evidence support violation in Connecticut

2009Rather, it instructed the jury that "a person acts intentionally with respect to conduct when his conscious objective is to engage in such conduct. " (Emphasis added.) Intent to engage in proscribed conduct is not sufficient. [4] "[I]t is improper for the trial court to read [the] entire statute [on intent] to a jury when the pleadings or the evidence support a violation of only a portion of the statute...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, supra, 244 Conn. at 235 , 710 A.2d 732 .

2009Rather, it instructed the jury that "a person acts intentionally with respect to conduct when his conscious objective is to engage in such conduct. " (Emphasis added.) Intent to engage in proscribed conduct is not sufficient. [4] "[I]t is improper for the trial court to read [the] entire statute [on intent] to a jury when the pleadings or the evidence support a violation of only a portion of the statute...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, supra, 244 Conn. at 235 , 710 A.2d 732 .

2000In instructing the jury on intent, however, the court read the entire statutory definition contained in § 53a-3 (11), including a reference to intent to engage in proscribed conduct. 14 As our Supreme Court has previously stated, “[i]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury when the pleadings or the evidence support a violation of only a portion of the statute . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, supra, 244 Conn. 235 ; State v. Dinoto, 229 Conn. 580, 584 , 642 A.2d 717 (1994); State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 537 , 643 A.2

2000In instructing the jury on intent, however, the court read the entire statutory definition contained in § 53a-3 (11), including a reference to intent to engage in proscribed conduct. 14 As our Supreme Court has previously stated, “[i]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury when the pleadings or the evidence support a violation of only a portion of the statute . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Austin, supra, 244 Conn. 235 ; State v. Dinoto, 229 Conn. 580, 584 , 642 A.2d 717 (1994); State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 537 , 643 A.2

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2018We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salters v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 819 , 170 A.3d 25 . "[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2017We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeJesus , 260 Conn. 466 , 474, 797 A.2d 1101 (2002).

2017We must determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeJesus , 260 Conn. 466 , 474, 797 A.2d 1101 (2002).

2010Tliis broad discretion . . . necessarily includes deciding which citizens should be prosecuted and for what charges they are to be held accountable . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690, 699 , 707 A.2d 1255 (1998). 5 Appellate counsel for the defendant further noted that the failure to focus on the term “firearm” may have been ineffective assistance of counsel or may have been a tactical decision. 6 General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cau

2010Tliis broad discretion . . . necessarily includes deciding which citizens should be prosecuted and for what charges they are to be held accountable . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690, 699 , 707 A.2d 1255 (1998). 5 Appellate counsel for the defendant further noted that the failure to focus on the term “firearm” may have been ineffective assistance of counsel or may have been a tactical decision. 6 General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... (5) with intent to cau

2010In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Fogarty’s property could have been planted in the defendant’s wallet. 2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when ... (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm . . . .” 3 “[I]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury whe

2010In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Fogarty’s property could have been planted in the defendant’s wallet. 2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when ... (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm . . . .” 3 “[I]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury whe

2010In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Fogarty’s property could have been planted in the defendant’s wallet. 2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when ... (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm . . . .” 3 “[I]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury whe

2010In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Fogarty’s property could have been planted in the defendant’s wallet. 2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when ... (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm . . . .” 3 “[I]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury whe

2005As defined by our statute, a person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct when his conscious objective is to cause such result or engage in such conduct(Emphasis added.) The defendant relies in part 7 on State v. DeBarros, supra, 58 Conn. App. 673 , to support his contention, properly noting that “[i]t is improper for the trial court to read an entire statute to a jury when the pleadings or the evidence support a violation of only a portion of the statute . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 682.

1994State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 583 , 560 A.2d 426 (1989); see State v. Franko, 199 Conn. 481, 493 , 508 A.2d 22 (1986); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631, 645 , 458 A.2d 379 (1983).

1994State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 583 , 560 A.2d 426 (1989); see State v. Franko, 199 Conn. 481, 493 , 508 A.2d 22 (1986); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631, 645 , 458 A.2d 379 (1983).

1994In light of the state’s concession in the Appellate Court that it had presented no evidence of the explicit threat of the use of force; 6 see State v. Diggs, 219 Conn. 295, 298-302 , 592 A.2d 949 (1991); we concluded that the trial court had acted improperly.

1994In light of the state’s concession in the Appellate Court that it had presented no evidence of the explicit threat of the use of force; 6 see State v. Diggs, 219 Conn. 295, 298-302 , 592 A.2d 949 (1991); we concluded that the trial court had acted improperly.

1994State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 583 , 560 A.2d 426 (1989); see State v. Franko, 199 Conn. 481, 493 , 508 A.2d 22 (1986); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631, 645 , 458 A.2d 379 (1983).

1994State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 583 , 560 A.2d 426 (1989); see State v. Franko, 199 Conn. 481, 493 , 508 A.2d 22 (1986); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 631, 645 , 458 A.2d 379 (1983).