intention bar (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

intention bar in California

45 California opinions name it 2 courts 1862–2022 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (41)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Estradagreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–2011
2 sentences

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

2002(Dis. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian., post, at pp. 587-588.) [16] Government Code section 9608 provides, "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." [17] We point out that in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 742, 746-748, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 , the

46
Sorensen v. Costagreen
cal · 1948 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1973–2008
2 sentences

1981The exception was applied to deny a claim of adverse possession in Holzer v. Read (1932) 216 Cal. 119, 123 [ 13 P.2d 647 ], where the occupation of the land was by mistake “with no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own, land which does not belong to him, but with the intention to claim only to the true line wherever it may be.” The relationship between the mistake rule and the exception was addressed in Sorensen v. Costa (1948) 32 Cal.2d 453, 459-461 [ 196 P.2d 900 ].

1981The exception was applied to deny a claim of adverse possession in Holzer v. Read (1932) 216 Cal. 119, 123 [ 13 P.2d 647 ], where the occupation of the land was by mistake “with no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own, land which does not belong to him, but with the intention to claim only to the true line wherever it may be.” The relationship between the mistake rule and the exception was addressed in Sorensen v. Costa (1948) 32 Cal.2d 453, 459-461 [ 196 P.2d 900 ].

23
Dillon v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2010 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2022
2 sentences

2022Code, § 9608 [“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law”]; Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828 [“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of sub

2020Code, § 9608 [“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law”]; Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828 [“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of sub

22
People v. Rossigreen
cal · 1976 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2011
2 sentences

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

22
Holzer v. Readgreen
cal · 1932 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1948–1981
2 sentences

1981The exception was applied to deny a claim of adverse possession in Holzer v. Read (1932) 216 Cal. 119, 123 [ 13 P.2d 647 ], where the occupation of the land was by mistake “with no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own, land which does not belong to him, but with the intention to claim only to the true line wherever it may be.” The relationship between the mistake rule and the exception was addressed in Sorensen v. Costa (1948) 32 Cal.2d 453, 459-461 [ 196 P.2d 900 ].

1948The requirement of “hostility” relied on by appellant (see West v. Evans, 29 Cal.2d 414, 417 [ 175 P.2d 219 ]) means, not that the parties must have a dispute as to the title during the period of possession, but that the claimant’s possession must be adverse to the record owner, “unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferable from the circumstances of the right in the latter.” (4 Tiffany, Real Property [3d ed.], 425.) Appellant’s contention that respondent’s possession was not adverse is based on the statement in Holzer v. Read, 216 Cal. 119, 123 [ 13 P.2d 697 ], that “where the occupa

22
People v. Gilesgreen
calctapp · 1965 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
People v. Arellanogreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
People v. Contrerasgreen
calctapp · 1957 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
People v. Thompsongreen
calctapp · 1967 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
People v. Quilongreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
People v. Butterfieldgreen
calctapp · 1962 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
Aguilera v. California Dept. of Correctionsgreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22
Southern California Freight Lines v. San Diego Electric Railway Co.green
calctapp · 1944 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1946–1962
2 sentences

1962Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 672, 676 [ 152 P.2d 470 ], where the court said: ‘We do not believe that it was the intention of the rule makers to change the long established rule that the written opinion of the trial judge may *383 not be used to impeach his solemn findings and judgment.

1962Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 672, 676 [ 152 P.2d 470 ], where the court said: ‘We do not believe that it was the intention of the rule makers to change the long established rule that the written opinion of the trial judge may *383 not be used to impeach his solemn findings and judgment.

22
People v. McNultygreen
cal · 1892 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1924–1986
2 sentences

1986However, California has a general saving clause in Government Code section 9608, and such a clause is just as effective as a specific one. 20 (People v. McNulty (1892) 93 Cal. 427, 437 [ 29 P. 61 ]; cf. Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461 [ 296 P. 291 , 74 A.L.R. 187 ].) This clause provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

1925It reads as follows: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing act.” The cases of People v. Pratt, 67 Cal. App. 606 [ 228 Pac. 47 ], People v. Davis, 67 Cal. App. 210 [ 227 Pac. 494 ]; People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425 [ 30 Pac. 481 ], and People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427 [ 26 Pac. 597 , 29 Pac. 61 ], are in point.

