intention claim in New Jersey

1989“It is the intention with which the rule or regulation was adopted that is controlling.” Ibid.

1989“It is the intention with which the rule or regulation was adopted that is controlling.” Ibid.

1961Super. 509, 513 ( App. Div. 1956). "`Hostile' means `with the intention to claim title against the true owner, and, * * *' [the] `use, which is claimed to be adverse was such that the owner knew or should have known that the disseizor intended to make title under it.' Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 5 N.J. 580, 588 (1950); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369 ( Sup. Ct. 1867). * * *" Defendants' contention of adverse possession for the 20-year statutory period is based upon the claim that their grantors' predecessor in title, Rittenhouse, made adverse entry upon the lands in question b

1956"Hostile" means "with the intention to claim title against the true owner, and, obviously it must appear that the possession, or use, which is claimed to be adverse was such that the owner knew or should have known that the disseizor intended to make title under it." Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, supra, 5 N.J., at page 588 ; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369 ( Sup. Ct. 1867).

1991Co., 208 N.J.

1987Super. 86, 94-96 (App. Div.) (the use of areas for street purposes for over twenty years does not constitute a prescriptive easement so as to prevent their use by the municipality for other than street purposes where the right asserted lacks continuity during the entirety of the period claimed and the use relied upon was more consistent with permission on the part of the municipal officials than with the assertion of a general public right to use the properties as streets in hostility to the reserved right of the municipality of unrestricted dominion), aff'd 22 N.J. 218 (1956).

1987The Supreme Court in Matter of Conda, supra, has explained the other alternatives available to the trial court (under N.J.S.A. 3B:15-l(d), -11 and -12) and both require bonds.

1985Ct. 1971), or with a report from a multifunctioned toxicological laboratory operated by a state health department, as in Reardon v. Manson, 644 F. 2d 122 (2 Cir.1981), or with a procedure permitting admission of a laboratory report unless defendant indicates an intention to challenge the truth of its conclusions, see Reardon v. Manson, supra, at 130, n. 12, or with a report accompanied by testimony from a supervising toxicologist or chemist as in Soney or State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A. 2d 33 (1980) (private hospital), or Commonwealth v. Seville, 266 Pa.Super. 587 , 405 A. 2d 1262 (1

1985Ct. 1971), or with a report from a multifunctioned toxicological laboratory operated by a state health department, as in Reardon v. Manson, 644 F. 2d 122 (2 Cir.1981), or with a procedure permitting admission of a laboratory report unless defendant indicates an intention to challenge the truth of its conclusions, see Reardon v. Manson, supra, at 130, n. 12, or with a report accompanied by testimony from a supervising toxicologist or chemist as in Soney or State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A. 2d 33 (1980) (private hospital), or Commonwealth v. Seville, 266 Pa.Super. 587 , 405 A. 2d 1262 (1

1985Ct. 1971), or with a report from a multifunctioned toxicological laboratory operated by a state health department, as in Reardon v. Manson, 644 F. 2d 122 (2 Cir.1981), or with a procedure permitting admission of a laboratory report unless defendant indicates an intention to challenge the truth of its conclusions, see Reardon v. Manson, supra, at 130, n. 12, or with a report accompanied by testimony from a supervising toxicologist or chemist as in Soney or State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A. 2d 33 (1980) (private hospital), or Commonwealth v. Seville, 266 Pa.Super. 587 , 405 A. 2d 1262 (1

1985Ct. 1971), or with a report from a multifunctioned toxicological laboratory operated by a state health department, as in Reardon v. Manson, 644 F. 2d 122 (2 Cir.1981), or with a procedure permitting admission of a laboratory report unless defendant indicates an intention to challenge the truth of its conclusions, see Reardon v. Manson, supra, at 130, n. 12, or with a report accompanied by testimony from a supervising toxicologist or chemist as in Soney or State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562 , 436 A. 2d 33 (1980) (private hospital), or Commonwealth v. Seville, 266 Pa.Super. 587 , 405 A. 2d 1262 (1

1983This test promotes uniformity of taxation by permitting the assessor to rely upon external appearances. [Id. 1 N.J.Tax at 276 ] In attempting to apply the Bostian test, the taxing district points to numerous aspects of plaintiff’s asphalt plant which allegedly show an intention to make the plant and its improvements permanent.

