reasonable possibility error in California

2024(See People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 266 , citing People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24”]; see People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state- law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].) C.

2022A penalty phase error requires reversal if “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, fn. 15 , italics omitted.) This standard “ ‘is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) It is not satisfied so long as there is a doubt “based upon ‘reason.’ ” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317 .) A “reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry” must not “ ‘become in effect a second jury.’ ” (N

2024(See People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 266 , citing People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24”]; see People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state- law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].) C.

2022A penalty phase error requires reversal if “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, fn. 15 , italics omitted.) This standard “ ‘is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) It is not satisfied so long as there is a doubt “based upon ‘reason.’ ” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317 .) A “reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry” must not “ ‘become in effect a second jury.’ ” (N

2018Even if the prosecution's failure to disclose its rebuttal witness was erroneous, any such error was harmless because there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 , 960-961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 .) "[T]o find prejudice, we must find both (1) a reasonable possibility defense counsel would have presented the mitigating evidence ... and (2) a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had defendant presented the mitigating evidence." ( Id. at p. 961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 .) The eviden

2018Even if the prosecution's failure to disclose its rebuttal witness was erroneous, any such error was harmless because there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 , 960-961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 .) "[T]o find prejudice, we must find both (1) a reasonable possibility defense counsel would have presented the mitigating evidence ... and (2) a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had defendant presented the mitigating evidence." ( Id. at p. 961, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 .) The eviden

2017(See People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229 , 1264, fn. 11, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 , 64 P.3d 762 ["State law error occurring during the penalty phase will be considered prejudicial when there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict."]; see also Brady , supra , at pp. 577-578, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 , 236 P.3d 312 [improperly speculative victim impact testimony that victim's mother, who died six months after the murder, " 'gave up on life,' " was not prejudicial].) Lastly, defendant takes issue with an unsolicited response during the cross- *353 examination of Sandra Kennedy, whi

2017(See People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229 , 1264, fn. 11, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 , 64 P.3d 762 ["State law error occurring during the penalty phase will be considered prejudicial when there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict."]; see also Brady , supra , at pp. 577-578, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 , 236 P.3d 312 [improperly speculative victim impact testimony that victim's mother, who died six months after the murder, " 'gave up on life,' " was not prejudicial].) Lastly, defendant takes issue with an unsolicited response during the cross- *353 examination of Sandra Kennedy, whi

2024(See People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 266 , citing People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24”]; see People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state- law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].) C.

2020(People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 94 [the standard that an “error is reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the verdict . . . is essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24”]; see People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [the reasonable possibility standard applies “when assessing the effect of state-law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial”].) His statement was brief and isolated.

2014(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ] (Carter); Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37 .) The failure to do so constitutes “an error at the penalty phase of a capital trial” which, under state law, “is prejudicial if ‘there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict.’ [Citation.] This test is effectively the same as that under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ], which asks whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178

2014(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ] (Carter); Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37 .) The failure to do so constitutes “an error at the penalty phase of a capital trial” which, under state law, “is prejudicial if ‘there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict.’ [Citation.] This test is effectively the same as that under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ], which asks whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178

2011(See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360 , 110 P.3d 289 ]; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ]; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128 , 874 P.2d 903 ].) 12 CALJIC No. 8.88; see CALCRIM Nos. 763, 766. 13 See ante, part I.B.l.b.i. 14 See ante, part I.B.l.b.ii. 15 “State law error occurring during the penalty phase will be considered prejudicial when there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict. [Citations.] Our state reasonable possibility standard is the same, in subst

2011(See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360 , 110 P.3d 289 ]; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ]; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128 , 874 P.2d 903 ].) 12 CALJIC No. 8.88; see CALCRIM Nos. 763, 766. 13 See ante, part I.B.l.b.i. 14 See ante, part I.B.l.b.ii. 15 “State law error occurring during the penalty phase will be considered prejudicial when there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict. [Citations.] Our state reasonable possibility standard is the same, in subst

2006(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ].) Under the circumstances, to find prejudice, we must find both (1) a reasonable possibility defense counsel would have presented the mitigating evidence had he received the discovery he requested (otherwise the error would not have affected the trial at all), and (2) a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had defendant presented the mitigating evidence.

2006(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ].) Under the circumstances, to find prejudice, we must find both (1) a reasonable possibility defense counsel would have presented the mitigating evidence had he received the discovery he requested (otherwise the error would not have affected the trial at all), and (2) a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had defendant presented the mitigating evidence.

1994(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 ; see People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 201 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 753 P.2d 629 ]; People v. Crew, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1605-1606; and see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 22-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 709-711] [stating that there is little if any difference between the inquiry whether there is a reasonable possibility an error contributed to a verdict and requiring the beneficiary of the error to prove it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) Such a standard is appropriate where sentence choice under review is between life or death.

