stated the general rule in New York

2010And, in Pattelli v Bell ( 187 Misc 2d 275 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2001]), one of only two reported cases applying section 240-c, the court stated that “[f]urther, such severance [by one cotenant] does not terminate the right of survivorship of the nonsevering joint tenant.” As the result of the conveyance by Conrad, George became vested with an undivided one-third interest held as a tenant in common, and George and Mrs. Swiers remained vested with an undivided two-thirds interest, as between the two, held as joint tenants.

1956This consent is of itself sufficient, but for it there is no substitute or equivalent (2 Kent Com. 77; Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 ; Harbeck v. Harbeck, 102 id. 714; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun 68 ; Smith v. Smith, 194 App. Div. 543 ; Bates v. Bates, 7 Misc. 547 , Freedman, J.).

1956This consent is of itself sufficient, but for it there is no substitute or equivalent (2 Kent Com. 77; Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 ; Harbeck v. Harbeck, 102 id. 714; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun 68 ; Smith v. Smith, 194 App. Div. 543 ; Bates v. Bates, 7 Misc. 547 , Freedman, J.).

1956(Matter of Burdak, 173 Misc. 839 ; Matter of Wynne, 194 Misc. 459 .) In Graham v. Graham ( 211 App. Div. 580, 583 ), the court stated the general rule “ To constitute a common-law marriage there must be an agreement between the parties, a present consent, per verba de preesenti, to take each other as husband and wife, to enter into a relation which was to continue until death did them part, with the resulting obligations of husband and wife.

1956(Matter of Burdak, 173 Misc. 839 ; Matter of Wynne, 194 Misc. 459 .) In Graham v. Graham ( 211 App. Div. 580, 583 ), the court stated the general rule “ To constitute a common-law marriage there must be an agreement between the parties, a present consent, per verba de preesenti, to take each other as husband and wife, to enter into a relation which was to continue until death did them part, with the resulting obligations of husband and wife.

1956(Matter of Burdak, 173 Misc. 839 ; Matter of Wynne, 194 Misc. 459 .) In Graham v. Graham ( 211 App. Div. 580, 583 ), the court stated the general rule “ To constitute a common-law marriage there must be an agreement between the parties, a present consent, per verba de preesenti, to take each other as husband and wife, to enter into a relation which was to continue until death did them part, with the resulting obligations of husband and wife.

1956This consent is of itself sufficient, but for it there is no substitute or equivalent (2 Kent Com. 77; Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 ; Harbeck v. Harbeck, 102 id. 714; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun 68 ; Smith v. Smith, 194 App. Div. 543 ; Bates v. Bates, 7 Misc. 547 , Freedman, J.).

1951Similarly, the Circuit Court opinion of Judge Wallace, in Easton v. German-American Bank ( 24 F. 523 ), treats the case as one controlled by the law of pledge.

1927In Hart v. Grennell ( 122 N. Y. 371 ) the court stated the general rule as follows: “ The general rule applicable to persons occupying real property for business purposes and who invite and induce others to visit their premises is that they must use reasonable prudence and care 1 o keep their property in such a condition that those who go there shall not be unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed to danger.

1926(Bennett v. Connelly, 122 Misc. 149 .) Furthermore, he was of the opinion that where the contract is made in this State to work on a foreign vessel, and the accident happens here, the laws of this jurisdiction control, citing Marra v. Hamburg-Am.

1926The learned justice presiding at the trial stated the general rule that, in the absence of a statute otherwise providing, the rights of a crew of a ship who have signed articles are determined by the laws of the flag under which the ship sails, citing Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co. ( 277 Fed. 812 ), and that, when an American makes a contract in this country for a foreign voyage on an American ship, and he is injured in a foreign port, the law of the flag governs.

1912In Nay v. Curley, ( 113 N. Y. 575, 577 ), this court stated the general rule to be that, in the absence of explanation, the presumption arising from the delivery of a check is that it was delivered in payment of a debt and notas a loan; but that it may “ represent a loan or a gift, or money of the drawer, to be-applied by the drawee to the use of the former as his agent or otherwise.” The action, in that case, had been brought to recover the amount of an alleged loan made by the plaintiffs’ intestate to defendant.

1906Assn., 103 App. Div. 153, 162 , affd., 182 N. Y. 531 , the court stated the general principle relating to the distribution of assets of insolvent building-loan associations by quoting, with approval from Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, volume 6, page 165, in part as follows: “ The courts are inclined to treat the rights of all those holding the relation of stockholders as equal, and to allow no priorities in their claims. * * * But where the rules and by-laws of the association are held to govern the distribution in insolvency the same as when the association was a going concern, the rule may

1906Assn., 103 App. Div. 153, 162 , affd., 182 N. Y. 531 , the court stated the general principle relating to the distribution of assets of insolvent building-loan associations by quoting, with approval from Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, volume 6, page 165, in part as follows: “ The courts are inclined to treat the rights of all those holding the relation of stockholders as equal, and to allow no priorities in their claims. * * * But where the rules and by-laws of the association are held to govern the distribution in insolvency the same as when the association was a going concern, the rule may