17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1957–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. White v. Tertegreen1 sentence1992White v. Terte, 293 S.W.2d 6, 10 [3, 4] (Mo.App.1956), in which this court stated the general rule that the relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency and on the death of the client the relationship terminates together with all authority incidental thereto, and the attorney has no authority to take any further action whatever in behalf of the deceased client until authorized by the duly qualified personal representative of the client. | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Also, in Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 25 (Ind.1984), the court stated the general rule in criminal law that an accused is not responsible for a death unless the variation between the result “hazarded and the result achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.” The court in People v. Dunhill, 40 Colo.App. 137 , 570 P.2d 1097 (1977), faced a case where the intoxicated driver was driving with one headlight and killed a pedestrian. | 1 | 1 |
Claflin v. McDonoughgreen1 sentence1987In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Shrock, 447 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Mo.App.1969) (quoting Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 415 (1863)), the court stated the general rule prohibiting restitution of money paid by a volunteer: The rule of law is well established, both in England and in this country, that a person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot recover it back, though the payment is made without a sufficient consideration, and under protest. | 1 | 1 |
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Shrockgreen1 sentence1987In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Shrock, 447 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Mo.App.1969) (quoting Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 415 (1863)), the court stated the general rule prohibiting restitution of money paid by a volunteer: The rule of law is well established, both in England and in this country, that a person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot recover it back, though the payment is made without a sufficient consideration, and under protest. | 1 | 1 |
Rosemary Bangert and William Bangert v. Boise Cascade Corporationgreen1 sentence1985See also Bangert v. Boise Cascade Corp., 527 F.2d 902 (8th Cir.1976). | 1 | 1 |
Silton v. Kansas Citygreen1 sentence1985In Lato this court held § 516.110 did not apply because the action was not one “to enforce compliance with the terms of the contract.” In Silton v. Kansas City, 446 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo.1969), the court stated the general rule: “The promise must be contained within the writing and may not be shown by extrinsic evidence or consist of an obligation imposed by law from the facts.” The court distinguished between actions for breach of contract and actions for enforcement of the contract, implying § 516.110 would apply in an action for enforcement. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence1979In State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.1968), this Court stated the general rule: “[Tjestimony which, by clear inference, showed that an alleged accomplice had implicated the defendant in the offense involved, was just as much hearsay and objectionable as the implicating statement itself would have been. [T]he extrajudicial statement of a third person [that] was attempted to be used as evidence of the guilt of the accused, [is] a clear-cut hearsay rule violation.” In Chernick , the circuit attorney testified that after he had questioned the alleged accomplice, “we put an arrest order out for | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. University Bank v. Blairgreen2 sentences1978University Bank v. Blair, 365 Mo. 699, 700 , 285 S.W.2d 678, 679 (banc 1956), this Court stated the general rule to be “that mandamus will not lie if a specific and adequate remedy by appeal exists.” The determinative question then becomes whether an appeal may be taken from the denial of an application to intervene of right under Rule 52.12(a). 1978University Bank v. Blair, 365 Mo. 699, 700 , 285 S.W.2d 678, 679 (banc 1956), this Court stated the general rule to be “that mandamus will not lie if a specific and adequate remedy by appeal exists.” The determinative question then becomes whether an appeal may be taken from the denial of an application to intervene of right under Rule 52.12(a). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Siegelgreen2 sentences1969In State v. Siegel, 265 Mo. 239, 245-246 , 177 S.W. 353, 354 (1915), this Court stated the general rule as follows: “ * * * Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, whether founded upon an express statute or such a construction of the statute of jeofails as to render the use of the word not necessary, there is no exception to the necessity of its use in Missouri in any indictment or information where the offense charged is a felony; and, while the word ‘felony’ seems, as defined by section 4923, R. 1969In State v. Siegel, 265 Mo. 239, 245-246 , 177 S.W. 353, 354 (1915), this Court stated the general rule as follows: “ * * * Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, whether founded upon an express statute or such a construction of the statute of jeofails as to render the use of the word not necessary, there is no exception to the necessity of its use in Missouri in any indictment or information where the offense charged is a felony; and, while the word ‘felony’ seems, as defined by section 4923, R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Daniels
green
2 sentences1964On page 405, the Supreme Court opinion made reference to and quoted approvingly the rule announced by the Supreme Court of Maryland as follows: “The court stated the general rule to be as follows [Keely-Springfield Tire Co. v. Daniels, 199 Md. 156 , 85 A.2d 795 ], 85 A.2d loc.cit. 797(1): ‘This broad rule, which has been adopted quite generally in the United States following the decisions in England, has not been fully accepted in Maryland. 1964On page 405, the Supreme Court opinion made reference to and quoted approvingly the rule announced by the Supreme Court of Maryland as follows: “The court stated the general rule to be as follows [Keely-Springfield Tire Co. v. Daniels, 199 Md. 156 , 85 A.2d 795 ], 85 A.2d loc.cit. 797(1): ‘This broad rule, which has been adopted quite generally in the United States following the decisions in England, has not been fully accepted in Maryland. | 2 | 1963–1964 |
In Re Keisker's Estate
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Perry v. Carter
green
