15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 | 4 | 6 |
Bell v. Conegreen2 sentences2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 | 3 | 9 |
People v. Benavidesgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 86 .) ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. 2015(People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 86 .) ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. | 1 | 2 |
Yarborough v. Gentrygreen2 sentences2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the 2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the | 1 | 1 |
In Re Avenagreen2 sentences2025(See In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727 [finding no Cronic error even though defense counsel’s “representation was minimal at best”].) Rather, defense counsel’s decision to acknowledge Robillard’s culpability in certain counts was likely a tactical choice to refute the robbery charge, especially considering the strong evidence (which included video footage) supporting his guilt on the other charges. 2025(See In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727 [finding no Cronic error even though defense counsel’s “representation was minimal at best”].) Rather, defense counsel’s decision to acknowledge Robillard’s culpability in certain counts was likely a tactical choice to refute the robbery charge, especially considering the strong evidence (which included video footage) supporting his guilt on the other charges. | 1 | 1 |
James Patrasso v. Keith O. Nelsongreen2 sentences2025(See People v. Ruiz (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 324 , 330, fn. 1 [rejecting the People’s argument that Cronic’s exception “requires a complete failure of counsel throughout the entire trial,” noting that “the claim in Cone involved counsel’s failure only at the sentencing hearing”]; see also Patrasso v. Nelson (7th Cir. 1997) 16 121 F.3d 297, 299, 303-305 [granting habeas relief under Cronic where counsel made no arguments in mitigation at sentencing immediately after presenting arguments in support of unsuccessful post-trial motion].) On the present record, however, we cannot conclude that McKinney 2025(See People v. Ruiz (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 324 , 330, fn. 1 [rejecting the People’s argument that Cronic’s exception “requires a complete failure of counsel throughout the entire trial,” noting that “the claim in Cone involved counsel’s failure only at the sentencing hearing”]; see also Patrasso v. Nelson (7th Cir. 1997) 16 121 F.3d 297, 299, 303-305 [granting habeas relief under Cronic where counsel made no arguments in mitigation at sentencing immediately after presenting arguments in support of unsuccessful post-trial motion].) On the present record, however, we cannot conclude that McKinney | 1 | 1 |
Scott Schmidt v. Brian Fostergreen2 sentences2025(Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 ; see Schmidt v. Foster (7th Cir. 2018) 911 F.3d 469, 498 [only deprivations “on par with total absence” trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice].) Such complete failures “occur[] so rarely as to be almost nonexistent.” (People v. Ruiz (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 324 , 331.) Here, defense counsel did not completely fail to represent defendant at sentencing. 2025(Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 ; see Schmidt v. Foster (7th Cir. 2018) 911 F.3d 469, 498 [only deprivations “on par with total absence” trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice].) Such complete failures “occur[] so rarely as to be almost nonexistent.” (People v. Ruiz (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 324 , 331.) Here, defense counsel did not completely fail to represent defendant at sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Freemangreen1 sentence2025“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than sheer neglect.” (Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 8 [ 124 S.Ct. 1 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt.”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1150 [“It is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the | 1 | 1 |
Roderick Lewis v. Dushan Zateckygreen1 sentence2023Lexis 188; 2023 WL 2517936 ] [Cronic presumption of prejudice applied where defense counsel failed to act in role of advocate at resentencing]; see Lewis v. Zatecky (7th Cir. 2021) 993 F.3d 994 , 1004–1006 [Cronic presumption of prejudice applied where defense counsel completely failed to advocate for defendant at sentencing, stating only, “ ‘I’m going to defer to [the defendant] if he has any comments. | 1 | 1 |
Burdine v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2021(Cronic, at pp. 658–661; accord, Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685 , 695–696 [A critical stage is “a step of a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that held significant consequences for the accused”].) In Javor v. United States, supra, 724 F.2d at page 833 , the federal appeals court held “when an attorney for a criminal defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial, such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate showing of prejudice is necessary.” (See Burdine v. Johnson (5th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 336 , 341 [“consistent unconsciousness of [defense] counsel” due t | 1 | 1 |
