the fact that each of said Notes carries the provision: "[w]e can delay enforcing any of our rights without losing them." Further, the defense that the husband took responsibility for payment of the debt as part of the divorce judgment has no merit in view of the fact that the Plaintiff was never a party

2002The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings Lockwood v. Gray, 26 Conn. App. 293 , 296-97 , 600 A.2d 1040 (1991)." ISSUES: CT Page 982 The Court concludes that the defense of laches has no merit in view of the fact that each of said Notes carries the provision: "[w]e can delay enforcing any of our rights without losing them." Further, the defense that the husband took responsibility for payment of the debt as part of the divorce judgment has no merit in view of the fact that the Plaintiff was never a party

2002A waiver involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soares v. Max Services, Inc. , 42 Conn. App. 147 , 175 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 915 (1996).

2001The plaintiff concedes that the defendants are “health care providers” pursuant to General Statutes § 52-184b. 2 The plaintiff also concedes that if this court concludes that her claim was correctly classified as a medical malpractice claim, then the trial court’s order was proper because she did not file a certificate of good faith. 3 The classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. “[Professional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the j'a

2001The plaintiff concedes that the defendants are “health care providers” pursuant to General Statutes § 52-184b. 2 The plaintiff also concedes that if this court concludes that her claim was correctly classified as a medical malpractice claim, then the trial court’s order was proper because she did not file a certificate of good faith. 3 The classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. “[Professional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the j'a

2001Furthermore, malpractice “presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Camposano v. Claiborn, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135, 136-37 , 196 A.2d 129 (1963).

2001Furthermore, malpractice “presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Camposano v. Claiborn, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135, 136-37 , 196 A.2d 129 (1963).

2000But even if the allegation was one of negligence that negligence can be read as the causative factor in the breach of contract claim — a not uncommon reason for such breaches. 3 Therefore, the court concludes that the rule in Cheshire Mortgage applies to the effect that in deciding whether unfairness has been established "all three criteria do not need to be satisfied . . . a practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets a one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." 223 Conn, at p. 106 .

1999Co., 2 Conn. App. 686 , 687 , 483 A.2d 616 (1984); which the plaintiff failed to rebut, the court concludes that the doctrine of qualified, governmental immunity shields the defendant Shaw from liability.

1999Co., 2 Conn. App. 686 , 687 , 483 A.2d 616 (1984); which the plaintiff failed to rebut, the court concludes that the doctrine of qualified, governmental immunity shields the defendant Shaw from liability.

1998"The act provides the exclusive remedy to employees sustaining work related injuries or death from such injuries `caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee . . . unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle . . .' General Statutes § 31-293a ." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 113 (1985).

1997As noted in the Korowotny decision our court has in effect adopted the relation back doctrine as applied under Rule 15 (R) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Giglio v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 180 Conn. 230 , 239 (1980).

1996Since the plaintiff was never given any prior notice of conduct that might have been considered evidence of "a material breach" nor advised of any charges, nor ever given a hearing to answer or refute the defendant's claim "for cause", the court concludes by the standard of law as set forth in New England Land Development Co. v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612 , 620 (1990) that the plaintiff has met his burden of proof and is entitled to a prejudgment attachment.

1996This court concludes that the exception created by Craig v. Wagner in 88 Conn. 100 (1914) is still a valid exception to the Connecticut General Statutes § 45a-382 abatement of a lawsuit CT Page 5230 against insolvent estates.

1996The defendant's final contention is that the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the defendant's counterclaim for foreclosure. "[F]oreclosure actions are equitable in nature and, therefore, do not give rise to a right to a jury trial under article first , § 19 , of the Connecticut constitution." Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 229 Conn. 634 , 641 , 642 A.2d 1194 (1994).

1996The defendant's final contention is that the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the defendant's counterclaim for foreclosure. "[F]oreclosure actions are equitable in nature and, therefore, do not give rise to a right to a jury trial under article first , § 19 , of the Connecticut constitution." Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 229 Conn. 634 , 641 , 642 A.2d 1194 (1994).

1995"In evaluating the validity of such (an investigative) stop, courts consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture, the police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harrison 30 Conn. App. 108 , 112 (1993).

1994Also, see Chace v. Warden , 19 Conn. App. 674 (1989), which held that failure to emphasize evidence of intoxication and its implications falls within the area of professional trial strategy.

1993This analysis requires the court to determine whether the petitioner has proved that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's deficient conduct, the verdict would have been different, Ostoloza v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 758 (1992), p. 761.