17 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. LaChancegreen2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. Lavoie , 464 Mass. 83 , 89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013). "[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply." Commonwealth v. LaChance , 469 Mass. 2017On the other hand, if counsel has procedurally waived a defendant’s right to a public trial, “the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply.” Celester, 473 Mass. at 579 , quoting LaChance, 469 Mass. at 856 . | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2016Jackson, supra. “[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel’s inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply.” LaChance, supra at 856 . 2016See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 268-269 (2015). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Upton U.green1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Upton U., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 252 , 255 n.3 (2003) (no need to determine appropriate standard of review where there is no error). 4 misleading jury, consuming time unnecessarily, or presenting cumulative evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Littlegreen2 sentences2023Factors relevant to this determination include "whether the prior conviction involves a crime implicating truthfulness." Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 773 (2009). 1 Here, we need not decide whether the judge abused her discretion in excluding the victim's prior conviction because, even assuming there was a preserved error, the defendant has not shown prejudice. 2023The victim testified that he knew the defendant "[f]rom jail." The defendant likewise stated in his recorded police interview, which was played for the jury, that he knew the victim because they had been in jail together. 2 Because an ordinary juror would have inferred from this evidence 1 The remaining factors -- "whether the prior conviction is substantially similar to the crime charged" and "whether there were other prior convictions that the Commonwealth could have used to impeach the defendant," Little, 453 Mass. at 773 -- are not relevant where, as here, the witness in question is not th | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Reedgreen1 sentence2022See generally Commonwealth v. Reed, 397 Mass. 440 , 443 & n.4 (1986) (fair assurance standard not met where "the error possibly weakened [the defendant's] case in some significant way" and court is left with "grave doubt" [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 774, 781-782 (2018) (no fair assurance where "evidence . . . was not overwhelming"); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393 , 405 & n.14 (2001) (no fair assurance where court is "left with grave doubt"). [Note 8] Massachusetts appellate courts have not explicitly stated whether the "discretion" afforded t | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2022See generally Commonwealth v. Reed, 397 Mass. 440 , 443 & n.4 (1986) (fair assurance standard not met where "the error possibly weakened [the defendant's] case in some significant way" and court is left with "grave doubt" [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 774, 781-782 (2018) (no fair assurance where "evidence . . . was not overwhelming"); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393 , 405 & n.14 (2001) (no fair assurance where court is "left with grave doubt"). [Note 8] Massachusetts appellate courts have not explicitly stated whether the "discretion" afforded t | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Helfantgreen2 sentences2019We recognize that this fair assurance standard typically has been applied in the context of criminal proceedings to evaluate whether a preserved error is nonprejudicial. 8 See, e.g., **206 Commonwealth v. Helfant , 398 Mass. 214 , 223-224, 496 N.E.2d 433 (1986) ("fair assurance" achieved where court concludes any prejudice arising from error "did not possibly weaken [defendant's] case in any significant way"). 2019We recognize that this fair assurance standard typically has been applied in the context of criminal proceedings to evaluate whether a preserved error is nonprejudicial. 8 See, e.g., **206 Commonwealth v. Helfant , 398 Mass. 214 , 223-224, 496 N.E.2d 433 (1986) ("fair assurance" achieved where court concludes any prejudice arising from error "did not possibly weaken [defendant's] case in any significant way"). | 1 | 1 |
Fyffe v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2019L.] c. 231, §§ 119, 132 ; Fyffe , 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 474 [ 17 N.E.3d 453 ]." As Fyffe indicates, however, the Fyffe factors are simply a way of determining whether a preserved claim of error arising out of attorney misconduct is prejudicial under the appellate prejudicial error standard of review. 2019L.] c. 231, §§ 119, 132 ; Fyffe , 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 474 [ 17 N.E.3d 453 ]." As Fyffe indicates, however, the Fyffe factors are simply a way of determining whether a preserved claim of error arising out of attorney misconduct is prejudicial under the appellate prejudicial error standard of review. | 1 | 1 |
Jessie Earl Purvis v. James Crosbygreen2 sentences2014See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 740-743 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 2014See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 740-743 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Peruzzigreen1 sentence2011Side bar, please.” In response to a preserved claim of error, “the Commonwealth must show that any error ‘did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.’ ” Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 399 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dargongreen1 sentence2011Side bar, please.” In response to a preserved claim of error, “the Commonwealth must show that any error ‘did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.’ ” Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 399 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 445 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2006Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lavoie
