demurrer defense in Connecticut

1975Mainolfi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 634 , 636 . . . ; see Practice Book § 106.

1975Mainolfi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 634 , 636 . . .; see Practice Book 106.

1995There is an older case, Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156 , 158 (1947) that upheld a demurrer to a claim by a child against one who the child claimed alienated him from his mother's affection.

1995There is an older case, Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156 , 158 (1947) that upheld a demurrer to a claim by a child against one who the child claimed alienated him from the affections of his mother.

2001The further claim is that the plaintiff was acting merely as an agent for the buyer to secure a loan, and not for the defendants as a broker for the sale of the property.” Sullo v. Luysterborghs, 129 Conn. 172, 175 , 26 A.2d 784 (1942). “[T]he bona fides of a mortgage, the possible use of a mortgage to evade the usury statutes, were questions of fact and that the creditor’s demurrer to a defense of usury should therefore have been overruled.

2001The further claim is that the plaintiff was acting merely as an agent for the buyer to secure a loan, and not for the defendants as a broker for the sale of the property.” Sullo v. Luysterborghs, 129 Conn. 172, 175 , 26 A.2d 784 (1942). “[T]he bona fides of a mortgage, the possible use of a mortgage to evade the usury statutes, were questions of fact and that the creditor’s demurrer to a defense of usury should therefore have been overruled.

2001Such a holding is not tantamount to a conclusion that uneonscionability is to be determined, as a question of law, merely by reference to the terms of the challenged instruments.” Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 496 , 429 A.2d 946 (1980). “[A] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through inference by presenting facts [that are] sufficient to remove the most likely bona fide reasons for an employment action ....

2001Such a holding is not tantamount to a conclusion that uneonscionability is to be determined, as a question of law, merely by reference to the terms of the challenged instruments.” Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 496 , 429 A.2d 946 (1980). “[A] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through inference by presenting facts [that are] sufficient to remove the most likely bona fide reasons for an employment action ....

1997The court refused to extend the foregoing modification of the strict rule of privity, stating that there was nothing to indicate that at the time the subject contract was entered into, the plaintiff, as a member of the general public, was "a person who, in the contemplation of the parties to the contract, might be expected to use, occupy or service the used automobile." Kuchy v. Norris, supra, 386 .

1992Alarm Application Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541 , 545 (1980).

1991In citing Hannon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710 , 712 (1961), the movant has apparently overlooked the actual holding of the case, which was the overruling of a demurrer to the claim of a consumer that the manufacturer of a household cleaning product was liable to the ultimate consumer for injuries suffered as a result of a defect in the product, which had been bought from a retail store.

1966Practice Book § 108; German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 165 , 188 A. 429 .

1966Practice Book § 108; German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 165 , 188 A. 429 .

1964Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 133 Conn. 403 , 409 .. . .” This court cannot as a matter of law on this demurrer rule that this is not the case here, and Part III of the demurrer, addressed solely to the substituted second count, is overruled.

1955Practice Book § 96 and Form No. 259 (third form); Goldfarb v. Cohen, 92 Conn. 277, 281 ; Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 106 Conn. 642, 649 .

1955Practice Book § 96 and Form No. 259 (third form); Goldfarb v. Cohen, 92 Conn. 277, 281 ; Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 106 Conn. 642, 649 .

1953Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145 , 153 , 110 A.L.R. 749 ; 32 Am.Jur. 527.

1953Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145 , 153 , 110 A.L.R. 749 ; 32 Am.Jur. 527.

1942It is true that in Hawes v. Mooney, 39 Conn. 37 , we held that property which had been fraudulently conveyed was subject to garnishment, saying (p. 38): “The principle upon which in such cases the creditor may have redress by garnishment, is that the transfer, being fraudulent, is as *545 against a creditor void; and although, the title may pass to the fraudulent grantee as between the parties, yet, as against a creditor, the grantee may be treated as mere trustee and bailee of the goods.” The defendants in their answer included a defense of res adjudicata based upon the judgment in the origin

1915Co. v. Brazos, 74 Conn. 208, 212 , 50 Atl. 722 , and Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145, 151 , 70 Atl. 450 , to wit, that “every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute is a void contract, though the statute does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty upon the offender.” Whether the rule, thus broadly stated, does not have its exceptions or limitations, as has been held in cases of high authority, we have no occasion to inquire, since the situation here differs essentially from those presented in the C

1915Co. v. Brazos, 74 Conn. 208, 212 , 50 Atl. 722 , and Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145, 151 , 70 Atl. 450 , to wit, that “every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute is a void contract, though the statute does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty upon the offender.” Whether the rule, thus broadly stated, does not have its exceptions or limitations, as has been held in cases of high authority, we have no occasion to inquire, since the situation here differs essentially from those presented in the C

1915Co. v. Brazos, 74 Conn. 208, 212 , 50 Atl. 722 , and Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145, 151 , 70 Atl. 450 , to wit, that “every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute is a void contract, though the statute does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty upon the offender.” Whether the rule, thus broadly stated, does not have its exceptions or limitations, as has been held in cases of high authority, we have no occasion to inquire, since the situation here differs essentially from those presented in the C

1915Co. v. Brazos, 74 Conn. 208, 212 , 50 Atl. 722 , and Connecticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 81 Conn. 145, 151 , 70 Atl. 450 , to wit, that “every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by statute is a void contract, though the statute does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty upon the offender.” Whether the rule, thus broadly stated, does not have its exceptions or limitations, as has been held in cases of high authority, we have no occasion to inquire, since the situation here differs essentially from those presented in the C

1915A demurrer to this defense was overruled, and judgment rendered for the defendants. *295 The court below relied, and defendants’ counsel rely, upon the principle enunciated in Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn. 124, 128 , and afterward affirmed or recognized in Wilcox Mfg.

1901In sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer to this defense, the Superior Court rightly held that the mere secret belief and understanding of the defendants as to the nature and purpose of the obligation into which they were entering, could not alter the effect of the plain language of the contract itself, and upon the authority of Birdsall v. Wheeler, 58 Conn. 429 , correctly decided that the defendants were estopped by the language of the recognizance from proving such facts as a complete defense to the action; since, as was held in that case, to permit them to do so would be to allow them to con