attempted waiver in New York

2017We observed that the District's "only purpose," to construct reservoirs, was "a State purpose" and the District therefore had "no special character different from that of the State" ( id. at 489 , 121 N.E.2d 428 ).

2017We observed that the District's "only purpose," to construct reservoirs, was "a State purpose" and the District therefore had "no special character different from that of the State" ( id. at 489 , 121 N.E.2d 428 ).

2000Plaintiff is not only precluded from asserting a section 1983 claim based on the FWPCA (see, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v National Sea Clammers Assn., supra, at 14-18; Welch Foods v Wilson, supra, 262 AD2d, at 951 ), but is also precluded from asserting a section 1983 claim based on an alleged constitutional violation because that claim is based on the same factual predicate as the attempted claim under the FWPCA (see, Bruneau v South Kortright Cent.

1995The attempted defense is not based on procedures and results generally accepted in the scientific community, which is the standard enunciated in Frye v United States (293 F 1013) and adopted by New York courts (see, People v Taylor, 75 NY2d 277, 286 ).

1995Federal courts have refused to accept expert testimony similar to that offered by defendant (see, e.g., United States v Shorter, 809 F2d 54, cert denied 484 US 817 ).

1988The allegation that the codefendant committed perjury, presumably a reference to that defendant’s statement, bears no relation to a request for a nonjury trial, and certainly affects this defendant’s purported waiver (Commonwealth v Garrison, 242 Pa Super 509, 364 A2d 388 [defendant’s expressed reason for waiving a jury trial to maneuver for a Judge he thought might be more lenient suggested less than a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver for the relinquishment of an important constitutional right]; 4 see, People v Di Constanza, 31 AD2d 250 , affd 26 NY2d 1014 ).

1988First, the defendant’s attempted waiver did not appear to be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as the statute required (People v Logue, 115 AD2d 285 , lv denied 67 NY2d 886 ; People v Cannady, 127 Misc 2d 783 ).

1988First, the defendant’s attempted waiver did not appear to be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as the statute required (People v Logue, 115 AD2d 285 , lv denied 67 NY2d 886 ; People v Cannady, 127 Misc 2d 783 ).

1988The allegation that the codefendant committed perjury, presumably a reference to that defendant’s statement, bears no relation to a request for a nonjury trial, and certainly affects this defendant’s purported waiver (Commonwealth v Garrison, 242 Pa Super 509, 364 A2d 388 [defendant’s expressed reason for waiving a jury trial to maneuver for a Judge he thought might be more lenient suggested less than a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver for the relinquishment of an important constitutional right]; 4 see, People v Di Constanza, 31 AD2d 250 , affd 26 NY2d 1014 ).

1988The allegation that the codefendant committed perjury, presumably a reference to that defendant’s statement, bears no relation to a request for a nonjury trial, and certainly affects this defendant’s purported waiver (Commonwealth v Garrison, 242 Pa Super 509, 364 A2d 388 [defendant’s expressed reason for waiving a jury trial to maneuver for a Judge he thought might be more lenient suggested less than a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver for the relinquishment of an important constitutional right]; 4 see, People v Di Constanza, 31 AD2d 250 , affd 26 NY2d 1014 ).

1987Here, there was no reliance or change of position or prejudice of any kind on the part of the defendants as a result of the plaintiff’s attempted waiver or consent, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable to the facts in this case (see, Glenesk v Guidance Realty Corp., 36 AD2d 852 ).

1962The contention that the will creates annuities and not trusts is rejected inasmuch as all the elements necessary to create trusts are in this will (Matter of Gargyan, 27 Misc 2d 137 and N. Y.

1946(Matter of Hirshfield v. Hanley, 228 N. Y. 346, 348 .) Except in an unusually clear case, a commissioner should not be checked at the threshold of its investigation by the quashing of its subpoenas thus rendering its investigation to a large extent abortive.

