judgment dismissing rule in Louisiana

2006In doing so, we observed that "[a]dequate notice is one of the most elementary requirements of procedural due process; it is fundamental to our system of laws that there be notice prior to trial, except in extraordinary cases, such as executory process." Davis v. Dunn & Bush Construction, 01-2472, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/20/03), 859 So.2d 155, 158 .

2004In Norton , the civil district court rendered a judgment dismissing the rule to quash a writ of attachment and garnishment against the criminal clerk of court "without prejudice to the right of the clerk of the criminal court to retain the money attached until final disposition of the criminal proceedings ... at which time, upon proper order, the clerk of said court will deliver the money in controversy to the civil sheriff to await final disposition of this case." 157 La. at 202-03 , 102 So. at 307 .

2004In Norton , the civil district court rendered a judgment dismissing the rule to quash a writ of attachment and garnishment against the criminal clerk of court "without prejudice to the right of the clerk of the criminal court to retain the money attached until final disposition of the criminal proceedings ... at which time, upon proper order, the clerk of said court will deliver the money in controversy to the civil sheriff to await final disposition of this case." 157 La. at 202-03 , 102 So. at 307 .

1977In Employer’s Overload Co. v. Employer's Overload Co., N.O., 266 So.2d 546 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972) writ refused, 263 La. 375 , 268 So.2d 260 , this court discussed the difference between a judgment on a preliminary injunction and one on the merits, i. e., for a permanent injunction.

1977In Employer’s Overload Co. v. Employer's Overload Co., N.O., 266 So.2d 546 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972) writ refused, 263 La. 375 , 268 So.2d 260 , this court discussed the difference between a judgment on a preliminary injunction and one on the merits, i. e., for a permanent injunction.

1977In Employer’s Overload Co. v. Employer's Overload Co., N.O., 266 So.2d 546 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972) writ refused, 263 La. 375 , 268 So.2d 260 , this court discussed the difference between a judgment on a preliminary injunction and one on the merits, i. e., for a permanent injunction.

1976In 1954, in Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1059, 78 So.2d 173, 174 , the Louisiana Supreme Court commented on a plaintiff’s inability to obtain the name of an adjuster-represented insurance company: “To give the name of the liability insurance carrier should become the prevailing ethics.” In 1974, the adjuster in this suit still refused to disclose the names of its insurers “and in the industry in whole, it’s generally assumed if the insurance company, the plaintiff’s attorney does not know the insurance company involved, that we don’t generally give him that information, that’s just readily

1976In 1954, in Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1059, 78 So.2d 173, 174 , the Louisiana Supreme Court commented on a plaintiff’s inability to obtain the name of an adjuster-represented insurance company: “To give the name of the liability insurance carrier should become the prevailing ethics.” In 1974, the adjuster in this suit still refused to disclose the names of its insurers “and in the industry in whole, it’s generally assumed if the insurance company, the plaintiff’s attorney does not know the insurance company involved, that we don’t generally give him that information, that’s just readily

1976This court did decide that the intervention asserting a class action (if necessary to interrupt prescription as to the other claims) came too late." 322 So.2d 445, 448 .

1976"The judgment dismissing the rule is affirmed." 322 So.2d 445, 447-448 . *803 In a footnote the Court of Appeal further explained its previous action: "This court did not decide in the previous appeal (and indeed could not decide, since the judgment appealed from simply maintained an exception of no cause of action) whether or not Servi-Clean's timely suit interrupted prescription as to all claims.

1974Art. 966. [2] Other than a judgment dismissing an exception of improper cumulation of actions filed by Travelers' counsel on behalf of the defendants, unrelated to this appeal, the record contains no judgment except the one here appealed from. [3] American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251 , 230 So.2d 253 ; Benoit v. Fuselier, La.App., 195 So.2d 679 ; Smith v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, La.App., 161 So.2d 903 . [4] LSA-C.C.P.

1974Arts. 966 and 967; see Garlington v. Kingsley, La.App., 277 So.2d 183, 186 , and cases cited therein; Mexican Gulf Fisheries, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 220 So.2d 141 ; Welsh Southern Oil Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., La.App., 201 So.2d 376 .

1974Arts. 966 and 967; see Garlington v. Kingsley, La.App., 277 So.2d 183, 186 , and cases cited therein; Mexican Gulf Fisheries, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 220 So.2d 141 ; Welsh Southern Oil Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., La.App., 201 So.2d 376 .

1974Art. 966. [2] Other than a judgment dismissing an exception of improper cumulation of actions filed by Travelers' counsel on behalf of the defendants, unrelated to this appeal, the record contains no judgment except the one here appealed from. [3] American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251 , 230 So.2d 253 ; Benoit v. Fuselier, La.App., 195 So.2d 679 ; Smith v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, La.App., 161 So.2d 903 . [4] LSA-C.C.P.

1974Art. 966. [2] Other than a judgment dismissing an exception of improper cumulation of actions filed by Travelers' counsel on behalf of the defendants, unrelated to this appeal, the record contains no judgment except the one here appealed from. [3] American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251 , 230 So.2d 253 ; Benoit v. Fuselier, La.App., 195 So.2d 679 ; Smith v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, La.App., 161 So.2d 903 . [4] LSA-C.C.P.

1974Art. 966. [2] Other than a judgment dismissing an exception of improper cumulation of actions filed by Travelers' counsel on behalf of the defendants, unrelated to this appeal, the record contains no judgment except the one here appealed from. [3] American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251 , 230 So.2d 253 ; Benoit v. Fuselier, La.App., 195 So.2d 679 ; Smith v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, La.App., 161 So.2d 903 . [4] LSA-C.C.P.

