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17 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 ( 591 SE2d 774 ) (2003) (“ ‘In the absence of a judgment in writing no question for decision is presented to the appellate court.’ ” (citation omitted)). 4 We recognize that this Court has on two occasions treated the specificity required in an indictment for assault with intent to murder differently, where the assault at issue was allegedly committed with an item that “may be used for the destruction of human life in a great variety of ways.” Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 446 ( 16 SE 92 ) (1892) (alleged assault with intent to murder using poison). 2014See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 ( 591 SE2d 774 ) (2003) (“ ‘In the absence of a judgment in writing no question for decision is presented to the appellate court.’ ” (citation omitted)). 4 We recognize that this Court has on two occasions treated the specificity required in an indictment for assault with intent to murder differently, where the assault at issue was allegedly committed with an item that “may be used for the destruction of human life in a great variety of ways.” Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 446 ( 16 SE 92 ) (1892) (alleged assault with intent to murder using poison). | 1 | 1 |
Titelman v. Stedmangreen2 sentences2014See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 ( 591 SE2d 774 ) (2003) (“ ‘In the absence of a judgment in writing no question for decision is presented to the appellate court.’ ” (citation omitted)). 4 We recognize that this Court has on two occasions treated the specificity required in an indictment for assault with intent to murder differently, where the assault at issue was allegedly committed with an item that “may be used for the destruction of human life in a great variety of ways.” Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 446 ( 16 SE 92 ) (1892) (alleged assault with intent to murder using poison). 2014See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 ( 591 SE2d 774 ) (2003) (“ ‘In the absence of a judgment in writing no question for decision is presented to the appellate court.’ ” (citation omitted)). 4 We recognize that this Court has on two occasions treated the specificity required in an indictment for assault with intent to murder differently, where the assault at issue was allegedly committed with an item that “may be used for the destruction of human life in a great variety of ways.” Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 446 ( 16 SE 92 ) (1892) (alleged assault with intent to murder using poison). | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. Beachamgreen2 sentences1927Hicks v. Beacham, 131 Ga. 89, at p. 93 ( 62 S. E. 45 ). 1927Hicks v. Beacham, 131 Ga. 89, at p. 93 ( 62 S. E. 45 ). | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Nugengreen2 sentences1919See also the case of Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 372 ( 45 S. E. 262 ). 1919See also the case of Watkins v. Nugen, 118 Ga. 372 ( 45 S. E. 262 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. South Carolina & Georgia Railroad
green
2 sentences1940Nor is the ruling in Davis v. South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Co., 107 Ga. 420 ( 33 S. E. 437 ), controlling in this case, since in the Davis case, a consent order was taken at the appearance term, setting the demurrer for a hearing at the trial term. 1940Nor is the ruling in Davis v. South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Co., 107 Ga. 420 ( 33 S. E. 437 ), controlling in this case, since in the Davis case, a consent order was taken at the appearance term, setting the demurrer for a hearing at the trial term. | 2 | 1940–1940 |
Gordon v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1940And in Gordon v. Hudson, 120 Ga. 698 ( 48 S. E. 131 ), a “numerously-signed” ; petition was presented to the judge before the appearance term, requesting him not to hold court at that term, and giving the reasons for such request; whereupon the court passed an order allowing the defendants sixty days from the date of his order, in which to file answers, defenses, demurrers, and other pleas required by law to be filed at that term.. 1940And in Gordon v. Hudson, 120 Ga. 698 ( 48 S. E. 131 ), a “numerously-signed” ; petition was presented to the judge before the appearance term, requesting him not to hold court at that term, and giving the reasons for such request; whereupon the court passed an order allowing the defendants sixty days from the date of his order, in which to file answers, defenses, demurrers, and other pleas required by law to be filed at that term.. | 2 | 1940–1940 |
West v. Miller
green
1 sentence1966Chambers v. Harlan Fuel Co., 32 Ga. App. 199 ( 122 SE 802 ); Grant v. Grant, 202 Ga. 40 ( 41 SE2d 534 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Chambers v. Harlan Fuel Co.