1 sentence1994The court stated the general rule that “the reimbursement rights of a workmen’s compensation carrier are governed by the law of the state whose Workmen’s Compensation Act was invoked by the claimant in obtaining benefits.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Dunhill
green
1 sentence1990Also, in Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 25 (Ind.1984), the court stated the general rule in criminal law that an accused is not responsible for a death unless the variation between the result “hazarded and the result achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.” The court in People v. Dunhill, 40 Colo.App. 137 , 570 P.2d 1097 (1977), faced a case where the intoxicated driver was driving with one headlight and killed a pedestrian. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Laughlin v. Forgrave
green
2 sentences1986I, § 14 unless it is plainly unreasonable. [6] In *19 Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. banc 1968), this Court stated the general rule that, [t]he legislative branch of the government has the power to enact statutes of limitations and inherent in that power is the power to fix the date when the statute commences to run. 1986I, § 14 unless it is plainly unreasonable. 6 In Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. banc 1968), this Court stated the general rule that, [t]he legislative branch of the government has the power to enact statutes of limitations and inherent in that power is the power to fix the date when the statute commences to run. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Chernick
green
1 sentence1979In State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.1968), this Court stated the general rule: “[Tjestimony which, by clear inference, showed that an alleged accomplice had implicated the defendant in the offense involved, was just as much hearsay and objectionable as the implicating statement itself would have been. [T]he extrajudicial statement of a third person [that] was attempted to be used as evidence of the guilt of the accused, [is] a clear-cut hearsay rule violation.” In Chernick , the circuit attorney testified that after he had questioned the alleged accomplice, “we put an arrest order out for | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Tayler v. Tayler
green
2 sentences1977The power created by a particular instrument may be a general or a limited power, the manner of its execution may be specified and limited." 243 S.W.2d at 316 . 1977The power created by a particular instrument may be a general or a limited power, the manner of its execution may be specified and limited.” 243 S.W.2d at 316 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Heath
green
2 sentences1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Stewart
neutral
2 sentences1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Bongard
green
2 sentences1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 1963The court stated the general rule to be, 52 S.W.2d p. 561 (2-5) : “Where the record shows personal violence — a battery — inflicted upon the slayer by the deceased at the time of the homicide, the general rule is that a manslaughter instruction is called for, State v. Bongard (Mo.Sup.Div. 2) 330 Mo. 805 , 51 S.W. (2d) 84 , * * *. an¿ ⅛⅛ js true though the evidence consist of the testimony of the defendant alone, State v. Heath, 221 Mo. 565, 581 , 121 S.W. 149, 153 ; State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 185 , 212 S.W. 853, 855 .” To the same effect is the ruling in State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805 , 51 | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Dildine
green
1 sentence1963Therein ( 51 S.W.2d 1 . c. 89), the rule in this state is clearly stated and is applicable to the case now before us: “But, in view of the long line of decisions cited in * * *, it appears to be well settled that the law of this state is not as liberal as in some other jurisdictions; and that to constitute adequate provocation there must be more than opprobrious words, more, even, than a demonstration with a deadly weapon imminently threatening danger — there must be actual violence to the person.” In the case of State v. Wright, Mo., 336 S.W.2d 714, 1 . c. 717(1), cited by the defendant, the | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Wright
green
1 sentence1963Therein ( 51 S.W.2d 1 . c. 89), the rule in this state is clearly stated and is applicable to the case now before us: “But, in view of the long line of decisions cited in * * *, it appears to be well settled that the law of this state is not as liberal as in some other jurisdictions; and that to constitute adequate provocation there must be more than opprobrious words, more, even, than a demonstration with a deadly weapon imminently threatening danger — there must be actual violence to the person.” In the case of State v. Wright, Mo., 336 S.W.2d 714, 1 . c. 717(1), cited by the defendant, the | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State Ex Rel. County of St. Louis v. St. Johns-Overland Sanitary Sewer District
green
2 sentences1959Johns-Overland Sanitary Sewer Dist., 353 Mo. 974 , 185 S.W.2d 780, 783 , the court stated the general rule but nevertheless reversed the case with directions to the lower court to determine under the facts how much of the decree prayed for was enforceable and to amend the decree accordingly. 1959Johns-Overland Sanitary Sewer Dist., 353 Mo. 974 , 185 S.W.2d 780, 783 , the court stated the general rule but nevertheless reversed the case with directions to the lower court to determine under the facts how much of the decree prayed for was enforceable and to amend the decree accordingly. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Wadsworth Electric Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1957The opinion in McAnally v. Little River Drainage District, 325 Mot 348, 28 S.W.2d 650, 651 , is by our Supreme Court en banc. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Delille v. Holton-Seelye Co.
green
2 sentences1957In this State the sudden and unexpected rupture of some portion of the internal structure of the body, or the failure of some essential function of the body, is held to be an accidental injury only when it results from some unusual strain or exertion of the employee or some unusual condition in the employment.” We ruled in De Lille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464 , 66 S.W.2d 834 , and in State ex rel. 1957In this State the sudden and unexpected rupture of some portion of the internal structure of the body, or the failure of some essential function of the body, is held to be an accidental injury only when it results from some unusual strain or exertion of the employee or some unusual condition in the employment.” We ruled in De Lille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464 , 66 S.W.2d 834 , and in State ex rel. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.