Eddie G. Javor v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021(Cronic, at pp. 658–661; accord, Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685 , 695–696 [A critical stage is “a step of a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that held significant consequences for the accused”].) In Javor v. United States, supra, 724 F.2d at page 833 , the federal appeals court held “when an attorney for a criminal defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial, such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate showing of prejudice is necessary.” (See Burdine v. Johnson (5th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 336 , 341 [“consistent unconsciousness of [defense] counsel” due t | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Nixongreen2 sentences2017(Id. at pp. 656–657.) To come within the exception, the United States Supreme Court has explained, counsel‘s failure to represent the defendant must be ―complete.‖ (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) The California Supreme Court has also deemed the Cronic exception to be extremely limited: ―Defendants have been relieved of the obligation to show prejudice only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.‖ (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 353 ; see also, Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 190 [―narrow exception‖].) Ce 2017(Id. at pp. 656–657.) To come within the exception, the United States Supreme Court has explained, counsel‘s failure to represent the defendant must be ―complete.‖ (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) The California Supreme Court has also deemed the Cronic exception to be extremely limited: ―Defendants have been relieved of the obligation to show prejudice only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.‖ (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 353 ; see also, Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 190 [―narrow exception‖].) Ce | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Benfordgreen1 sentence2013(Cf. U.S. v. Benford (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3d 1228, 1231-1233 [pretrial status conference was not a "critical stage" in that case]; Hereford v. Warren (6th Cir. 2008) 536 F.3d 523, 529-530 [midtrial bench 57 conference between prosecution, codefendant's counsel, and court without defendant's counsel did not qualify as Cronic error]; U.S. v. Olano (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 1180 , 1193 [midtrial conference with court, to which defense counsel arrived late, was not "critical" phase of trial because "matters discussed were minor"].) C. | 1 | 1 |
Hereford v. Warrengreen1 sentence2013(Cf. U.S. v. Benford (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3d 1228, 1231-1233 [pretrial status conference was not a "critical stage" in that case]; Hereford v. Warren (6th Cir. 2008) 536 F.3d 523, 529-530 [midtrial bench 57 conference between prosecution, codefendant's counsel, and court without defendant's counsel did not qualify as Cronic error]; U.S. v. Olano (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 1180 , 1193 [midtrial conference with court, to which defense counsel arrived late, was not "critical" phase of trial because "matters discussed were minor"].) C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boningreen2 sentences1996“We recognize that in some cases ineffective assistance must be presumed ‘without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial’ because ‘the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small’ that the cost of litigating the issue is unjustified.” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 844 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 765 P.2d 460 ], quoting Cronic, supra at pp. 659-660 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 668].) As in Bonin , we conclude this case does not come within Cronic’s exception to the rule requiring a showing of prejudice laid down in Strickland v. Washingto 1996“We recognize that in some cases ineffective assistance must be presumed ‘without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial’ because ‘the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small’ that the cost of litigating the issue is unjustified.” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 844 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 765 P.2d 460 ], quoting Cronic, supra at pp. 659-660 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 668].) As in Bonin , we conclude this case does not come within Cronic’s exception to the rule requiring a showing of prejudice laid down in Strickland v. Washingto | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c 2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c | 4 | 1996–2023 |
In Re Visciotti
green
2 sentences2025(In re Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 353 ; Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 658–660.) “Defendants have been relieved of the obligation to show prejudice only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.” (In re Visciotti, at p. 353.) Where, as here, a claim of Cronic error is based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697, 696 [ 122 S.Ct. 1843 , 152 L.Ed.2d 914 ].) We cannot conclude that defense counsel completely failed to subject t 2017(Id. at pp. 656–657.) To come within the exception, the United States Supreme Court has explained, counsel‘s failure to represent the defendant must be ―complete.‖ (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) The California Supreme Court has also deemed the Cronic exception to be extremely limited: ―Defendants have been relieved of the obligation to show prejudice only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.‖ (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 353 ; see also, Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 190 [―narrow exception‖].) Ce | 3 | 2015–2025 |
People v. Rices
green
2 sentences2025As relevant here, prejudice is presumed when there has been a “complete denial of counsel” at a “critical stage” of the proceedings or when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (Ibid.; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695-696 .) The “attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Cone, at p. 697.) It is not enough for a defendant to identify particular omissions “at specific 15 points.” (Ibid.) The Cronic exception to the ordinary requirement to demonstrate prejudice is “very narrow.” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 91 .) We conclude that 2025As relevant here, prejudice is presumed when there has been a “complete denial of counsel” at a “critical stage” of the proceedings or when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (Ibid.; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695-696 .) The “attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Cone, at p. 697.) It is not enough for a defendant to identify particular omissions “at specific 15 points.” (Ibid.) The Cronic exception to the ordinary requirement to demonstrate prejudice is “very narrow.” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 91 .) We conclude that | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Doolin
