17 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Juan M. Garrett v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2019Id. at 719-20 (“We evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective and may consider the charging information, jury instructions, and arguments of counsel.”). [18] Here, Dorsey observes that to establish the felony murder count as charged and presented to the jury, the State was required to prove that the killing occurred during the commission of an attempted robbery, which required evidence that Dorsey took a substantial step toward committing the robbery. 2014The reasonable-possibility standard applicable to claims under the actual-evidence test “permits convictions for multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary facts.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46) (emphasis supplied). | 3 | 3 |
Curry v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Curry v. State, 740 N.E.2d 162 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. de-mied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences2018The existence of a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1708-CR-2023 | February 6, 2018 Page 8 of 12 “‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of whether the [fact finder] may have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236 . 2017The existence of a “‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of whether the [fact-finder] may have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236 . | 13 | 2013–2018 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences2018The reasonable possibility standard “fairly implements the protections of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and also permits convictions for multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46. 2017The reasonable possibility standard “fairly implements the protections of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and also permits convictions for multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46. | 13 | 2013–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.