15
Spears v. Cty. of Modocgreen
cal · 1894 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1923–1968
2 sentences

1968(In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ]; Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303 [ 35 P. 869 ]; The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551 [ 5 L.Ed. 520 ].) California’s saving clause for criminal offenses is found in section 9608, Government Code: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment

1923If the judgment is appealed from, and its enforcement is suspended until the determination of the appeal, the power to enforce the judgment falls with the repeal of the statute, and the appellate court will direct a dismissal of the proceedings.” (Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303, 305 [ 35 Pac. 869, 870 ].) Section 329 of the Political Code provides: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

13
People v. Davisgreen
calctapp · 1924 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1925–1976
2 sentences

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

12
People v. Prattgreen
calctapp · 1924 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1925–1976
2 sentences

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

12
People v. Perezgreen
cal · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Rather, [section 1170.95] represents a [legislative] act of lenity . . . . [¶] Viewed that way, proceedings under [section 1170.95] do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in the First District reached the same conclusion in People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102 , 1156 and again more recently in People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609-611 (James).) Furthermore, a factual finding that results in ineligibility for section 1170.95 relief does not increase the penalty for a crime. “[I]t sim

11
Badella v. Millergreen
cal · 1955 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
People v. Borjagreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021The parties also acted as if the 8 court had issued a ruling: Plaintiff filed a notice of ruling reporting that the trial court had ruled on the motion, and neither the law firm nor Shuck objected to that notice of ruling.3 Although the trial court’s ruling was not in a minute order and was thus not immediately effective (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170 ), that omission was a clerical error that the trial court was empowered to—and, in its February 2020 order, did—correct retroactively, although the court did so without using the words “nunc pro tunc.” (People v. Sanch

11
General Insurance Co. of America v. Commerce Hyatt Housegreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
11
In Re Griffingreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Soil v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.green
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
People v. Garciagreen
cal · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
People v. Whittgreen
cal · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Schlick v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
People v. Community Release Boardgreen
calctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Durbingreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Figueroagreen
calctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Beckley v. Aaron N.green
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Alexandergreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Collinsgreen
cal · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
In Re Finkgreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Riversgreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Charrot v. Municipal Courtgreen
calctapp · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Francisgreen
cal · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
People v. Fowlergreen
calctapp · 1959 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11
People v. Lindsaygreen
calctapp · 1925 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11
Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Controlgreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970
11
People v. Tawneygreen
calctapp · 1959 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
People v. Gallegosgreen
cal · 1964 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
2 sentences

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

1968For other expositions of the rights and disabilities of a parolee refererenee is made to People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 84-85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ]; Aguilera v. California Dept, of Corrections (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; People v. Quilon (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 627 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294]; People v. Giles (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 643, 646-647 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 758 ]; and People v. Contreras (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 315 P.2d 916 ]; but cf. People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176 , 178 and 180 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 397 P.2d 174 ]; People v. Arellano (1966) 2

22

Also cited on this issue (38)

CaseCitedYears
Cruz v. Martínez green
prsupreme · 1921
2 sentences

1986However, California has a general saving clause in Government Code section 9608, and such a clause is just as effective as a specific one. 20 (People v. McNulty (1892) 93 Cal. 427, 437 [ 29 P. 61 ]; cf. Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461 [ 296 P. 291 , 74 A.L.R. 187 ].) This clause provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

1925It reads as follows: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing act.” The cases of People v. Pratt, 67 Cal. App. 606 [ 228 Pac. 47 ], People v. Davis, 67 Cal. App. 210 [ 227 Pac. 494 ]; People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425 [ 30 Pac. 481 ], and People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427 [ 26 Pac. 597 , 29 Pac. 61 ], are in point.

