17 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2018The Court observed: "Apart from circumstances of that magnitude, however, there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt." Id. at 659 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039 . 9 We acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit has applied the second Cronic exception in cases similar to Lewis's. 2012More importantly, as noted by the State, since Christian was decided, the United States Supreme Court has explained that for the Cronic presumption of prejudice to be applicable, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “must be complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ) (noting that presumption of prejudice will apply only “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.”) (emphasis added). | 4 | 9 |
Conner v. Stategreen2 sentences2017And Hamilton states that Jaffe “struggled with the law governing Hamilton’s case” and cites two pages in the transcript as proof that the trial court “needed to help and assist him” and that Jaffe “admitted on record that he needed to review the rules.” Id. [15] Hamilton has not demonstrated that these alleged deficiencies warrant the application of the Cronic presumption, which, again, is reserved for cases involving “limited circumstances of extreme magnitude.” See Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1254 . 2017And Hamilton states that Jaffe “struggled with the law governing Hamilton’s case” and cites two pages in the transcript as proof that the trial court “needed to help and assist him” and that Jaffe “admitted on record that he needed to review the rules.” Id. [15] Hamilton has not demonstrated that these alleged deficiencies warrant the application of the Cronic presumption, which, again, is reserved for cases involving “limited circumstances of extreme magnitude.” See Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1254 . | 2 | 3 |
Spranger v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The posteonviction court did not enter findings on the Cronic claim; accordingly, no deference to the trial court’s conclusion is due under Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117,1119-20 (Ind.1995). 1999The posteonviction court did not enter findings on the Cronic claim; accordingly, no deference to the trial court’s conclusion is due under Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117,1119-20 (Ind.1995). | 2 | 2 |
Minnick v. Stategreen2 sentences2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot 2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot | 1 | 3 |
Keith Miller v. Walter E. Martingreen1 sentence2018See Miller v. Martin , 481 F.3d 468 , 472 (7th Cir. 2007) ; Patrasso v. Nelson , 121 F.3d 297 , 303-05 (7th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017And Hamilton states that Jaffe “struggled with the law governing Hamilton’s case” and cites two pages in the transcript as proof that the trial court “needed to help and assist him” and that Jaffe “admitted on record that he needed to review the rules.” Id. [15] Hamilton has not demonstrated that these alleged deficiencies warrant the application of the Cronic presumption, which, again, is reserved for cases involving “limited circumstances of extreme magnitude.” See Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1254 . 2017And Hamilton states that Jaffe “struggled with the law governing Hamilton’s case” and cites two pages in the transcript as proof that the trial court “needed to help and assist him” and that Jaffe “admitted on record that he needed to review the rules.” Id. [15] Hamilton has not demonstrated that these alleged deficiencies warrant the application of the Cronic presumption, which, again, is reserved for cases involving “limited circumstances of extreme magnitude.” See Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1254 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollingreen2 sentences2017“We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective,’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001)). [12] Acuna-Hinojosa first argues that a Cronic violation occurred. 2017“We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective,’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001)). [12] Acuna-Hinojosa first argues that a Cronic violation occurred. | 1 | 1 |
Timberlake v. Stategreen2 sentences2017“We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective,’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001)). [12] Acuna-Hinojosa first argues that a Cronic violation occurred. 2017“We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and ‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective,’” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001)). [12] Acuna-Hinojosa first argues that a Cronic violation occurred. | 1 | 1 |
Dillon v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660-61 .8 8 While we note that Wilson’s defense resulted in Jenkins being acquitted of one Class A felony count of child molesting and Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor, our Supreme Court has said, “We do not determine adequacy of representation on the basis of whether or not an acquittal was won.” Dillon v. State, 448 N.E.2d 21, 27 (Ind. 1983). 2015Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660-61 .8 8 While we note that Wilson’s defense resulted in Jenkins being acquitted of one Class A felony count of child molesting and Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor, our Supreme Court has said, “We do not determine adequacy of representation on the basis of whether or not an acquittal was won.” Dillon v. State, 448 N.E.2d 21, 27 (Ind. 1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Anayagreen2 sentences2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). 2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Conegreen2 sentences2012More importantly, as noted by the State, since Christian was decided, the United States Supreme Court has explained that for the Cronic presumption of prejudice to be applicable, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “must be complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ) (noting that presumption of prejudice will apply only “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.”) (emphasis added). 2012More importantly, as noted by the State, since Christian was decided, the United States Supreme Court has explained that for the Cronic presumption of prejudice to be applicable, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “must be complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ) (noting that presumption of prejudice will apply only “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.”) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Cooke v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). 2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Banks v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Banks v. State, 884 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Holman, 314 F.3d at 839-40 (concluding that two-part Strickland analysis, not Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applied where trial counsel, without client’s approval, 12 acknowledged that his client was guilty of one of numerous charges to bolster his case for innocence on the remaining charges)). 