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17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2009In another case involving a preserved claim of error, the Southern District similarly reversed for a new trial where "this basically was a 'he said-she said’ credibility case with no confession, no eyewitnesses, and no physical evidence.” State v. Foster, 244 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Mo.App. 2009The State plainly sought to portray him as an individual with expertise concerning the credibility of child sex-abuse victims superior to that of a lay witness or jury member. [4] In another case involving a preserved claim of error, the Southern District similarly reversed for a new trial where "this basically was a `he said-she said' credibility case with no confession, no eyewitnesses, and no physical evidence." State v. Foster, 244 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Mo.App. | 2 | 2 |
Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc.green1 sentence2024See Eoff v. McDonald, 578 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Mo. banc 2019) (voir 24 dire); Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. banc 2000) (opening argument); Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. banc 2013) (closing argument); Deveney v. Smith, 812 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (examination); see also Moore v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 527 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (“[t]he standard of review for preserved error in cross-examination is that of an abuse of discretion”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Deveney v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024See Eoff v. McDonald, 578 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Mo. banc 2019) (voir 24 dire); Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. banc 2000) (opening argument); Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. banc 2013) (closing argument); Deveney v. Smith, 812 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (examination); see also Moore v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 527 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (“[t]he standard of review for preserved error in cross-examination is that of an abuse of discretion”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Waxmangreen1 sentence2024See Eoff v. McDonald, 578 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Mo. banc 2019) (voir 24 dire); Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. banc 2000) (opening argument); Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. banc 2013) (closing argument); Deveney v. Smith, 812 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (examination); see also Moore v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 527 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (“[t]he standard of review for preserved error in cross-examination is that of an abuse of discretion”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen1 sentence2024“A defendant is competent when he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 432 (Mo. banc 2002) (internal marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Highwaygreen1 sentence2024See Eoff v. McDonald, 578 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Mo. banc 2019) (voir 24 dire); Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. banc 2000) (opening argument); Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. banc 2013) (closing argument); Deveney v. Smith, 812 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (examination); see also Moore v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 527 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (“[t]he standard of review for preserved error in cross-examination is that of an abuse of discretion”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Abraham J. Eoff and Crystal M. Eoff, Individually and as ad Litem for Sophee R. Eoff v. Jennifer K. McDonald, D.O., and Seasons Healthcare for Women, P.C.green1 sentence2024See Eoff v. McDonald, 578 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Mo. banc 2019) (voir 24 dire); Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. banc 2000) (opening argument); Delacroix v. Doncasters, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 13, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. banc 2013) (closing argument); Deveney v. Smith, 812 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (examination); see also Moore v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 527 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (“[t]he standard of review for preserved error in cross-examination is that of an abuse of discretion”) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morgangreen1 sentence2023See State v. Morgan, 366 S.W.3d 565, 582 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (noting manifest injustice is “a higher bar than prejudice”). | 1 | 1 |
Deck v. Stategreen2 sentences2023On the same day the Court issued Thompson, the Court also issued Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. banc 2002), which explained “[t]he standard for finding prejudice in the context of preserved error is lower than the standard for finding error under Strickland, and both are lower than the plain error standard.” Id. at 427, n.5 . 3 Because the abuse of discretion standard applied in Thompson is less stringent than the standard for Strickland prejudice, Phillips’s argument that Thompson is “controlling precedent” is without merit. 2023On the same day the Court issued Thompson, the Court also issued Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. banc 2002), which explained “[t]he standard for finding prejudice in the context of preserved error is lower than the standard for finding error under Strickland, and both are lower than the plain error standard.” Id. at 427, n.5 . 3 Because the abuse of discretion standard applied in Thompson is less stringent than the standard for Strickland prejudice, Phillips’s argument that Thompson is “controlling precedent” is without merit. | 1 | 1 |
Kim Moss v. Gerald Hofbauergreen1 sentence2023See Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851, 863 (6th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases); 3 Unlike Phillips’s postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Thompson involved a direct appeal applying the abuse of discretion standard particular to a preserved claim of trial court error. | 1 | 1 |
