attempted waiver in Texas

2025See authorities cited, infra ¶ 22. 46 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 13 0122 first time on appeal; [and] it may not be waived by the parties.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445 ; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[S]ubject- matter jurisdiction is a power that exists by operation of law only, and cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver.”) (internal quotations omitted); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a judgment is void when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).

2025See authorities cited, infra ¶ 22. 46 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 13 first time on appeal; [and] it may not be waived by the parties.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445 ; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[S]ubject- matter jurisdiction is a power that exists by operation of law only, and cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver.”) (internal quotations omitted); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a judgment is void when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).

2025See authorities cited, infra ¶ 22. 46 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 13 0122 first time on appeal; [and] it may not be waived by the parties.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445 ; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[S]ubject- matter jurisdiction is a power that exists by operation of law only, and cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver.”) (internal quotations omitted); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a judgment is void when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).

2025See authorities cited, infra ¶ 22. 46 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 13 first time on appeal; [and] it may not be waived by the parties.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445 ; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[S]ubject- matter jurisdiction is a power that exists by operation of law only, and cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver.”) (internal quotations omitted); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that a judgment is void when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).

2004See Chen, 42 S.W.3d at 929 (discussing legal and factual impossibility, attempt, and age of alleged victim as applied to sexual performance by child statute); Yalch v. State, 743 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (discussing required elements of criminal attempt).

2004See Chen, 42 S.W.3d at 929 (discussing legal and factual impossibility, attempt, and age of alleged victim as applied to sexual performance by child statute); Yalch v. State, 743 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Chen, 42 S.W.3d at 929 (discussing legal and factual impossibility, attempt, and age of alleged victim as applied to sexual performance by child statute); Yalch v. State, 743 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (discussing required elements of criminal attempt).

2004See Chen, 42 S.W.3d at 929 (discussing legal and factual impossibility, attempt, and age of alleged victim as applied to sexual performance by child statute); Yalch v. State, 743 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658 , 661–62 (Tex. Crim.

2010After a short discussion, the trial court suggested, ―[L]et‘s . . . see whether or not we can bench warrant [Conley] back‖ 2 ―Homestead rights have historically enjoyed great protection in our jurisprudence.‖ Florey v. Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (prisoner who murdered his wife was entitled to claim homestead exemption).

2006See Ortiz v. Gutierrez, 792 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (holding waiver of notice provisions in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure did not constitute exceptions to former guardianship statute’s requirement that a proposed ward be personally served with notice of the guardianship application); see also Tex Prob.Code § 633(c)(1), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (personal service of citation on a proposed ward who is 12 years of age or older is required in permanent guardianship proceedings; proposed ward may not waive the receipt of notice or the issuance and personal service of

1988Circuit has said, Whereas before Faretta the focus of the judge was upon the constitutional necessity to provide counsel if a defendant's attempted waiver of his right to counsel was inadequate, now the judge is also bound by constitutional considerations to grant a request for self-representation if it appears that the choice of that right is, as the Supreme Court put it in Faretta , made `competently and intelligently.' United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C.Cir.1982).

1988Circuit has said, Whereas before Faretta the focus of the judge was upon the constitutional necessity to provide counsel if a defendant’s attempted waiver of his right to counsel was inadequate, now the judge is also bound by constitutional considerations to grant a request for self-representation if it appears that the choice of that right is, as the Supreme Court put it in Faret-ta, made ‘competently and intelligently.’ United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C.Cir.1982).

1988See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.1976) (The right to self-representation is `one which the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert before trial....

1988See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir.1976) (The right to self-representation is ‘one which the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert before trial_ This is necessary because the trial court faces the difficult related problem of ascertaining whether there is an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.’).

1978See First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. James, 471 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ history); Martin v. Moore, 562 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1978, no writ history).