state superintendent of public instruction in Kansas

2011In support of the County’s argument, it cites State, ex rel., v. Brooks, 160 Kan. 526 , 163 P.2d 414 (1945), an original action in mandamus in which the plaintiffs asked this court to order the state superintendent of public instruction to consent to the annexation of certain territory to a rural high school district.

2011In support of the County’s argument, it cites State, ex rel., v. Brooks, 160 Kan. 526 , 163 P.2d 414 (1945), an original action in mandamus in which the plaintiffs asked this court to order the state superintendent of public instruction to consent to the annexation of certain territory to a rural high school district.

1957Pursuant to Art. 2, § 1. and Art. 6, § 1, the legislature and the state superintendent of public instruction may coordinately exercise legislative power in altering the boundaries of school districts (State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1051 ). 5.

1957Pursuant to Art. 2, ž 1 and Art. 6, ž 1, the legislature and the state superintendent of public instruction may coordinately exercise legislative power in altering the boundaries of school districts ( State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P.2d 1051 ). 5.

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1945In State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , we considered G.

1965Appellants rely on State, ex rel., v. Hines, supra; School District Joint No. 71 v. Throckmorton, supra, and State, ex rel., v. Hardwick. 144 Kan. 3 , 57 P. 2d 1231 , in support of their position that the delegation made is unlawful.

1965Appellants rely on State, ex rel., v. Hines, supra; School District Joint No. 71 v. Throckmorton, supra, and State, ex rel., v. Hardwick. 144 Kan. 3 , 57 P. 2d 1231 , in support of their position that the delegation made is unlawful.

1950(Field v. School District, 83 Kan. 186, 109 Pac. 775 ; State, ex rel., v. Rural High School Joint District, supra.) Appeals from orders concerning joint school districts are to the state superintendent of public instruction (72-305, supra) and appeals from orders concerning school districts lying wholly within a county are to the board of county commissioners (72-309, supra).

1950(Field v. School District, 83 Kan. 186, 109 Pac. 775 ; State, ex rel., v. Rural High School Joint District, supra.) Appeals from orders concerning joint school districts are to the state superintendent of public instruction (72-305, supra) and appeals from orders concerning school districts lying wholly within a county are to the board of county commissioners (72-309, supra).

1950A quite analogous situation was considered in State, ex rel., v. Miley, 120 Kan. 321 , 243 Pac. 262 , where it was held: “In an action to enjoin the state superintendent of public instruction and the county superintendents and the boards of county commissioners of two or more counties from proceeding illegally in the formation of a rural high-school district, the state superintendent of public instruction may be sued with the other defendants in any one of the counties in which some of the defendants may be served and in which the proposed rural high-school district may be situated.” (Syl.

1950A quite analogous situation was considered in State, ex rel., v. Miley, 120 Kan. 321 , 243 Pac. 262 , where it was held: “In an action to enjoin the state superintendent of public instruction and the county superintendents and the boards of county commissioners of two or more counties from proceeding illegally in the formation of a rural high-school district, the state superintendent of public instruction may be sued with the other defendants in any one of the counties in which some of the defendants may be served and in which the proposed rural high-school district may be situated.” (Syl.

1949S. 1935, 72-3514, material for our purposes, are as follows: “Territory outside the limits of any rural high-school district, but adjacent thereto, may be attached to such high-school district for high-school purposes, upou application being made to the rural high-school board by a majority of the electors of such adjacent territory, and upon the approval of said rural high-school board and the consent of the county superintendent of public instruction: (Provided, that an appeal may be taken from the decision of the county superintendent to the board of county commissioners, if such property p

1949S. 1935, 72-3514, material for our purposes, are as follows: “Territory outside the limits of any rural high-school district, but adjacent thereto, may be attached to such high-school district for high-school purposes, upou application being made to the rural high-school board by a majority of the electors of such adjacent territory, and upon the approval of said rural high-school board and the consent of the county superintendent of public instruction: (Provided, that an appeal may be taken from the decision of the county superintendent to the board of county commissioners, if such property p