1973In Smith v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 254 La. 341 , 223 So.2d 826 , the motion for appeal alluded to judgment rendered “on the 18th day of January, 1968”, and recited further: “The judgment desired to be appealed from is a judgment dismissing a rule' for a new trial.” Despite such language, the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the bond was in amount sufficient for suspen-sive appeal from the judgment adverse to appellant, and other circumstances indicat ed intent to appeal the judgment on the merits, the appeal was sustained as an appeal on the merits.

1973In Smith v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 254 La. 341 , 223 So.2d 826 , the motion for appeal alluded to judgment rendered “on the 18th day of January, 1968”, and recited further: “The judgment desired to be appealed from is a judgment dismissing a rule' for a new trial.” Despite such language, the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the bond was in amount sufficient for suspen-sive appeal from the judgment adverse to appellant, and other circumstances indicat ed intent to appeal the judgment on the merits, the appeal was sustained as an appeal on the merits.

1964He relies heavily upon the decision of this Court in Wilmot v. Wilmot, La.App., 136 So.2d 806 , and contends that there is nothing in the record which could or would warrant the Court in considering the support for any of the children differently than on a proportionate basis; he points out that the judgment dismissing his rule has the effect of increasing the alimony for the support of the two remaining children notwithstanding that Mrs. Lawrence has filed no rule for such increase; and contends that the Trial Judge acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in dismissing the rule.

1940Charles Hotel Co., 145 La. [1004] 1007, 83 So. 222 . *438 , “For the reasons assigned, the appeal herein is dismissed at appellant’s costs.” (Italics ours.) It follows, necessarily, that the judgment dismissing the rule on defendant for an accounting in this case, on the ground that the motion for ntle discloses no right of action, is likewise a final judgment and must be signed by the trial judge.

1940Defendant in rule, appellee, also relies upon Bacas v. Smith, 33 La.Ann. 139 .

1939In the recent case of Brock, Bank Com’r, v. Stassi, 189 La. 88 , 179 So. 44 , it is indicated that a suspensive appeal from a final judgment refusing an injunction to prevent the sale of property under exec-utory. process, will not have the effect of staying the proceedings, where no restraining order or preliminary injunction has been issued.

1939In the recent case of Brock, Bank Com’r, v. Stassi, 189 La. 88 , 179 So. 44 , it is indicated that a suspensive appeal from a final judgment refusing an injunction to prevent the sale of property under exec-utory. process, will not have the effect of staying the proceedings, where no restraining order or preliminary injunction has been issued.

1938We again reversed the action of the district court in maintaining this exception ( 159 So. 413 ) in the following language [page 414] : “But Odom overlooks the fact that Emily Stewart Foster claims as universal legatee, and he also overlooks the fact that, when we overruled the exception dismissing his claim, we did so because of the fact that we felt that in the absence of, a name beneficiary the proper heir of the deceased is entitled to the proceeds of the policy.

1938Odom thereupon prosecuted an appeal to this court where the judgment dismissing his claim on exception was reversed (see 158 So. 386 ) it being our opinion that he, being a blood relative of the deceased, would be entitled to recover the insurance proceeds if he could prove (1) his relationship to the assured and (2) that Hicks, the designated beneficiary under the policy, was ineligible, under Act No. 256 of 1912, to receive the fund.

1937One appeal is from a judgment sustaining a plea of prescription to a suit brought by the appellants against the succession, and the other is from a judgment dismissing a rule to remove the executor from office, This court held in the case of Succession of Esteves, 182 La. 717 , 162 So. 576 , that an action to remove an administrator must be commenced by petition and citation and be conducted in the form of an ordinary suit, stating therein: “It is well settled that an action to remove an administrator is not a summary proceeding, but must be brought by ordinary suit.

1937One appeal is from a judgment sustaining a plea of prescription to a suit brought by the appellants against the succession, and the other is from a judgment dismissing a rule to remove the executor from office, This court held in the case of Succession of Esteves, 182 La. 717 , 162 So. 576 , that an action to remove an administrator must be commenced by petition and citation and be conducted in the form of an ordinary suit, stating therein: “It is well settled that an action to remove an administrator is not a summary proceeding, but must be brought by ordinary suit.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1937Code Prac. arts. 1013, 1017, 1018; Succession of Boyd, 12 La.Ann. 611 ; Succession of Guilbeau, 25 La.Ann. 474 ; Succession of Calhoun, 28 La.Ann. 323 ; Succession of Feray, 31 La.Ann. 727 ; Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857 , 54 So. 127 ; State v. Tebault, 147 La. 889 , 86 So. 320 .” The judgment of the lower court dismissing the rule is correct.

1921King, Judge.” It is further alleged that: “The only question now before the Supreme Court is whether or not the preliminary writ of injunction should be dissolved, and this question is, in so far as concerns the city of New Orleans, a moot question, because, no matter which way this court decides the question, the city of New Orleans has no longer any real interest therein, its demands (which said preliminary writ sought to conserve) having been, on its own motion, discontinued and dismissed from court.” Opinion. [1,2] And, in support of the right of the city and of the authority of the distri

1886It has been held that a judgment dismissing a rule to dissolve an injunction on the face of the papers, or exceptions having the same purport, are interlocutory orders which can cause no irremediable wrong and which are not appealable anterior to a judgment on the merits. 7 Ann. 206; 14 Ann. 388; 3 R. 437 .

1868A motion is made in this court to dismiss the appeal, because that remedy is not allowed by law from a judgment on a rule to arrest proceedings under final process by a writ of fieri facias, which the plaintiff says could only be done by way of injunction, and the appellee relies, in support of his motion, on the case of The State of Louisiana v. The Judge of the Second District Court of New Orleans, 9 A. 302 .