1994As here, the defendant in May contended the trial court had erred by failing to state proper reasons for consecutive sentencing. ( People v. May, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 838 .) Without discussion, reasoning, or explanation, the court cited People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 201 , for the proposition that the defendant was entitled to reversal if there was a "reasonable possibility" the result would have been different had proper reasons been stated. ( May, supra, at pp. 839-840 .) However, Heishman is one of the many examples of the application of the reasonable possibility test to

2018(See People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088 , 1107, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 , 839 P.2d 1020 .) "For prosecutorial misconduct at the penalty phase, we apply the reasonable-possibility standard of prejudice[,]" which is the " 'same in substance *706 and effect' as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test for prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ]." ( People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032 , 1092, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651 , 189 P.3d 911 .) To preserve such a claim for appeal, the " 'defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial

2018(See People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088 , 1107, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 , 839 P.2d 1020 .) "For prosecutorial misconduct at the penalty phase, we apply the reasonable-possibility standard of prejudice[,]" which is the " 'same in substance *706 and effect' as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test for prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ]." ( People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032 , 1092, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651 , 189 P.3d 911 .) To preserve such a claim for appeal, the " 'defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial

2022A penalty phase error requires reversal if “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility such an error affected a verdict.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, fn. 15 , italics omitted.) This standard “ ‘is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) It is not satisfied so long as there is a doubt “based upon ‘reason.’ ” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317 .) A “reviewing court making this harmless-error inquiry” must not “ ‘become in effect a second jury.’ ” (N

2022(People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 218, fn. 15 .) We find no such reasonable possibility.

2015The commonsense exemption is available only when the agency, based on the record evidence, meets its burden of demonstrating “with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), italics added; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386-387 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 , 160 P.3d 116 ].) This exacting requirement exceeds an agency’s obligation under section 15300.2(c), before applying a categorical exemption, to consider the evidence in its files and pr

2015The commonsense exemption is available only when the agency, based on the record evidence, meets its burden of demonstrating “with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), italics added; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386-387 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 , 160 P.3d 116 ].) This exacting requirement exceeds an agency’s obligation under section 15300.2(c), before applying a categorical exemption, to consider the evidence in its files and pr

2014(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ] (Carter); Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37 .) The failure to do so constitutes “an error at the penalty phase of a capital trial” which, under state law, “is prejudicial if ‘there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict.’ [Citation.] This test is effectively the same as that under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ], which asks whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178

2014(People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1219 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ] (Carter); Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 37 .) The failure to do so constitutes “an error at the penalty phase of a capital trial” which, under state law, “is prejudicial if ‘there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict.’ [Citation.] This test is effectively the same as that under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ], which asks whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178

2005Under state law, error at the penalty phase of a capital trial requires reversal of a death judgment if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 .) This standard "is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ." ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11 , 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 , 64 P.3d 762 .) In adopting this strict standard, the court has

2005Under state law, error at the penalty phase of a capital trial requires reversal of a death judgment if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 .) This standard "is the same, in substance and effect, as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ." ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11 , 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 , 64 P.3d 762 .) In adopting this strict standard, the court has

1988When the "result" under review is such a normative conclusion based on guided, individualized discretion, the Watson standard of review is simply insufficient to ensure "reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ] (plur. opn.); accord, Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249 , ___ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 292-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1796-1798 ]; Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 329-330 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 239-240 ]; Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S

1988When the "result" under review is such a normative conclusion based on guided, individualized discretion, the Watson standard of review is simply insufficient to ensure "reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 ] (plur. opn.); accord, Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249 , ___ [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 292-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1796-1798 ]; Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 329-330 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 239-240 ]; Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S

1993After our decision in Lewis , we have made clear that in determining prejudice, the inquiry must be whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the error affected the decision.” (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 812 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 ].) We have also stated elsewhere that “a remand is unwarranted when ‘[t]he statement of decision makes apparent that the [trial] court did not deem the issue of penalty to be a close one.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 893 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ].) Here, there is no reasonable possibility that, absen

1993After our decision in Lewis , we have made clear that in determining prejudice, the inquiry must be whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the error affected the decision.” (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 812 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 ].) We have also stated elsewhere that “a remand is unwarranted when ‘[t]he statement of decision makes apparent that the [trial] court did not deem the issue of penalty to be a close one.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 893 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ].) Here, there is no reasonable possibility that, absen

1992II When an error other than a violation of the federal Constitution occurs at the penalty phase of a capital trial, this court must reverse the judgment as to penalty if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ].) This is a "more exacting standard of review" than that employed for state law errors at the guilt phase. ( Id. at p. 447.) Different standards are warranted by the "fundamental difference between review of a jury's objective guilt phase verdict, and its normative, discr