1942The attempted waiver is not set forth until paragraph 18, and then in language which oh its face fails to apprise the tenant of its contents. • It is a rule frequently stated that parties may stipulate away statutory and even constitutional rights (Hotchkiss v. City of Binghamton, 211 N. Y. 279 ; Phyfe v. Eimer, 45 id. 102; Matter of New York, L. & W.

1935In its recent opinion in Matter of Manzi (Tietjen) ( 155 Misc. 670 ) this court attempted an analysis of its powers pursuant to sections 275 to 281, inclusive, of the Surrogate’s Court Act, to award costs, allowances and disbursements in proceedings before it.

1931Item “sixty-fourth” of the will reads as follows: “I hereby direct my executors and trustees hereinafter named to pay out of my residuary estate all transfer or inheritance taxes that may be imposed upon any devise or legacy herein contained or any transfer thereof and that the same shall not be chargeable to or paid by any devisee or legatee herein named.” In Matter of Lilienthal ( 139 Misc. 225 ) this court attempted an analysis of the leading decisions of this State respecting the circumstances under which general legacies will be construed as a charge upon real estate passing under a resid

1926(See for principle, Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U. S. [20 Wall.] 445 ; 22 L.

1914(Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70 ; Greene v. Hallenbeck, 32 Hun, 469 ; McElroy v. Board of Education, 158 App. Div. 219 .) The second defense repeats the first with the addition of allegations purporting to show that the amount for which judgment was recovered was larger than it should have been.

1914(Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70 ; Greene v. Hallenbeck, 32 Hun, 469 ; McElroy v. Board of Education, 158 App. Div. 219 .) The second defense repeats the first with the addition of allegations purporting to show that the amount for which judgment was recovered was larger than it should have been.

1912(Roach v. Curtis, 115 App. Div. 765 ; 191 N. Y. 387 ; Hurley v. Allman Gas Engine & Machine Co., 144 App. Div. 300 .) The defendant did not retake and sell the property in the manner required in the case of a conditional sale, and the attempted waiver' of the provisions of the statute in that respect is without effect.

1912(Roach v. Curtis, 115 App. Div. 765 ; 191 N. Y. 387 ; Hurley v. Allman Gas Engine & Machine Co., 144 App. Div. 300 .) The defendant did not retake and sell the property in the manner required in the case of a conditional sale, and the attempted waiver' of the provisions of the statute in that respect is without effect.

1912(Roach v. Curtis, 115 App. Div. 765 ; 191 N. Y. 387 ; Hurley v. Allman Gas Engine & Machine Co., 144 App. Div. 300 .) The defendant did not retake and sell the property in the manner required in the case of a conditional sale, and the attempted waiver' of the provisions of the statute in that respect is without effect.

1901Ferguson v. Baker, 116 N. Y. 257 ; Esdaile v. Wuytack, 33 N. Y.

1881(Foote v. Beecher, 78 N. Y., 155 ; Church v. Howard, 79 id., 423.) We must, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial.

1869Does it not equally belong to him when paid to another for him ?” He then cites in support of these views the cases of Tenant v. Elliott, and Farmer v. Russell, thus indorsing and re-affirming the authority of those cases, and Hamilton v. Canfield, ( 2 Hall 526 ,) and Armstrong v. Toler, ( 11 Wheat. 258 ,) and adds: “The defendant’s liability arose upon the receipt of the money, and it is entirely separate from and independent of the illegal contract.” It is unnecessary to add any thing beyond this by way of argument, illustration or authority; for the principle stated and enforced covers the

1869Does it not equally belong to him when paid to another for him ?” He then cites in support of these views the cases of Tenant v. Elliott, and Farmer v. Russell, thus indorsing and re-affirming the authority of those cases, and Hamilton v. Canfield, ( 2 Hall 526 ,) and Armstrong v. Toler, ( 11 Wheat. 258 ,) and adds: “The defendant’s liability arose upon the receipt of the money, and it is entirely separate from and independent of the illegal contract.” It is unnecessary to add any thing beyond this by way of argument, illustration or authority; for the principle stated and enforced covers the