Delise diaz v. Autozoners, LLC, D/B/A Autozonegreen1 sentence2019See Diaz, 484 S.W.3d at 91 (rejecting a preserved claim that a 13:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages violated due process violation). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2016In the context of an alleged Doyle violation, "the factors used in an analysis of a preserved error violation pursuant to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable[-]doubt standard are the same as those used to determine whether a non-preserved violation is plain error resulting in manifest injustice." State v. Jones, 7 S.W.3d 413, 418 (Mo. 10 App. E.D. 1999). 2016In the context of an alleged Doyle violation, “the factors used in an analysis of a preserved error violation pursuant to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable[-]doubt standard are the same as those used to determine whether a non-preserved violation is plain error resulting in manifest injustice.” State v. Jones, 7 S.W.3d 413, 418 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp.green1 sentence2013See Snider v. Casino Aztar, 156 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Mo. banc 2005). 3 Analyzed under these principles, I believe the Assessor’s preserved claim is correct. | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. Bushmeyergreen1 sentence2013“Determining the true value in money is an issue of fact for the [State Tax Commission,]” Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chaneygreen1 sentence2001The preserved claim is that the prosecutor misstated the law in reference to penalty phase when he remarked, “You’re no longer interested in whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; you have already made that decision.” To support this claim, Christeson cites State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 S.Ct. 551 , 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998), which implies that even when guilt has been decided, residual doubt may finger and influence the jury in the penalty phase. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mageegreen1 sentence1997State v. Magee, 911 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Mo.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen1 sentence1995State v. Young, 889 S.W.2d 102,104 (Mo.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stockbridgegreen1 sentence1985State v. Mobley, 369 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Mo.1963); State v. Stockbridge, 549 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Mo.App.1977). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mobleygreen1 sentence1985State v. Mobley, 369 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Mo.1963); State v. Stockbridge, 549 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Mo.App.1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ware
green
1 sentence2025When analyzing this preserved error for an abuse of discretion, this Court found “[t]he comment may have dissuaded the jury from even considering third-degree assault because a lay person generally understands that the punishment for misdemeanors is substantially less than that for felonies.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Dunn
green
1 sentence2023Preserved error: IAD investigation into recording and transfer from homicide A trial court has “broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination.” Raines, 118 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Dunn, 817 S.W.2d at 245 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Raines
green
1 sentence2023Preserved error: IAD investigation into recording and transfer from homicide A trial court has “broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination.” Raines, 118 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Dunn, 817 S.W.2d at 245 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Barnum
green
1 sentence2023It was only then that the prosecutor stated “I anticipate defense counsel will talk about this, as well, under the law, the defendant has the right not to testify.” As in Barnum, these comments when viewed in context were “restatements of the law and general comments concerning the rights of any defendant in a criminal trial.” Barnum, 14 S.W.3d at 592 . 1 This Court recognizes the manifest injustice standard applied in Barnum imposes a higher bar for reversal than in cases involving a preserved claim of error. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Leslie Riggs v. State of Missouri Department of Social Services
green
1 sentence2019We are not persuaded that the unpreserved error about which DES complains is "'so egregious as to weaken the very foundation of the process and seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.'" Riggs, 473 S.W.3d at 186 (quoting Snellen ex rel. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Wolf
green
1 sentence2018Plain error is found "only if we determine that its ruling was an obvious and clear abuse of discretion, which resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice to the appellant." State v. Wolf , 91 S.W.3d 636 , 644-45 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Missouri v. Adrian E. Roberson
green
1 sentence2016The Western District recently rejected a preserved claim similar to Defendant’s un-preserved claim and on facts similar to the facts in this case in State v. Roberson, No. WD 78191, 501 S.W.3d 465 , 2016 WL 3960989 (Mo.App. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lockhart v. United States
green
1 sentence2001The preserved claim is that the prosecutor misstated the law in reference to penalty phase when he remarked, “You’re no longer interested in whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; you have already made that decision.” To support this claim, Christeson cites State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 S.Ct. 551 , 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998), which implies that even when guilt has been decided, residual doubt may finger and influence the jury in the penalty phase. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rosenberg v. Arlington County Government
green
1 sentence2001The preserved claim is that the prosecutor misstated the law in reference to penalty phase when he remarked, “You’re no longer interested in whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; you have already made that decision.” To support this claim, Christeson cites State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 S.Ct. 551 , 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998), which implies that even when guilt has been decided, residual doubt may finger and influence the jury in the penalty phase. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Williams v. Francis
green
1 sentence2001The preserved claim is that the prosecutor misstated the law in reference to penalty phase when he remarked, “You’re no longer interested in whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; you have already made that decision.” To support this claim, Christeson cites State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 60 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 S.Ct. 551 , 142 L.Ed.2d 458 (1998), which implies that even when guilt has been decided, residual doubt may finger and influence the jury in the penalty phase. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.