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947Beginning with State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of Ford County, 12 Kan. 441 , this court has held repeatedly that the legislature has “absolute power over the organization . . . school-districts . . .” See, also, School District v. Board of Education, 16 Kan. 536, 540 ; School District v. Board of Education, 110 Kan. 613, 620 , 204 Pac. 758 ; State, ex rel., v. Mowry, 119 Kan. 74, 78 , 237 Pac. 1032 ; State, ex rel., v. School District, 140 Kan. 171 , 34 P. 2d 102 ; and State, ex rel., v. Storey, 144 Kan. 311 , 58 P. 2d 1090 , from which the following is quoted: “We agree with appellee that the ques

1947A superintendent of public instruction shall be elected in each county, whose term of office shall be two years, and whose duties and compensation shall be prescribed by law.” In construing the above-quoted section of the constitution this court has held that the legislature can confer legislative power upon the state superintendent of public instruction because the constitution “specifically authorized him to ‘perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law/ without limiting those duties to such as might be classified as executive or administrative only.” (See State, ex rel., v. Storey,

1947A superintendent of public instruction shall be elected in each county, whose term of office shall be two years, and whose duties and compensation shall be prescribed by law.” In construing the above-quoted section of the constitution this court has held that the legislature can confer legislative power upon the state superintendent of public instruction because the constitution “specifically authorized him to ‘perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law/ without limiting those duties to such as might be classified as executive or administrative only.” (See State, ex rel., v. Storey,

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1936Our constitutional provisions the statutes were' held to violate read: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate.” (Art. 2, § 1.) “The legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the county business of the several counties, such powers of local legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient.” (Art. 2, § 21.) In support of the ruling of the trial court it is argued by appellee that the legislative power of this state must be exercised by our legislature, except that it may confer powers of local legislation on boards of county

1933An analogous case, where the clerk of this court served as official stakeholder pending a determination of the validity of the statute under which money was exacted from litigants, was State, ex rel., v. Railway Co., 87 Kan. 348 , 125 Pac. 98 ; and see, also, City of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 125 Kan. 346, 353, 354 , 264 Pac. 68 .

1933An analogous case, where the clerk of this court served as official stakeholder pending a determination of the validity of the statute under which money was exacted from litigants, was State, ex rel., v. Railway Co., 87 Kan. 348 , 125 Pac. 98 ; and see, also, City of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 125 Kan. 346, 353, 354 , 264 Pac. 68 .

1933The peremptory writ is denied, and the custodian of the sums referred to as paid under protest is directed to return them to the proper parties.” (p. 353.) In State, ex rel., v. Ross, 101 Kan. 377 , 166 Pac. 505 , the state superintendent of public instruction collected certain fees paid under protest by exhibitors of moving pictures under the censorship statute of 1913, and was made defendant in mandamus proceedings to determine the validity of the statute.

1933The peremptory writ is denied, and the custodian of the sums referred to as paid under protest is directed to return them to the proper parties.” (p. 353.) In State, ex rel., v. Ross, 101 Kan. 377 , 166 Pac. 505 , the state superintendent of public instruction collected certain fees paid under protest by exhibitors of moving pictures under the censorship statute of 1913, and was made defendant in mandamus proceedings to determine the validity of the statute.

1922The notice itself is of course mandatory (The State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 ), but the form, printed or typewritten, is directory and merely for ease of legibility (Jones v. The State, 1 Kan. 273 ; Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569, 586 ; 36 Cyc. 1157 et seq.).

1922The notice itself is of course mandatory (The State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 ), but the form, printed or typewritten, is directory and merely for ease of legibility (Jones v. The State, 1 Kan. 273 ; Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569, 586 ; 36 Cyc. 1157 et seq.).

1922(Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan. 134 , syl. ¶ 2, 59 Pac. 266 ; Bank v. Reilly, 97 Kan. 817, 823 , 156 Pac. 747 .) In the blank notices for calling such elections to organize rural high-school districts and to vote bonds for school buildings submitted therewith, which are prepared by the state superintendent of public instruction and in general use throughout the state, appropriate recitals and suitable -space for defining the territory of such proposed districts are embodied in the notices.

