special injury rule in Florida

2011Regulation, 390 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla.1980) (“If the legislature had meant for the special injury rule to be preserved in the area of environmental protection, it could easily have said so.”).

2009Regulation, 390 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla.1980) (“If the [Legislature had meant for the special injury rule to be preserved in the area of environmental protection, it could easily have said so.”).

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2016Appellants claim that they have standing, pursuant to Rickman v. Whitehurst, 78 Fla. 152 , 74 So. 205 (1917), based on their allegation of special injury, and also as.taxpayers under the limited exception to the special injury rule expressed in Department of Administra *362 tion v. Home, 269 So.2d 659 (Fla.1972).

2016In Home , the Florida Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the special injury rule in cases where a taxpayer challenges a legislative exercise of the taxing and spending power in contravention of specific constitutional provisions. 269 So.2d at 663 .

2016Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (“[I]t has long been recognized that in a representative democracy the public’s representatives in government should ordinarily be relied on to institute the appropriate legal proceedings to prevent the unlawful exercise of the state or county’s taxing and spending power.”); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-45 , 126 S.Ct. 1854 , 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (“A taxpayer plaintiff has no right to insist that the government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax lia

2001See Dep't of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So.2d 659, 662-63 (Fla.1972) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)); Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) ("A taxpayer may institute such a suit without a showing of special injury if he attacks ... taxing or spending authority on the ground that it exceeds specific limitations imposed on the... taxing or spending power by the ...

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2011Significantly, in Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla.1989), this Court recognized that remedies provided in chapter 400 may be waived when it ruled that the attorney’s fees provision of section 400.023 is “merely a statutory right to seek fees,” and that “[cjlearly, statutory rights can be waived.” See also Bland, 927 So.2d at 258 (“[A] compelling argument can be made that, absent a legislative restriction, the courts should honor a party’s decision to contract away statutory protections.”); § 400.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (stating that nursing home contract shall

2007Moreover, in Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla.1989), the Florida Supreme Court recognized that remedies provided in Chapter 400 may be waived when it ruled that the attorney's fees provision of section 400.023 is "merely a statutory right to seek fees," and that "[c]learly, statutory rights can be waived." See also Bland v. Health Care & Ret.

2016Horne followed a United States Supreme Court case, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), which established a narrow exception for standing in federal taxpayer suits.

2016Horne followed a United States Supreme Court case, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), which established a narrow exception for standing in federal taxpayer suits.

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2016See, e.g., North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 156 (Fla.1985) (finding no reason to modify the special injury requirement for taxpayer suits); Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981) (reiterating that in the absence of a constitutional challenge a taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers to have standing); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1974) (stating that although it had created a limited exception to the Rick-man rule in Home “this Court did not intend to abrogate in any way the s

2015Renard v. Dade Cnty., 261 So.2d 832, 837 (Fla.1972) (“An aggrieved or adversely affected person having standing to sue is a person who has a legally recognizable interest which is or will be affected by the action of the zoning authority in question.

2006In Renard , the supreme court limited the application of the special injury rule in zoning suits by holding that "[t]he Boucher rule was not intended to be applied to zoning matters other than suits by individuals for zoning *1095 violations." 261 So.2d at 835 .

2006Although originally applied in taxpayer suits, the special injury rule was extended to zoning suits in Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132 (Fla.1958).

1988The final order which denies the plaintiffs' motion for temporary injunction and dismisses the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief is affirmed upon a holding that (a) the complaint failed to allege, as required by law, see Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132, 134-35 (Fla. 1958); Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Scott, 169 So.2d 368 , *1267 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), that the plaintiffs had standing under the special injury rule, or an exception thereto, to bring the instant lawsuit to open a temporarily closed public boat ramp at the Dinner Key Marina in Miami, Florida, see North Browa

2023By contrast, where plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants’ “actions resulted in damages in the form of a loss to their equity ownership in [the] LLC and a decrease in financial benefits to them,” they have “alleged an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other members of the LLC.” Ayres v. AG Processing Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (D.

2016Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (“[I]t has long been recognized that in a representative democracy the public’s representatives in government should ordinarily be relied on to institute the appropriate legal proceedings to prevent the unlawful exercise of the state or county’s taxing and spending power.”); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-45 , 126 S.Ct. 1854 , 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (“A taxpayer plaintiff has no right to insist that the government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax lia

2016Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (“[I]t has long been recognized that in a representative democracy the public’s representatives in government should ordinarily be relied on to institute the appropriate legal proceedings to prevent the unlawful exercise of the state or county’s taxing and spending power.”); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-45 , 126 S.Ct. 1854 , 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (“A taxpayer plaintiff has no right to insist that the government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax lia

2016Horne, 269 So.2d at 663 ; Alachua Cty. v. Scharps, 855 So.2d 195, 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2016Smith, 944 So.2d at 1094 ; Scharps, 855 So.2d at 198 .

2011Significantly, in Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla.1989), this Court recognized that remedies provided in chapter 400 may be waived when it ruled that the attorney’s fees provision of section 400.023 is “merely a statutory right to seek fees,” and that “[cjlearly, statutory rights can be waived.” See also Bland, 927 So.2d at 258 (“[A] compelling argument can be made that, absent a legislative restriction, the courts should honor a party’s decision to contract away statutory protections.”); § 400.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (stating that nursing home contract shall

2006Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 341 So.2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

2006Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1984) ("The question of standing to challenge zoning decisions was comprehensively explained in Renard v. Dade County. "); Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, 390 So.2d at 67 (noting that the supreme court has carved out an exception to the special injury rule in zoning suits and citing Renard for this proposition).

1988Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 155-56 (Fla. 1985); O'Dell v. Walsh, 81 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1955); Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); and (b) it was plain on this record that the plaintiffs could not by amendment have possibly shown any standing to bring this lawsuit.

1980See Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447 , 52 So. 802 (1910); Case Comment-Public Nuisance: Standing to Sue without Showing "Special Injury," 26 F.S.U.L.Rev. 360 (1974).