stated the general rule in Kansas

1994“It has been held in many cases that an owner, or a contractee, is responsible for injuries to a third party caused by work done by an independent contractor where the contract directly requires the performance of work intrinsically dangerous, however skillfully done.” 83 Kan. at 354 .

1994Laffery v. Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 , 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Reilly v. Highman, 185 Kan. 537 , 345 P.2d 652 (1959); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Kansas Cold Storage, Inc., 192 Kan. 480, 487 , 389 P.2d 766 (1964).

2002Citing Alderman and Hamilton , the court noted that an exception to this general *1283 rule had been recognized “where a close relative suffers emotional harm from the negligent mishandling of a corpse.” (Emphasis added.) 233 Kan. at 274 .

2002App. 2d 4 , Syl. ¶ 3, 801 P.2d 59 (1990), rev. denied 248 Kan. 998 (1991), where the court stated the general rule that “a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates a contrary legislative intent.

1997See Intermountain Health v. Bd. of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 847 (Utah App. 1992); Blackwell v. Bostitch Div. of Textron, 591 A.2d 384 (R.I. 1991) (subsequent injury or aggravation is compensable so long as it is clear that the real operative factor is the progression of the compensable injury); Home Ins.

1997App. 3d 834 , 612 N.E.2d 77 (1993), the court stated the general principle that the fact that other incidents, whether work related or not, may have aggravated a compensable condition are irrelevant as long as they do not constitute intervening causes.

1995The court stated the general rule that “[pjroof of remarriage by the recipient of maintenance and a motion to terminate presents a prima facie case for termination of maintenance absent proof by the recipient of strong compelling circumstances why the maintenance should not cease. [Citations omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 18 Kan.

1995In City of Kansas City v. Robb, 164 Kan. 577 , 190 P.2d 398 (1948), this court stated the general rule applicable in such a situation: “ ‘So where an act expressly repealing another act and providing a substitute therefor is found to be invalid, the repealing clause must also be held to be invalid, unless it shall appear that the legislature would have passed the repealing clause even if it had not provided a substitute for die act repealed.’ ” 164 Kan. at 579 (quoting 59 C.J. 940).

1995In City of Kansas City v. Robb, 164 Kan. 577 , 190 P.2d 398 (1948), this court stated the general rule applicable in such a situation: “ ‘So where an act expressly repealing another act and providing a substitute therefor is found to be invalid, the repealing clause must also be held to be invalid, unless it shall appear that the legislature would have passed the repealing clause even if it had not provided a substitute for die act repealed.’ ” 164 Kan. at 579 (quoting 59 C.J. 940).

1994In State v. Goetz, 187 Kan. 117 , 353 P.2d 816 (1960), a case presenting a procedural situation similar to the case at bar, this court stated the general rule that the right to a speedy trial is a personal right which may be waived, and it is waived if an accused fails to assert the right.

1994In State v. Goetz, 187 Kan. 117 , 353 P.2d 816 (1960), a case presenting a procedural situation similar to the case at bar, this court stated the general rule that the right to a speedy trial is a personal right which may be waived, and it is waived if an accused fails to assert the right.

1994Laffery v. Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 , 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Reilly v. Highman, 185 Kan. 537 , 345 P.2d 652 (1959); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Kansas Cold Storage, Inc., 192 Kan. 480, 487 , 389 P.2d 766 (1964).

1994Laffery v. Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 , 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Reilly v. Highman, 185 Kan. 537 , 345 P.2d 652 (1959); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Kansas Cold Storage, Inc., 192 Kan. 480, 487 , 389 P.2d 766 (1964).

1994Laffery v. Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 , 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Reilly v. Highman, 185 Kan. 537 , 345 P.2d 652 (1959); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Kansas Cold Storage, Inc., 192 Kan. 480, 487 , 389 P.2d 766 (1964).

1994Laffery v. Gypsum Co., 83 Kan. 349 , 111 Pac. 498 (1910); Reilly v. Highman, 185 Kan. 537 , 345 P.2d 652 (1959); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Kansas Cold Storage, Inc., 192 Kan. 480, 487 , 389 P.2d 766 (1964).

1989Md. 1980), the court stated the general rule for filing consolidated income tax returns: “(1) that consolidated taxable income be determined by taking into account the separate taxable income of each member of the group and (2) that the separate taxable income of a member of a group be computed in accordance with the provisions covering the determination of taxable income of separate corporations.” 490 F. Supp. at 358 .

1984See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.

1984In State v. Amodei, 222 Kan. 140, 142 , 563 P.2d 440 (1977), the court stated the general rule: ‘In order for defendant to be entitled to an instruction on any particular defense there must be some evidence to support that defense and justify the instruction.

1984In State v. Amodei, 222 Kan. 140, 142 , 563 P.2d 440 (1977), the court stated the general rule: ‘In order for defendant to be entitled to an instruction on any particular defense there must be some evidence to support that defense and justify the instruction.

1976In State v. Miller, 53 Kan. 324 , 36 Pac. 751 , this court stated the general rule in Syl. 1 in the following language: “To constitute the crime of robbery by forcibly taking money from the person of its owner, it is not necessary that violence to the person of the owner should precede the taking of the money; it is sufficient if it be contemporaneous with the taking.” In Miller the factual circumstances were stated in the opinion to be as follows: “ ‘That on the evening of the 26th day of August, 1893, the defendant came into the laundry of the complaining witness, at about 10 o’clock at nigh

1976In State v. Miller, 53 Kan. 324 , 36 Pac. 751 , this court stated the general rule in Syl. 1 in the following language: “To constitute the crime of robbery by forcibly taking money from the person of its owner, it is not necessary that violence to the person of the owner should precede the taking of the money; it is sufficient if it be contemporaneous with the taking.” In Miller the factual circumstances were stated in the opinion to be as follows: “ ‘That on the evening of the 26th day of August, 1893, the defendant came into the laundry of the complaining witness, at about 10 o’clock at nigh

1971A. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 , the court stated the general rule to be that a policy indemnifying an insured against liability for his own willful wrongs is void as against public policy.

1971Co., 185 C.A.2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 , the court stated the general rule to be that a policy indemnifying an insured against liability for his own willful wrongs is void as against public policy.