1992II When an error other than a violation of the federal Constitution occurs at the penalty phase of a capital trial, this court must reverse the judgment as to penalty if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ].) This is a "more exacting standard of review" than that employed for state law errors at the guilt phase. ( Id. at p. 447.) Different standards are warranted by the "fundamental difference between review of a jury's objective guilt phase verdict, and its normative, discr

1991The court has adopted a standard that reviews such error “under the so-called ‘reasonable possibility’ test—i.e., is there a reasonable possibility that the error affected the decision?” (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 812 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 ], citing People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1202 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 791 P.2d 965 ]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 751-752 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ].) This reasonable possibility test appears to be based on the Chapman harmless error test, under which federal constitutional error will not be deemed ha

1991The court has adopted a standard that reviews such error “under the so-called ‘reasonable possibility’ test—i.e., is there a reasonable possibility that the error affected the decision?” (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 812 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 827 , 802 P.2d 330 ], citing People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1202 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 791 P.2d 965 ]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 751-752 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ].) This reasonable possibility test appears to be based on the Chapman harmless error test, under which federal constitutional error will not be deemed ha

1990(See Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 257-258 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 294-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 ].) And it applies to the federal constitutional violation here. ( People v. Lewis, supra, ante, at p. 285.) (27) In People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ], we declared the following general rule: error in the penalty phase of a capital trial that is not of federal constitutional dimension is not automatically reversible, but is subject to harmless-error analysis under the reasonable-possibility test.

1990(See Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 257-258 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 294-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 ].) And it applies to the federal constitutional violation here. ( People v. Lewis, supra, ante, at p. 285.) (27) In People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 [ 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ], we declared the following general rule: error in the penalty phase of a capital trial that is not of federal constitutional dimension is not automatically reversible, but is subject to harmless-error analysis under the reasonable-possibility test.

1989(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17 .) It is, however, plain error to instruct a 1977-law jury under the language of the 1978 law. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 883 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ].) Thus, contrary to the majority view, we should not undertake the Brown analysis in the present case, but move directly to the question whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.

1989(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17 .) It is, however, plain error to instruct a 1977-law jury under the language of the 1978 law. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 883 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ].) Thus, contrary to the majority view, we should not undertake the Brown analysis in the present case, but move directly to the question whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.

1970Under these circumstances, unlike situations where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt as to other charges (see, e.g., People v. Nieto (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 231, 241 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 844 ]; People v. Blagg (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 598, 610 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]), there is a reasonable possibility that the error in admitting Bloss’ testimony given at the preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict of guilt on count II.

1970Under these circumstances, unlike situations where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt as to other charges (see, e.g., People v. Nieto (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 231, 241 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 844 ]; People v. Blagg (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 598, 610 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]), there is a reasonable possibility that the error in admitting Bloss’ testimony given at the preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict of guilt on count II.

1970Under these circumstances, unlike situations where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt as to other charges (see, e.g., People v. Nieto (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 231, 241 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 844 ]; People v. Blagg (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 598, 610 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]), there is a reasonable possibility that the error in admitting Bloss’ testimony given at the preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict of guilt on count II.

1970Under these circumstances, unlike situations where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt as to other charges (see, e.g., People v. Nieto (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 231, 241 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 844 ]; People v. Blagg (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 598, 610 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 93 ]), there is a reasonable possibility that the error in admitting Bloss’ testimony given at the preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict of guilt on count II.

2026(People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671 (Reese).) 4 We repeat the evidence of guilt.

2022(Reese, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 671 ; see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) 15 C.

2018For such erroneous admission of uncharged crime evidence, as for other *365 errors at the penalty phase, we ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict, a standard essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415 , 527, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ( Lewis ).) We conclude under that standard that the admission of evidence of the Uzel assault was harmless.

2018For such erroneous admission of uncharged crime evidence, as for other *365 errors at the penalty phase, we ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict, a standard essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415 , 527, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ( Lewis ).) We conclude under that standard that the admission of evidence of the Uzel assault was harmless.

2025Indeed, if we were to adopt the OCDA’s interpretation of the statute, we would have to ignore the last seven words of the operative sentence: “as a result of their military service.” (§ 1001.80 (b)(2)(A) & ; Moore v. Hill (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281 [“our interpretation is faithful to the canon that we must ‘interpret a statute consistently with the meaning derived from its grammatical structure’”]; San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego Civil Service Com. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 275, 284 [“we are required to give independent meaning and significance to each word, phrase, an

2025Indeed, if we were to adopt the OCDA’s interpretation of the statute, we would have to ignore the last seven words of the operative sentence: “as a result of their military service.” (§ 1001.80 (b)(2)(A) & ; Moore v. Hill (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281 [“our interpretation is faithful to the canon that we must ‘interpret a statute consistently with the meaning derived from its grammatical structure’”]; San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego Civil Service Com. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 275, 284 [“we are required to give independent meaning and significance to each word, phrase, an