51924–1986
Díaz v. Sánchez Morales & Co. green
prsupreme · 1918
2 sentences

1925It reads as follows: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing act.” The cases of People v. Pratt, 67 Cal. App. 606 [ 228 Pac. 47 ], People v. Davis, 67 Cal. App. 210 [ 227 Pac. 494 ]; People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425 [ 30 Pac. 481 ], and People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427 [ 26 Pac. 597 , 29 Pac. 61 ], are in point.

1924To meet this situation we have in this state a general provision saving from the effect of the repeal such violations, namely, section 329 of the Political Code, which reads as follows: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of any act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing statute.” In construing this section of the supreme court, in the case of People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427 [ 26

41924–1945
Santiago A. Panzardi, Inc. v. Gallardo green
prsupreme · 1926
2 sentences

1968(In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ]; Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303 [ 35 P. 869 ]; The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551 [ 5 L.Ed. 520 ].) California’s saving clause for criminal offenses is found in section 9608, Government Code: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment

1923If the judgment is appealed from, and its enforcement is suspended until the determination of the appeal, the power to enforce the judgment falls with the repeal of the statute, and the appellate court will direct a dismissal of the proceedings.” (Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303, 305 [ 35 Pac. 869, 870 ].) Section 329 of the Political Code provides: “The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

31923–1968
People v. Anthony green
calctapp5d · 2019
2 sentences

2022Rather, [section 1170.95] represents a [legislative] act of lenity . . . . [¶] Viewed that way, proceedings under [section 1170.95] do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in the First District reached the same conclusion in People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102 , 1156 and again more recently in People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609-611 (James).) Furthermore, a factual finding that results in ineligibility for section 1170.95 relief does not increase the penalty for a crime. “[I]t sim

2020Rather, [section 1170.95] represents a [legislative] act of lenity . . . . [¶] Viewed that way, proceedings under [section 1170.95] do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in the First District reached the same conclusion in People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 .

22020–2022
Passerini v. Lasalle green
calctapp · 1945
2 sentences

1962(Estate of Soulie, 72 Cal.App.2d 332 [ 164 P.2d 565 ].) ‘. . . constructions which lead to intestacy, total or partial, are not favored; and that such interpretation should, if possible, be placed upon the provisions of the will as will prevent intestacy, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of his whole estate.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of paragraph Third of the will suggests an intention to rule out of the status of joint property any other assets which stood in the “name of myself and my wife,” either as tenants in common or wit

1962(Estate of Soulie, 72 Cal.App.2d 332 [ 164 P.2d 565 ].) ‘. . . constructions which lead to intestacy, total or partial, are not favored; and that such interpretation should, if possible, be placed upon the provisions of the will as will prevent intestacy, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of his whole estate.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of paragraph Third of the will suggests an intention to rule out of the status of joint property any other assets which stood in the “name of myself and my wife,” either as tenants in common or wit

21962–1962
People v. Barbour green
cal · 1858
2 sentences

1945(People v. Quinn, 18 Cal. 122 ; People v. Barbour, 9 Cal. 230 ; People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427 [ 26 P. 597 , 29 P. 61 ].) In 1872 the provisions of the 1853 statute were substantially embodied in section 329 of the Political Code.

1862If the defendant be not indicted or tried, as provided in the last two sections, and sufficient reasons therefor be shown, the Court may order the action to be continued from term to term, and in the meantime may discharge the defendant from custody on his own recognizance, or on the recognizance of bail, for his appearance to answer the charge at the time to which the action is continued." By a general statute of this State, passed May 17th, 1853, it is provided “ that the repeal of any law creating a criminal offense shall not be held to constitute a bar to the indictment and punishment of a

21862–1945
Montgomery & Mullen Lumber Co. v. Quimby green
cal · 1912
2 sentences

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

21927–1935
Goodrich v. Mortimer green
calctapp · 1919
2 sentences

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

21927–1935
Franz v. Mendonca green
cal · 1900
2 sentences

1935(Franz v. Mendonea, 131 Cal. 205 [ 63 Pac. 361 ].) It is not necessary that one claiming by adverse possession be in personal occupation.

