inadvertence requirement in New Jersey

2022See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 223 (1983) (holding the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts); see also State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (eliminating the inadvertence requirement from the plain view exception, noting it is inconsistent with the strong preference for objective standards of reasonableness and A-0509-20 19 inadvertence analysis calls for subjective inquiry into an individual officer's motivations).

2022See State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (eliminating the inadvertence requirement for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement based in part on the strong preference for objective standards of reasonableness, as inadvertence analysi s calls for a subjective inquiry into an officer's motivation); see also Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 219 (noting that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts, and rejecting a "bad faith doctrine").

2022See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 223 (1983) (holding the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts); see also State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (eliminating the inadvertence requirement from the plain view exception, noting it is inconsistent with the strong preference for objective standards of reasonableness and A-0509-20 19 inadvertence analysis calls for subjective inquiry into an individual officer's motivations).

2022See State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (eliminating the inadvertence requirement for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement based in part on the strong preference for objective standards of reasonableness, as inadvertence analysi s calls for a subjective inquiry into an officer's motivation); see also Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 219 (noting that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts, and rejecting a "bad faith doctrine").

2017Finally, it was immediately apparent the handgun was evidence of a crime or contraband. "[E]vidence of a crime is 'immediately apparent' under the plain-view doctrine when 5 While our Supreme Court prospectively removed the inadvertence requirement in State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016), the present appeal arises from a judgment that predates Gonzales, so we apply the previous three-part test. 12 A-2711-15T4 the officer possesses 'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.'" Id. at 93 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 , 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 , 75 L.

2017Finally, it was immediately apparent the handgun was evidence of a crime or contraband. "[E]vidence of a crime is 'immediately apparent' under the plain-view doctrine when 5 While our Supreme Court prospectively removed the inadvertence requirement in State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016), the present appeal arises from a judgment that predates Gonzales, so we apply the previous three-part test. 12 A-2711-15T4 the officer possesses 'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.'" Id. at 93 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 , 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 , 75 L.

2016According to the ACLU-NJ, the inadvertence requirement has continuing vitality because it deters pretextual searches—“planned warrantless searches, where [the police] know in advance the location of certain evidence and intend to seize it,” quoting State v. Damplias, 282 N.J.Super. 471, 478-79 , 660 A.2d 570 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 , 713 A.2d 498 (1998).

2016According to the ACLU-NJ, the inadvertence requirement has continuing vitality because it deters pretextual searches—“planned warrantless searches, where [the police] know in advance the location of certain evidence and intend to seize it,” quoting State v. Damplias, 282 N.J.Super. 471, 478-79 , 660 A.2d 570 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 , 713 A.2d 498 (1998).

2016The plain-view seizure of the car in Coolidge violated the inadvertence prong, and therefore the Fourth Amendment, because the “police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile’s exact description and location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge’s property.” Id. at 472 , 91 S.Ct. at 2041 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 586-87 . 6 In a dissenting opinion, Justice White advanced the position that “the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any Fourth Amendment ends.” Id. at 517 , 91 S.Ct. at 2063 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 613 (White, J., dissenting)

2016The plain-view seizure of the car in Coolidge violated the inadvertence prong, and therefore the Fourth Amendment, because the “police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile’s exact description and location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge’s property.” Id. at 472 , 91 S.Ct. at 2041 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 586-87 . 6 In a dissenting opinion, Justice White advanced the position that “the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any Fourth Amendment ends.” Id. at 517 , 91 S.Ct. at 2063 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 613 (White, J., dissenting)

2018See Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (finding extending a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop is unlawful); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding a determination of reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires consideration of "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 100-01 (2016), the Court prospectively modified the plain-view doctrine, eliminating the inadvertence

2018See Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (finding extending a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop is unlawful); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding a determination of reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires consideration of "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 100-01 (2016), the Court prospectively modified the plain-view doctrine, eliminating the inadvertence

2018"The purpose of the inadvertence requirement" was "to prevent the police from engaging in planned warrantless searches where they know in advance the location of certain evidence and intend to seize it, relying on the 'plain view' exception as a pretext." State v. Padilla, 321 N.J.

2018See Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (finding extending a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop is unlawful); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding a determination of reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires consideration of "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 100-01 (2016), the Court prospectively modified the plain-view doctrine, eliminating the inadvertence

2018See Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (finding extending a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop is unlawful); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding a determination of reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires consideration of "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 100-01 (2016), the Court prospectively modified the plain-view doctrine, eliminating the inadvertence

2016See, e.g., People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529 , 534 n.6 (Colo.1999); State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or. 613 , 801 P.2d 749 , 753 n.9 (1990); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285 , 662 A.2d 1043 , 1049 & n.6 (1995); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436 , 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) (adopting the Horton rule and noting that in doing so it “join[ed] ... the majority of states”).

2016See, e.g., People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529 , 534 n.6 (Colo.1999); State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or. 613 , 801 P.2d 749 , 753 n.9 (1990); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285 , 662 A.2d 1043 , 1049 & n.6 (1995); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436 , 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) (adopting the Horton rule and noting that in doing so it “join[ed] ... the majority of states”).

2016See, e.g., People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529 , 534 n.6 (Colo.1999); State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or. 613 , 801 P.2d 749 , 753 n.9 (1990); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285 , 662 A.2d 1043 , 1049 & n.6 (1995); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436 , 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) (adopting the Horton rule and noting that in doing so it “join[ed] ... the majority of states”).

2016In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision to eliminate the inadvertence requirement as part of the plain-view *90 exception under the Fourth Amendment, Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 141-42 , 110 S.Ct. at 2310 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 126 , we now address whether the inadvertence prong of the plain-view doctrine has continuing vitality under our State Constitution.

2016In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision to eliminate the inadvertence requirement as part of the plain-view *90 exception under the Fourth Amendment, Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 141-42 , 110 S.Ct. at 2310 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 126 , we now address whether the inadvertence prong of the plain-view doctrine has continuing vitality under our State Constitution.

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly

1982See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35. [4] We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F. 2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952 , 100 S.Ct. 2918 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, "`Inadvertence': The Increasingly