reasonable possibility error in Texas

2023We focus on the error’s probable impact in light of the other evidence presented at trial and ask whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question.” Id.

2016We are to ask “if there was a reasonable possibility that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question.” Westbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. Crim.

2020Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846 (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2016Mosley v, State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 901-02 ; see Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (noting that under predecessor to current constitutional harmless error analysis, primary question was whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have “contributed to the conviction or affected the punishmentassessed”).

2020See Washington v. State, 567 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. Crim.

2016Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 852-53 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2013App. 2000) (stating that in determining harm, we may ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error ―moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question‖), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 944 (2001); see also Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 285 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 2000) (stating that in determining harm, we may ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error “moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question”), cert. denied , 532 U.S. 944 (2001); see also Neal v. State , 256 S.W.3d 264, 285 (Tex. Crim.

1996In other words, was there 'a reasonable possibility that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issue in question?'" Jones v. State , 833 S.W.2d 118, 127 (Tex. Crim.

1996In other words, was there 'a reasonable possibility that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issue in question?'" Jones v. State , 833 S.W.2d 118, 127 (Tex. Crim.

2001Id.; Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 586-88 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). “[A] reviewing court asks if there was a reasonable possibility that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury *859 from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question.” Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 119 .

1996Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

2016Mosley v, State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 901-02 ; see Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (noting that under predecessor to current constitutional harmless error analysis, primary question was whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have “contributed to the conviction or affected the punishmentassessed”).

1987Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 67 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).

2011We examine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction and, without evidence that the shackles were visible to the jury or that the shackles unduly restricted appellant’s ability to communicate with trial counsel, binding precedent compels the conclusion that the trial court’s error is harmless.” Yglesias v. State , 252 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Canales v. State , 98 S.W.3d 690 , 697–98 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Canales, 98 S.W.3d at 698 ; (concluding that ordering defendant to wear shackles was harmless); Grayson, 192 S.W.3d at 792-93 (same as Canales ); see also Ramirez v. State, No. 14-05-00435-CR, 2006 WL 2345952 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (same as Canales ).

2024See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 .

2024See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 .

1996App. 1992) (quoting Cook v. State , 821 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. Crim.

1996App. 1992) (quoting Cook v. State , 821 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. Crim.

2025In the end, we must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error moved the jury “from a state of non- persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue.” Id.

2020Id. 18 We must ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue.

2014See Tex.RApp. 44.2(b); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (stating that in determining harm, we may ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error “moved the jury from a state of nonper-suasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question”), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 1407 , 149 L.Ed.2d 349 (2001).

2014See Tex.RApp. 44.2(b); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (stating that in determining harm, we may ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error “moved the jury from a state of nonper-suasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question”), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 1407 , 149 L.Ed.2d 349 (2001).

2021Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Tex. Crim.

2020Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846 (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 2003); Grayson v. State , 192 S.W.3d 790 , 792–93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Ramirez v. State , No. 14–05–00435–CR, 2006 WL 2345952 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see also Cooks v. State , 844 S.W.2d 697, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Canales, 98 S.W.3d at 698 ; (concluding that ordering defendant to wear shackles was harmless); Grayson, 192 S.W.3d at 792-93 (same as Canales ); see also Ramirez v. State, No. 14-05-00435-CR, 2006 WL 2345952 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (same as Canales ).

1986However, is this the same test as the reasonable possibility test that is found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)?

1986However, is this the same test as the reasonable possibility test that is found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)?

1987Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 67 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).

1987Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 67 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).

1986However, is this the same test as the reasonable possibility test that is found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)?

1986However, is this the same test as the reasonable possibility test that is found in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)?

2020See Washington v. State, 567 S.W.3d 430, 443 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, e.g., Cole v. State, No. 06-13-00179-CR, 2014 WL 7183859, at *10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 18, 2014, pet. filed); cf. Gentry v. State, No. 12-13-00168-CR, 2014 WL 4215544 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 27, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding admission of blood- alcohol evidence harmed defendant because court could not conclude erroneous denial of motion to suppress did not influence defendant’s decision to plead guilty).

2011We examine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction and, without evidence that the shackles were visible to the jury or that the shackles unduly restricted appellant’s ability to communicate with trial counsel, binding precedent compels the conclusion that the trial court’s error is harmless.” Yglesias v. State , 252 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Canales v. State , 98 S.W.3d 690 , 697–98 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 2003); Grayson v. State , 192 S.W.3d 790 , 792–93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Ramirez v. State , No. 14–05–00435–CR, 2006 WL 2345952 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see also Cooks v. State , 844 S.W.2d 697, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2002“If there is a reasonable likelihood that the error materially affected the jury’s deliberations, then the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 2693 , 153 L.Ed.2d 862 (2002).