Cronic exception in Illinois

2025Id. ¶ 25 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-61 (1984)). ¶ 91 “The United States Supreme Court has characterized the second Cronic exception, failing to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, as narrow and infrequently applied.” People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640, ¶ 26 (citing Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 , ¶ 26, citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).

2023We disagree. ¶ 20 The second Cronic exception to Strickland’s prejudice requirement is “narrow” and applies “infrequently.” People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶27 (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).

2026In People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989), this court explained that the second Cronic exception applies when ‘counsel’s effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely to incompetence, but to no representation at all.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 267 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ). *** Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has explained that ‘Cronic only applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case; if counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate test.’ (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Holman, 31

2025Id. ¶ 25 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-61 (1984)). ¶ 91 “The United States Supreme Court has characterized the second Cronic exception, failing to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, as narrow and infrequently applied.” People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640, ¶ 26 (citing Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 , ¶ 26, citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).

2026In People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989), this court explained that the second Cronic exception applies when ‘counsel’s effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely to incompetence, but to no representation at all.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 267 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ). *** Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has explained that ‘Cronic only applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case; if counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate test.’ (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Holman, 31

2025Id. ¶ 25 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-61 (1984)). ¶ 91 “The United States Supreme Court has characterized the second Cronic exception, failing to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, as narrow and infrequently applied.” People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640, ¶ 26 (citing Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 , ¶ 26, citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).

2025Id. (citing Miller v. - 26 - 2025 IL App (2d) 230543 Martin, 481 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir. 2007)).

2022Id. (citing Miller v. Martin, 481 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir. 2007)).

2016The result was that “counsel’s actions deprived defendant of the right of having the issue of his guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue.” Id. ¶ 28 The second and only other time we applied the second Cronic exception was in People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004).

2016The result was that “counsel’s actions deprived defendant of the right of having the issue of his guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue.” Id. - 12 - ¶ 28 The second and only other time we applied the second Cronic exception was in People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004).

2026In People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989), this court explained that the second Cronic exception applies when ‘counsel’s effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely to incompetence, but to no representation at all.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 267 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ). *** Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has explained that ‘Cronic only applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case; if counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate test.’ (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Holman, 31

2026In People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989), this court explained that the second Cronic exception applies when ‘counsel’s effectiveness has fallen to such a low level as to amount not merely to incompetence, but to no representation at all.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 267 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ). *** Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has explained that ‘Cronic only applies if counsel fails to contest any portion of the prosecution’s case; if counsel mounts a partial defense, Strickland is the more appropriate test.’ (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Holman, 31

2011People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 270 , 131 Ill.Dec. 562 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). ¶ 28 Defendant fails to meet the Cronic standard because he argues neither a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the trial nor a failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

2011People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 270 , 131 Ill.Dec. 562 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). ¶ 28 Defendant fails to meet the Cronic standard because he argues neither a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the trial nor a failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

2026More specifically, defendant argues: “[E]ven were it the case that standing on the motion filed by prior counsel and neglecting to meaningfully add to [his] argument at the hearing was not Cronic error, going further and suggesting that [his] claims were legally dubious had the effect of meeting the State’s burden for it, just as was the case in [People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004)].” ¶ 22 Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the familiar two-prong test articulated in Strickland—and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1

2000After rejecting the Cronic analysis, the Shatner and Chandler courts went on to determine whether defense counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance according to the traditional standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by this court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-26 , 85 Ill.Dec. 441 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984).

2020App. 3d 744, 748 (2006) (“We decline to extend the Cronic test to termination proceedings.”); see also In re Jamarqon C., 338 Ill.

2020App. 3d 744, 748 (2006) (“We decline to extend the Cronic test to termination proceedings.”); see also In re Jamarqon C., 338 Ill.

2015App. 3d 595 (1994)), and stipulating to the admission of testimony that is inadmissible against a defendant by a supreme court rule (see People v. Hoerer, 375 Ill.

2015App. 3d 595 (1994)), and stipulating to the admission of testimony that is inadmissible against a defendant by a supreme court rule (see People v. Hoerer, 375 Ill.

1999See Foster, 168 Ill. 2d at 482 , 660 N.E.2d at 959 .

1999See Foster, 168 Ill. 2d at 482 , 660 N.E.2d at 959 .

2016Again, the second Cronic exception applies only when counsel “ ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Bell, 535 U.S. at 697 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ).

2016Again, the second Cronic exception applies only when counsel “ ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Bell, 535 U.S. at 697 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ).

2025Id. ¶ 25 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-61 (1984)). ¶ 91 “The United States Supreme Court has characterized the second Cronic exception, failing to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, as narrow and infrequently applied.” People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640, ¶ 26 (citing Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 , ¶ 26, citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).

2024This court has previously “decline[ed] to presume prejudice in a situation where the filing of the motion is a matter of discretion,” noting that a “general failure to file [such] a motion *** does not per se amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, as some basis must exist to make the motion.” People v. Bailey, 364 Ill.

2014See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79 (finding that the law requires an inquiry into a defendant's posttrial assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel). 14 When "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 . ¶ 26 First we address the defendant's argument that his claim is properly evaluated under the Cronic standard.

2014See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79 (finding that the law requires an inquiry into a defendant's posttrial assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel). 14 When "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 . ¶ 26 First we address the defendant's argument that his claim is properly evaluated under the Cronic standard.

2009See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 , 169 L.

2009See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 , 169 L.