degree violation in Massachusetts

2025Rather, in deciding whether suppression is warranted as a result of a violation, a court must assess “‘the degree to which the violation undermined the . . . governing rule of law,’ and . . . the extent to which exclusion will serve as a deterrent in the future.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 46 (1990).[6] At the threshold, I note that Detective Mattos’s affidavit sets out sufficient probable cause to believe that knocking and announcing their presence before executing the search warrant would have put the police officers executing the search warrant in danger.

2025Looking, as I must, to whether “‘the degree to which the violation undermined the . . . governing rule of law,’ and . . . the extent to which exclusion will serve as a deterrent in the future,” id., quoting Gomes, 408 Mass. at 46 , I conclude that suppression is not warranted.

2015Commonwealth v. Gomes, supra. These two factors are interdependent to the extent that (even where constitutional rather than, as here, common law principles are implicated), “[b]ad faith of the police . . . will be relevant in assessing the severity of any constitutional violation.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 118 (1989). 5 , 6 Applying these principles to the present circumstances, we con- *284 elude that suppression is not warranted.

1990Rather, the decision whether to exclude such evidence should properly turn on: (1) the degree to which the violation undermined the principles underlying the governing rule of law, see Rutkowski, supra at 677 , and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated in the future, see Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 114-115 (1989).

2004See also Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 413 Mass. 73, 77 (1992).

2001In determining whether to exclude the evidence the court should examine “(1) the degree to which the violation undermined the principles underlying the governing rule of law . . . and (2) the extent to which exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated in the future ...” Id. (holding a violation of the “knock and announce” rule required suppression); see also Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 413 Mass. 73, 77 (1992) (evidence seized in violation of the law will be suppressed if the violation is substantial or rises to the level of a Federal or State constitutional violation).

2013Viewed against the goal of providing an accurate determination whether revocation is proper, these factors include the Commonwealth’s interest in expeditiously containing the threat posed by, and imposing punishment upon, noncompliant probationers; the Commonwealth’s interest in “informality, flexibility, and economy” in probation revocation proceedings, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra; and the probationer’s conditional, rather than absolute, liberty interest, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).* *** 9 Turning to the case before us, we first address the degree to which the hearing im

2002Commonwealth v. Gomes, 408 Mass. 43, 46 (1990); Commonwealth v. Siano, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 912, 914 (2001), rev. den., 435 Mass. 1108 (2002).

1984See also Norton v. West, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 350 (1979), in which we observed in connection with a confirmation proceeding that findings of a Land Court judge were to be regarded with an even more accepting disposition, i.e., the findings were to stand if warranted on any view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom.

1984A reviewing court will not conclude that such a degree of error has occurred unless “on the entire evidence [it] is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, *399 372 Mass. 671, 675 (1977).