1969J., in Ross v. Gould, supra, [ 5 Me. 204 ], ‘is an essential ingredient in disseisin.’ And in Worcester v. Lord, supra [ 56 Me. 266 ], the court says: ‘To make a disseisin in fact, there must be an intention on the part of the party assuming-possession to assert title in himself.’ Indeed, the authorities all agree that this intention of the occupant to claim the ownership of land not embraced in his title is a necessary element of adverse possession; and in case of occupancy by mistake beyond a line capable of being ascertained this intention to claim title to the extent of the occupancy must

1969J., in Ross v. Gould, supra, [ 5 Me. 204 ], ‘is an essential ingredient in disseisin.’ And in Worcester v. Lord, supra [ 56 Me. 266 ], the court says: ‘To make a disseisin in fact, there must be an intention on the part of the party assuming-possession to assert title in himself.’ Indeed, the authorities all agree that this intention of the occupant to claim the ownership of land not embraced in his title is a necessary element of adverse possession; and in case of occupancy by mistake beyond a line capable of being ascertained this intention to claim title to the extent of the occupancy must

1969Hitehings v. Morrison, 72 Me. 331 , is a pertinent illustration of this principle.

1962Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, Inc., 25 N.J. 407, 420 (1957); Mulford v. Abott , above, 42 N.J.

1950Cornelius and Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1 (at p. 31); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 Id. 369; Myers v. Folkman, 89 Id. 390." See also Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 ; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N.J.L. 675 , 48 A. 567 ; Nuzzi v. Corcione, 139 N.J.

1950Cornelius and Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1 (at p. 31); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 Id. 369; Myers v. Folkman, 89 Id. 390." See also Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 ; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N.J.L. 675 , 48 A. 567 ; Nuzzi v. Corcione, 139 N.J.

1950Cornelius and Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1 (at p. 31); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 Id. 369; Myers v. Folkman, 89 Id. 390." See also Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 ; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N.J.L. 675 , 48 A. 567 ; Nuzzi v. Corcione, 139 N.J.

1950Cornelius and Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1 (at p. 31); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 Id. 369; Myers v. Folkman, 89 Id. 390." See also Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 ; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N.J.L. 675 , 48 A. 567 ; Nuzzi v. Corcione, 139 N.J.

1950In DeLuca v. Melin, 103 N.J.L. 140 , 134 A. 735 , the court said at page 144: "To sustain a title by adverse possession the party relying thereon must establish a continued, open, visible and exclusive possession and one that is hostile, that is, with the intention to claim title against the true owner, and, obviously, it must appear that the possession, *603 or use, which is claimed to be adverse was such that the owner knew, or should have known, that the disseizor intended to make title under it.

1950In DeLuca v. Melin, 103 N.J.L. 140 , 134 A. 735 , the court said at page 144: "To sustain a title by adverse possession the party relying thereon must establish a continued, open, visible and exclusive possession and one that is hostile, that is, with the intention to claim title against the true owner, and, obviously, it must appear that the possession, *603 or use, which is claimed to be adverse was such that the owner knew, or should have known, that the disseizor intended to make title under it.

1950Cornelius and Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1 (at p. 31); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 Id. 369; Myers v. Folkman, 89 Id. 390." See also Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527 ; Clement v. Bettle, 65 N.J.L. 675 , 48 A. 567 ; Nuzzi v. Corcione, 139 N.J.

1941The purpose was to notify the complainant only of the general subject-matter of the argument." Krueger v. Armitage, 58 N.J.

1867Angell on Limitations, § 385, 390; Cornelius v. Giberson, 1 Dutcher 1; Bicard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59 .