green
1 sentence1966Chambers v. Harlan Fuel Co., 32 Ga. App. 199 ( 122 SE 802 ); Grant v. Grant, 202 Ga. 40 ( 41 SE2d 534 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Grant v. Grant
green
2 sentences1966Chambers v. Harlan Fuel Co., 32 Ga. App. 199 ( 122 SE 802 ); Grant v. Grant, 202 Ga. 40 ( 41 SE2d 534 ). 1966Chambers v. Harlan Fuel Co., 32 Ga. App. 199 ( 122 SE 802 ); Grant v. Grant, 202 Ga. 40 ( 41 SE2d 534 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Morgan v. Crowley
green
1 sentence1966Morgan v. Crowley, 91 Ga. App. 68 (5) ( 85 SE2d 40 ). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Stanfield v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1962Again, we think that the case of Stanfield v. Johnson, 95 Ga. App. 349 , supra, settles the matter and the overruling of the demurrer was not error. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Crowley v. Calhoun
green
2 sentences1959Sims v. Ethridge, 169 Ga. 400 (2) ( 150 S. E. 647 ); Crowley v. Calhoun, 161 Ga. 354 (3) ( 130 S. E. 563 ) and cases cited. 1959Sims v. Ethridge, 169 Ga. 400 (2) ( 150 S. E. 647 ); Crowley v. Calhoun, 161 Ga. 354 (3) ( 130 S. E. 563 ) and cases cited. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Sims v. Etheridge
green
2 sentences1959Sims v. Ethridge, 169 Ga. 400 (2) ( 150 S. E. 647 ); Crowley v. Calhoun, 161 Ga. 354 (3) ( 130 S. E. 563 ) and cases cited. 1959Sims v. Ethridge, 169 Ga. 400 (2) ( 150 S. E. 647 ); Crowley v. Calhoun, 161 Ga. 354 (3) ( 130 S. E. 563 ) and cases cited. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Jett v. Jones
green
2 sentences1958Jett v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 531 ( 74 S. E. 2d 483 ). 1958Jett v. Jones, 87 Ga. App. 531 ( 74 S. E. 2d 483 ). | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Langley v. City Council
green
2 sentences1956Langley v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 590 (11) ( 45 S. E. 486 , 98 Am. 1956Langley v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 590 (11) ( 45 S. E. 486 , 98 Am. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Maecker v. Maecker
green
1 sentence1953In Story v. First National Bank of Thomson, 34 Ga. App. 27 ( 128 S. E. 12 ), it is held: “Where a general demurrer to a plea is overruled and no exception to this ruling is taken, the ruling becomes the law of the case and 'stands as a solemn adjudication that the plea was good.’ Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 531 ( 118 S. E. 494 ), and citations. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Home Insurance v. Clinkscales
neutral
1 sentence1953In Story v. First National Bank of Thomson, 34 Ga. App. 27 ( 128 S. E. 12 ), it is held: “Where a general demurrer to a plea is overruled and no exception to this ruling is taken, the ruling becomes the law of the case and 'stands as a solemn adjudication that the plea was good.’ Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 531 ( 118 S. E. 494 ), and citations. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Heath v. Miller
green
2 sentences1947Heath v. Miller, 197 Ga. 443 (3) ( 29 S. E. 2d, 416 ). 1947Heath v. Miller, 197 Ga. 443 (3) ( 29 S. E. 2d, 416 ). | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Butler v. State
green
2 sentences1942It was likewise held in Butler v. State, 18 Ga. App. 201 ( 89 S. E. 178 ): “When the crime charged is only a misdemeanor, any number of offenses of the same nature may be included in the same accusation [indictment]. 1942It was likewise held in Butler v. State, 18 Ga. App. 201 ( 89 S.E. 178 ): "When the crime charged is only a misdemeanor, any number of offenses of the same nature may be included in the same accusation [indictment]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
McDonald v. Baton
green
2 sentences1942It was likewise held in Butler v. State, 18 Ga. App. 201 ( 89 S. E. 178 ): “When the crime charged is only a misdemeanor, any number of offenses of the same nature may be included in the same accusation [indictment]. 1942It was likewise held in Butler v. State, 18 Ga. App. 201 ( 89 S.E. 178 ): "When the crime charged is only a misdemeanor, any number of offenses of the same nature may be included in the same accusation [indictment]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank
green
2 sentences1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Ridley v. Hightower
green
2 sentences1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Branan v. Southern Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Kinard & Son v. Mangham
neutral
1 sentence1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Taff v. Larey
green
2 sentences1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Real Estate Loan Co. v. Pugh
green
1 sentence1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Smith v. Vickers
neutral
1 sentence1939Before the passage of the negotiable-instruments law (Ga. L. 1924, p. 126 et seq.), “A person who merely writes his name on the back of such a paper [a note or bill of exchange] to guarantee its payment, but whose indorsement is neither essential to nor proper in the due transmission of title in the course of negotiation, is a surety only, and is not entitled to notice as an indorser.” Sibley v. American Exchange National Bank, 97 Ga. 126 (4) ( 25 S. E. 470 ); Ridley v. Hightower, 112 Ga. 476 ( 37 S. E. 733 ); Preston v. Dozier, 135 Ga. 25 ( 68 S. E. 793 ); Taff v. Larey, 29 Ga. App. 631 ( 116 | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Bass v. West
green
2 sentences1928R. 290 ), and of Bass v. West, 110 Ga. 698 ( 36 S. E. 244 ), the allegations of the petition were sufficient to stand the test of the general demurrer, and the judgment sustaining the demurrer was error. 1928R. 290 ), and of Bass v. West, 110 Ga. 698 ( 36 S. E. 244 ), the allegations of the petition were sufficient to stand the test of the general demurrer, and the judgment sustaining the demurrer was error. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Jones v. Owens
neutral
1 sentence1919But we are of the opinion that the defense set up by way of amendment, based upon the ground that the notes were unenforceable because they were based upon an illegal and immoral consideration, was meritorious, and the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer thereto, and the Court of Appeals, instead of affirming the judgment of the court below, should have reversed it.” Eor full opinion of the Supreme Court see 149 Ga. ( 99 S. E. 121 ). | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.