intention claim in Nebraska

1953The claimant relies on Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546 , 290 N. W. 250 , wherein it was said: “Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning *753 of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1940Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1953The claimant relies on Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546 , 290 N. W. 250 , wherein it was said: “Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning *753 of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1940Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1922In Cervena v. Thurston, 59 Neb. 343 , this court has said: “To acquire real property by adverse possession it is not essential that entry should have been made under claim of ownership, if the occupancy was with intent to claim against the true owner.” And in Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814 , in the body of the opinion it is said: “While the intention to claim the land need not exist at the time of the entry, the statute will not begin to run until the possession is adverse, and the acts and intention of the occupant are those of an owner.” It will thus be seen that this cause may not be determi

1906But such failure, where the land is assessed separately, is strong and forcible evidence that the possessor did not intend to claim title adversely to the owner. * * * If the payment of taxes tends to show an intention to claim title — and clearly it does — the failure to pay them would a fortiori tend to show the converse of the proposition.” ■ It appearing, then, that the plaintiff took and retained possession without any claim of right or color of title, and with no intention of holding it as against the owner, but merely to use it for his own purposes as long as he could, the case falls wi

2023Id.

1989The court in Ernst v. Conditt, 54 Tenn. App. 328 , 390 S.W.2d 703 (1964), quoting Williams v. Williams, 84 Tenn. 164 (1885), stated, “ ‘We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the construction of conveyances in this State, and look to the intention of the instrument alone for our guide, that intention is to be arrived at from the language of the instrument read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” 54 Tenn. App. at 337 , 390 S.W.2d at 707 .

1989The court in Ernst v. Conditt, 54 Tenn. App. 328 , 390 S.W.2d 703 (1964), quoting Williams v. Williams, 84 Tenn. 164 (1885), stated, “ ‘We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the construction of conveyances in this State, and look to the intention of the instrument alone for our guide, that intention is to be arrived at from the language of the instrument read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” 54 Tenn. App. at 337 , 390 S.W.2d at 707 .

1989The court in Ernst v. Conditt, 54 Tenn. App. 328 , 390 S.W.2d 703 (1964), quoting Williams v. Williams, 84 Tenn. 164 (1885), stated, “ ‘We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the construction of conveyances in this State, and look to the intention of the instrument alone for our guide, that intention is to be arrived at from the language of the instrument read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” 54 Tenn. App. at 337 , 390 S.W.2d at 707 .

1969Woodcock v. Unknown Heirs of Crosby, 92 Neb. 723 , 139 N. W. 646 ; Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335 , 177 N. W. 171 .

1969Woodcock v. Unknown Heirs of Crosby, 92 Neb. 723 , 139 N. W. 646 ; Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335 , 177 N. W. 171 .

1969Woodcock v. Unknown Heirs of Crosby, 92 Neb. 723 , 139 N. W. 646 ; Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335 , 177 N. W. 171 .

1969Woodcock v. Unknown Heirs of Crosby, 92 Neb. 723 , 139 N. W. 646 ; Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335 , 177 N. W. 171 .

1953The claimant relies on Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546 , 290 N. W. 250 , wherein it was said: “Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning *753 of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1953The claimant relies on Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546 , 290 N. W. 250 , wherein it was said: “Medical expenses are compensation rights within the meaning *753 of the workmen’s compensation law (Baade v. Omaha Flour Mills Co., 118 Neb. 445 , 225 N. W. 117 ), and a demand for payment of medical expenses is necessarily a claim for compensation, where it is made under such circumstances as to manifest an intention to claim the benefits of the statute.

1953Giving to the compensation law the liberal construction to which it is entitled, we must accordingly hold that, where a claim for any compensation benefits is made Within six months after the occurrence of an injury, this is sufficient to support the employee’s right to institute proceedings within a year, to recover every benefit which has then accrued under the law.” See, also, New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 304 Ill. 613 , 136 N. E. 782 ; Aiello v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Mich. 15 , 262 N. W. 726 .

1953Giving to the compensation law the liberal construction to which it is entitled, we must accordingly hold that, where a claim for any compensation benefits is made Within six months after the occurrence of an injury, this is sufficient to support the employee’s right to institute proceedings within a year, to recover every benefit which has then accrued under the law.” See, also, New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 304 Ill. 613 , 136 N. E. 782 ; Aiello v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Mich. 15 , 262 N. W. 726 .

1953Giving to the compensation law the liberal construction to which it is entitled, we must accordingly hold that, where a claim for any compensation benefits is made Within six months after the occurrence of an injury, this is sufficient to support the employee’s right to institute proceedings within a year, to recover every benefit which has then accrued under the law.” See, also, New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 304 Ill. 613 , 136 N. E. 782 ; Aiello v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Mich. 15 , 262 N. W. 726 .

1953Giving to the compensation law the liberal construction to which it is entitled, we must accordingly hold that, where a claim for any compensation benefits is made Within six months after the occurrence of an injury, this is sufficient to support the employee’s right to institute proceedings within a year, to recover every benefit which has then accrued under the law.” See, also, New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 304 Ill. 613 , 136 N. E. 782 ; Aiello v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Mich. 15 , 262 N. W. 726 .

1922In Cervena v. Thurston, 59 Neb. 343 , this court has said: “To acquire real property by adverse possession it is not essential that entry should have been made under claim of ownership, if the occupancy was with intent to claim against the true owner.” And in Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814 , in the body of the opinion it is said: “While the intention to claim the land need not exist at the time of the entry, the statute will not begin to run until the possession is adverse, and the acts and intention of the occupant are those of an owner.” It will thus be seen that this cause may not be determi