2012See Banks v. State, 884 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Holman, 314 F.3d at 839-40 (concluding that two-part Strickland analysis, not Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applied where trial counsel, without client’s approval, 12 acknowledged that his client was guilty of one of numerous charges to bolster his case for innocence on the remaining charges)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Freeman Holmangreen2 sentences2012As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837 , 839 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002), “Cronic only applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case; if counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate test.” Here, Mr. Mohler clearly did not fail to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case. 2012See Banks v. State, 884 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Holman, 314 F.3d at 839-40 (concluding that two-part Strickland analysis, not Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applied where trial counsel, without client’s approval, 12 acknowledged that his client was guilty of one of numerous charges to bolster his case for innocence on the remaining charges)). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). 2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). 2012See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 850 (Del. 2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences1998Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 395 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2593-94 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 333 (Powell, J., concurring). 1998Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 395 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. at 2593-94 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 333 (Powell, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Wilfred W. Nielsen v. Frank X. Hopkins, Warden, Nebraska State Penitentiarygreen | 1 | 1 |
Games v. Stategreen1 sentence1997We recently discussed the operation of the Cronic exception to Strickland (and its narrowness) in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 478-80 (Ind.1997), reh'g granted on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Charles R. Chadwick v. Calvin E. Green, Superintendent, Wayne Correctional Institution, Odum, Georgiagreen1 sentence1997Federal courts have uniformly held that the circumstances to which Cronic’s presumption applies are “very limited in number," Nielsen v. Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir.1995), applying only when "the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all," Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir.1984), and that the "burden of proof under Cronic is a very heavy one.” Stone v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1071 , 109 S.Ct. 1354 , 103 L.Ed.2d 821 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Raymond R. Stone v. Richard L. Dugger, Tom Bartongreen1 sentence1997Federal courts have uniformly held that the circumstances to which Cronic’s presumption applies are “very limited in number," Nielsen v. Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir.1995), applying only when "the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all," Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir.1984), and that the "burden of proof under Cronic is a very heavy one.” Stone v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1071 , 109 S.Ct. 1354 , 103 L.Ed.2d 821 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James Patrasso v. Keith O. Nelson
green
1 sentence2018See Miller v. Martin , 481 F.3d 468 , 472 (7th Cir. 2007) ; Patrasso v. Nelson , 121 F.3d 297 , 303-05 (7th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
1 sentence2018The Court observed: "Apart from circumstances of that magnitude, however, there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt." Id. at 659 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039 . 9 We acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit has applied the second Cronic exception in cases similar to Lewis's. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Christian v. State
green
2 sentences2012But the court concluded that “[c]ounsel’s concession as to the element of penetration did not put the State’s charges to a meaningful adversarial test[,]” and that the Cronic presumption of prejudice was applicable Id. at 7 . 2012But the court concluded that “[c]ounsel’s concession as to the element of penetration did not put the State’s charges to a meaningful adversarial test[,]” and that the Cronic presumption of prejudice was applicable Id. at 7 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot 2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Minnick v. Indiana
neutral
2 sentences2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot 2001There are three circumstances under which a Cronic claim may be made: (1) there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1998) (quot | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Roche v. State
green
1 sentence1999We reject Williams’ claim for reasons similar to those elaborated in Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.); Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind.1998), reh’g denied; Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind.1997), reh’g denied. *162 IV. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1999We reject Williams’ claim for reasons similar to those elaborated in Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.); Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind.1998), reh’g denied; Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind.1997), reh’g denied. *162 IV. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Coleman v. State
green
1 sentence1999We reject Williams’ claim for reasons similar to those elaborated in Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.); Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind.1998), reh’g denied; Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind.1997), reh’g denied. *162 IV. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Games v. State
green
1 sentence1997We recently discussed the operation of the Cronic exception to Strickland (and its narrowness) in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 478-80 (Ind.1997), reh'g granted on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cooper v. United States
green
1 sentence1997Federal courts have uniformly held that the circumstances to which Cronic’s presumption applies are “very limited in number," Nielsen v. Hopkins, 58 F.3d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir.1995), applying only when "the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all," Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir.1984), and that the "burden of proof under Cronic is a very heavy one.” Stone v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1071 , 109 S.Ct. 1354 , 103 L.Ed.2d 821 (1989). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Green v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.