green
2 sentences2025(United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453 .) In Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. 685 , for example, the high court considered the defendant’s Cronic claim that defense counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial failed to adduce mitigating evidence and waived closing argument. 2025(United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453 .) In Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. 685 , for example, the high court considered the defendant’s Cronic claim that defense counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial failed to adduce mitigating evidence and waived closing argument. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 2025Rather than attempting to show prejudice, defendant argues prejudice should be presumed because his attorney “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 .) However, the Supreme Court later clarified that, for the Cronic rule to apply, “the attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 697 .) Thus, prejudice is presumed under Cronic “ ‘only where counsel was either totally absent or was prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Glasser v. United States
green
1 sentence2024These cases, however, do not support that the first Cronic exception can be met where counsel was present during these stages.4 4 Calderon de Leon’s reliance on Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60 , 75–76 is inapposite as Glasser involved prejudice stemming from 6 The second Cronic exception—when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”—is also inapplicable here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Ledesma
green
2 sentences2023Counsel’s Representation Fell Below the Objective Standard of Reasonableness Under Prevailing Professional Norms To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional norms” and that, as a consequence, the defendant was prejudiced. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 , 216–217.) The Attorney General appropriately concedes that “[t]his is the rare case where [the] deficient performance prong of Strickland is clear from the 6 record.” It is part of 2023Counsel’s Representation Fell Below the Objective Standard of Reasonableness Under Prevailing Professional Norms To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional norms” and that, as a consequence, the defendant was prejudiced. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 , 216–217.) The Attorney General appropriately concedes that “[t]his is the rare case where [the] deficient performance prong of Strickland is clear from the 6 record.” It is part of | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Banks
green
2 sentences2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c 2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Scott
green
2 sentences2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c 2021A. Legal Principles “Under Cronic, if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be reversed without further prejudice analysis. [Citation.] ‘A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. [Citation.] ‘But when the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only stand when c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2017(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 690–691.) Instead, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland) provides the guiding principles, and it requires a showing of both deficient professional performance and prejudice. 2017(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 690–691.) Instead, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland) provides the guiding principles, and it requires a showing of both deficient professional performance and prejudice. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Brent Paul Swanson
green
1 sentence2015(United States v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070 .) As detailed above, nothing comparable occurred here. 13 leave after Doe told him she had no money, he did not take anything when he left, there was mud smeared on the bed sheets indicating defendant had been on the bed, and Doe’s underwear was on the floor next to the bed when the police arrived. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
cluster 701822
green
1 sentence2013(Cf. U.S. v. Benford (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3d 1228, 1231-1233 [pretrial status conference was not a "critical stage" in that case]; Hereford v. Warren (6th Cir. 2008) 536 F.3d 523, 529-530 [midtrial bench 57 conference between prosecution, codefendant's counsel, and court without defendant's counsel did not qualify as Cronic error]; U.S. v. Olano (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 1180 , 1193 [midtrial conference with court, to which defense counsel arrived late, was not "critical" phase of trial because "matters discussed were minor"].) C. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2013(Id. at p. 659.) Under Cronic, the Sixth Amendment is violated where there is a "complete denial of counsel" or a defendant is "denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial." (Ibid., 43 fn. omitted.) There is also a violation where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing . . . ." (Ibid.) A denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel occurs in a third situation, not being invoked here, when "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effectiv | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.