1935(Franz v. Mendonea, 131 Cal. 205 [ 63 Pac. 361 ].) It is not necessary that one claiming by adverse possession be in personal occupation.

21927–1935
Botsford v. Eyraud green
cal · 1906
2 sentences

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

1935Co. v. Quimby, 164 Cal. 250 [ 128 Pac. 402 ]; Botsford v. Eyraud, 148 Cal. 431 [ 83 Pac. 1008 ]; Goodrich v. Mortimer, 44 Cal. App. 576 [ 186 Pac. 844 ].) Furthermore, any visible act which clearly demonstrates an intention to claim owner *158 ship and possession, and either puts the legal owner upon inquiry or conveys actual notice, is sufficient.

21927–1935
In Re Marriage of Drake green
calctapp · 1997
12021–2021
People v. Conley green
cal · 2016
12021–2021
Gilardi v. Hallam green
cal · 1981
12008–2008
Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc. green
calctapp · 1998
12003–2003
People v. Glenn green
calctapp · 1997
12002–2002
People v. Rivers green
cal · 1967
11994–1994
Peterson v. Ball green
cal · 1931
11986–1986
Bouchard v. Insona green
calctapp · 1980
11981–1981
Allegretto v. Oregon Automobile Insurance green
or · 1932
11981–1981
Johns v. Scobie green
cal · 1939
11977–1977
Newman v. Cornelius green
calctapp · 1970
11977–1977
Madden v. Alpha Hardware & Supply Co. green
calctapp · 1954
11977–1977
Park v. Powers green
cal · 1935
11977–1977
In Re Crane green
calctapp · 1935
11976–1976
People v. Harmon green
cal · 1960
11976–1976
People v. Williams green
calctapp · 1914
11976–1976
People v. King green
calctapp · 1934
11976–1976
Peters v. De Rose Gracia neutral
cal · 1895
11973–1973
The Irresistible green
scotus · 1822
11968–1968
McGuire v. State neutral
· 1898
11965–1965
State v. Arlin green
nh · 1859
11965–1965
Commonwealth v. Wyman green
mass · 1853
11965–1965
People v. . Hayes green
ny · 1894
11965–1965
In re Petty green
· 1879
11965–1965
Von Schmidt v. Huntington green
cal · 1850
11965–1965
People v. Oliver green
ny · 1956
11965–1965
Strong v. State green
· 1822
11965–1965
Hernandez v. State green
ariz · 1934
11965–1965

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Government Code § 9608 (10) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1007 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 61 (1866–2025) CA 45 (1862–2022) AL 22 (1845–1993) MO 19 (1902–1997) MN 18 (1884–2015) NJ 17 (1867–2024) PA 16 (1901–2019) WA 15 (1904–2016) RI 14 (1994–2020) IL 13 (1895–2003) TN 13 (1992–2024) GA 10 (1898–2019) FL 9 (1907–2023) CO 9 (1913–2013) MT 8 (1896–2012) SD 8 (1941–2023) KY 8 (1909–2012) MA 7 (1919–2017) OR 7 (1893–2026) NY 7 (1924–2007) NE 7 (1906–2023) VT 7 (1909–2016) OK 6 (1917–1976) OH 6 (1983–2025) MI 6 (1905–2024) SC 6 (1940–2012) IA 5 (1899–1970) AR 5 (1894–2005) MD 5 (1906–2001) KS 5 (1907–2014) CT 5 (1913–2012) AZ 5 (1970–2002) ID 4 (1899–1998) UT 4 (1937–2025) VA 4 (1890–1991) IN 4 (1886–1990) WY 3 (1921–2002) WI 3 (1940–1982) NC 2 (2014–2026) MS 2 (1953–1959) LA 2 (1991–2019) NM 2 (1895–1968) NV 2 (2013–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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