green
2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. Lavoie , 464 Mass. 83 , 89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013). "[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply." Commonwealth v. LaChance , 469 Mass. 2017Thus, if a defendant can show that the public was unlawfully excluded from the courtroom during a critical part of the trial, but that claim of error was procedurally waived, the defendant generally is not entitled to a new trial unless he can show that the closure caused “a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.” LaChance, supra, at 857 ; Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 89 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Kirschenbaum v. Department of Labor
green
2 sentences2018Commonwealth v. Lavoie , 464 Mass. 83 , 89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013). "[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply." Commonwealth v. LaChance , 469 Mass. 2016Where a defendant procedurally waives his or her Sixth Amendment public trial claim, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, as is the case here, “the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel’s inadequate performance” — that is, a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice — and “the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply.” Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 856 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015). | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Cruz
green
1 sentence2022See generally Commonwealth v. Reed, 397 Mass. 440 , 443 & n.4 (1986) (fair assurance standard not met where "the error possibly weakened [the defendant's] case in some significant way" and court is left with "grave doubt" [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 774, 781-782 (2018) (no fair assurance where "evidence . . . was not overwhelming"); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393 , 405 & n.14 (2001) (no fair assurance where court is "left with grave doubt"). [Note 8] Massachusetts appellate courts have not explicitly stated whether the "discretion" afforded t | 1 | 2022–2022 |
L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022See generally Commonwealth v. Reed, 397 Mass. 440 , 443 & n.4 (1986) (fair assurance standard not met where "the error possibly weakened [the defendant's] case in some significant way" and court is left with "grave doubt" [citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 774, 781-782 (2018) (no fair assurance where "evidence . . . was not overwhelming"); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393 , 405 & n.14 (2001) (no fair assurance where court is "left with grave doubt"). [Note 8] Massachusetts appellate courts have not explicitly stated whether the "discretion" afforded t | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Nardi
green
2 sentences2019Where the preserved error is constitutional, "we evaluate the admission of constitutionally proscribed evidence to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Commonwealth v. Nardi , 452 Mass. 379 , 394, 893 N.E.2d 1221 (2008). 2019Where the preserved error is constitutional, "we evaluate the admission of constitutionally proscribed evidence to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Commonwealth v. Nardi , 452 Mass. 379 , 394, 893 N.E.2d 1221 (2008). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Lavoie , 464 Mass. 83 , 89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013). "[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply." Commonwealth v. LaChance , 469 Mass. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Patterson v. Oates
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Lavoie , 464 Mass. 83 , 89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013). "[W]here the defendant has procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply." Commonwealth v. LaChance , 469 Mass. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Flebotte
green
1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Flebotte , 417 Mass. 348 , 353 (1994). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Celester
green
1 sentence2017On the other hand, if counsel has procedurally waived a defendant’s right to a public trial, “the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply.” Celester, 473 Mass. at 579 , quoting LaChance, 469 Mass. at 856 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
1 sentence2016In Scott , 467 Mass, at 349, quoting Martin, 427 Mass. at 824 , we noted that “a prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence extends to information in the possession of a person who ‘has participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and has reported to the prosecutor’s office concerning the case.’ ” We concluded that, where Dookhan was the primary or secondary chemist who examined a questioned substance, she falls within the rubric of an agent of the prosecution team and, in considering a motion for a new trial, information in her possession is deemed to be in the possessi | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
1 sentence2011The United States Supreme Court described the interpretation of the latter results as “not so simple or certain.” Bullcoming, supra at 2711 n.1. 15 The situation would be otherwise had Hanchett himself weighed the substance, which was available at trial as an exhibit. 16 The preserved claim of error is that a sentence in Donnelly’s report constituted improper opinion testimony. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Barbosa
green
1 sentence2009Ibid. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.