1922(Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan. 134 , syl. ¶ 2, 59 Pac. 266 ; Bank v. Reilly, 97 Kan. 817, 823 , 156 Pac. 747 .) In the blank notices for calling such elections to organize rural high-school districts and to vote bonds for school buildings submitted therewith, which are prepared by the state superintendent of public instruction and in general use throughout the state, appropriate recitals and suitable -space for defining the territory of such proposed districts are embodied in the notices.

1922The notice itself is of course mandatory (The State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 ), but the form, printed or typewritten, is directory and merely for ease of legibility (Jones v. The State, 1 Kan. 273 ; Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569, 586 ; 36 Cyc. 1157 et seq.).

1922The notice itself is of course mandatory (The State v. Bentley, 80 Kan. 227 , 101 Pac. 1073 ), but the form, printed or typewritten, is directory and merely for ease of legibility (Jones v. The State, 1 Kan. 273 ; Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569, 586 ; 36 Cyc. 1157 et seq.).

1922(Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan. 134 , syl. ¶ 2, 59 Pac. 266 ; Bank v. Reilly, 97 Kan. 817, 823 , 156 Pac. 747 .) In the blank notices for calling such elections to organize rural high-school districts and to vote bonds for school buildings submitted therewith, which are prepared by the state superintendent of public instruction and in general use throughout the state, appropriate recitals and suitable -space for defining the territory of such proposed districts are embodied in the notices.

1922(Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan. 134 , syl. ¶ 2, 59 Pac. 266 ; Bank v. Reilly, 97 Kan. 817, 823 , 156 Pac. 747 .) In the blank notices for calling such elections to organize rural high-school districts and to vote bonds for school buildings submitted therewith, which are prepared by the state superintendent of public instruction and in general use throughout the state, appropriate recitals and suitable -space for defining the territory of such proposed districts are embodied in the notices.

1922The district mentioned in Schenck v. School District, 100 Kan. 389 , 164 Pac. 169 , which was eight miles long and five miles wide, illustrates the necessity for more than one school building in a district located in different parts of it, and although the power to provide more than one was not drawn directly in question, the authority to build additional ones is recognized.

1922The district mentioned in Schenck v. School District, 100 Kan. 389 , 164 Pac. 169 , which was eight miles long and five miles wide, illustrates the necessity for more than one school building in a district located in different parts of it, and although the power to provide more than one was not drawn directly in question, the authority to build additional ones is recognized.

1922In The State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634, 638 , 196 Pac. 620 , this was said: “While the powers of a public officer or board are those and those only which the law confers, yet when the law does confer a power or prescribe a duty to be performed or exercised by a public officer, the powers granted and duties prescribed carry with them by necessary implication such incidents of authority as are necessary for the effectual exercise of the powers conferred and duties imposed.” It must be said that the board can meet, if it so desires, without being called together by the state superintende

1922In The State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634, 638 , 196 Pac. 620 , this was said: “While the powers of a public officer or board are those and those only which the law confers, yet when the law does confer a power or prescribe a duty to be performed or exercised by a public officer, the powers granted and duties prescribed carry with them by necessary implication such incidents of authority as are necessary for the effectual exercise of the powers conferred and duties imposed.” It must be said that the board can meet, if it so desires, without being called together by the state superintende

1888In the case of The State, ex rel., v. Comm’rs of School Fund, 4 Kas. 261 , which board consisted of the state superintendent of public instruction, the secretary of state, and the attorney general, no question of jurisdiction was raised, and the court decided the case upon its merits, and refused to grant the writ of mandamus prayed for.

1888In the case of The State, ex rel., v. Barker, Secretary of State, 4 Kas. 379 , no question of jurisdiction was raised, and the court decided the case upon its merits, and awarded a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to deliver to the relator copies of the recently enacted laws for the purpose that he might publish the same for the state.