59 California opinions name it 4 courts 1914–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gainergreen2 sentences2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent 2013This determination . . . is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual 6 volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.” (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 .) Here, defendant’s premise is that the trial court, in a rather lengthy dialogue, coerced the jury by instructing that it was obligated to order the jury to continue deliberating rather than instructing something akin to that it was choosing to order the jury to continue deliberat | 1 | 5 |
Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co.green2 sentences1977(Philbrick v. Huff, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 633, 642-644 ; Bliss v. Sneath (1898) 119 Cal. 526, 528-529 [ 51 P. 848 ]; but cf., Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [ 47 P.2d 273 ].) In the case last cited the court adopted the following rule in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal: “Where the answer to a complaint sets up new matter constituting an affirmative cause of action or counterclaim, such new matter is deemed controverted under the provisions of section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the adverse party may, without formal plea, show that th 1977(Philbrick v. Huff, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 633, 642-644 ; Bliss v. Sneath (1898) 119 Cal. 526, 528-529 [ 51 P. 848 ]; but cf., Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [ 47 P.2d 273 ].) In the case last cited the court adopted the following rule in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal: “Where the answer to a complaint sets up new matter constituting an affirmative cause of action or counterclaim, such new matter is deemed controverted under the provisions of section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the adverse party may, without formal plea, show that th | 1 | 3 |
People v. Singhgreen2 sentences2024In order to prove an attempted violation of section 288(a), “the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating (1) the defendant intended to commit a lewd and lascivious act with a child under 14 years of age, and (2) the defendant took a direct but ineffectual step toward committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child under 14 years of age.” 8 (People v. Singh (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 364, 368 .) “The crime of a lewd or lascivious act upon a child requires a touching of a child under the age of 14 with the specific intent ‘of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual 2022(Ibid.) A defendant violates section 288, subdivision (a) when he “willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act, . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child. . . .” To demonstrate an attempted violation of section 288, subdivision (a), the People must show the defendant intended to commit a lewd or lascivious act with a child under age 14, and “the defendant took a direct but ineffectual step toward committin | 1 | 2 |
People v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2022(Ibid., fn. omitted.) After issuing the decision in Sivongxxay, the California Supreme Court clarified that it “continue[d] to eschew any rigid rubric for trial courts to follow in order to decide whether to accept a defendant’s relinquishment of this right,” but also asserted “the trial court is not merely a passive receiver of an attempted waiver.” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 , 992–993 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.); id. at p. 993.) “We uphold the validity of a jury waiver ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstance 2021(People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 993 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“the trial court is not merely a passive receiver of an attempted waiver”].) Like in Blancett, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at page 1206 , this proceeding appears to be appellant’s first civil commitment, and we cannot presume she was legally sophisticated or understood the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Brevermangreen2 sentences2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the 2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the | 1 | 2 |
People v. Flannelred2 sentences2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the 2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the | 1 | 2 |
People v. Maria D.green2 sentences2017(See Jones, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 441-442, 96 Cal.Rptr. 795 [defendant was guilty of lynching based upon his participation in taking a person who had just been arrested from the backseat of a police vehicle].) This element is included in the requirement in both section 4550 and section 405a that the offender take another person who is in "lawful custody." Violation of section 405a is a felony "punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three or four years." (§ 405a.) Under section 664, conviction for an attempted violation of section 405a is punishabl 2017(See Jones, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 441-442, 96 Cal.Rptr. 795 [defendant was guilty of lynching based upon his participation in taking a person who had just been arrested from the backseat of a police vehicle].) This element is included in the requirement in both section 4550 and section 405a that the offender take another person who is in "lawful custody." Violation of section 405a is a felony "punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three or four years." (§ 405a.) Under section 664, conviction for an attempted violation of section 405a is punishabl | 1 | 2 |
Moore v. Gouldgreen2 sentences1931This court has held that the statute of limitations is applicable to claims asserted in an answer by way of set-off or counterclaim (Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 322 [ 4 Pac. 103 ]; Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 732 [ 91 Pac. 616 ]), and the same reason exists for making the statute apply to defenses based upon an equitable cause of action asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff. 1931This court has held that the statute of limitations is applicable to claims asserted in an answer by way of set-off or counterclaim (Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 322 [ 4 Pac. 103 ]; Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 732 [ 91 Pac. 616 ]), and the same reason exists for making the statute apply to defenses based upon an equitable cause of action asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Richard I. Berger, United States of America v. Richard I. Bergergreen1 sentence2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nelsongreen1 sentence2026The law is clear, for example, that the court must investigate reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an offending juror with a substitute.’ ” (Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1251 , quoting People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 .) “Penal Code section 1089 gives a trial court authority to discharge a juror, ‘ “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty . . ..” ’ A juror who ‘refuses to follow the co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Russellgreen2 sentences2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent 2026The law is clear, for example, that the court must investigate reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an offending juror with a substitute.’ ” (Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1251 , quoting People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 .) “Penal Code section 1089 gives a trial court authority to discharge a juror, ‘ “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty . . ..” ’ A juror who ‘refuses to follow the co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucaterogreen1 sentence2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rangelgreen1 sentence2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spectorgreen2 sentences2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks 2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks 2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks | 1 | 1 |
People v. Duffgreen1 sentence2025(Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 550, fn. 9 ; Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [argument forfeited where raised for first time in reply]; People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115, fn. 1 [“A footnote is not a proper place to raise an argument on appeal.”]; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793 [argument forfeited where appellant made only a “general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence”].) Even if we were to consider the forfeited challenge, we would conclude that it lacks | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gartongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gainesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tunkl v. Regents of University of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Elden v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Strong v. Stronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hermosa Beach Land & Water Co. v. Law Credit Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Brazgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. La Fontainegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rojasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bennettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Vanderbiltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cantrellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morenogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co.green2 sentences1977(Philbrick v. Huff, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 633, 642-644 ; Bliss v. Sneath (1898) 119 Cal. 526, 528-529 [ 51 P. 848 ]; but cf., Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [ 47 P.2d 273 ].) In the case last cited the court adopted the following rule in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal: “Where the answer to a complaint sets up new matter constituting an affirmative cause of action or counterclaim, such new matter is deemed controverted under the provisions of section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the adverse party may, without formal plea, show that th 1977(Philbrick v. Huff, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 633, 642-644 ; Bliss v. Sneath (1898) 119 Cal. 526, 528-529 [ 51 P. 848 ]; but cf., Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [ 47 P.2d 273 ].) In the case last cited the court adopted the following rule in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal: “Where the answer to a complaint sets up new matter constituting an affirmative cause of action or counterclaim, such new matter is deemed controverted under the provisions of section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the adverse party may, without formal plea, show that th | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
green
2 sentences2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.) In reviewing a claim that the trial judge’s supplemental instructions coerced a verdict, we determine “ ‘whether the instructions tend[ed] to impose such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict that we are uncertain of the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated conclusion’ ” by assessing “ ‘the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 461 .) An instruction is coerciv 2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.) In reviewing a claim that the trial judge’s supplemental instructions coerced a verdict, we determine “ ‘whether the instructions tend[ed] to impose such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict that we are uncertain of the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated conclusion’ ” by assessing “ ‘the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 461 .) An instruction is coerciv | 4 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent 2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent | 3 | 2014–2026 |
People v. Santiago
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met. 2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Castillo
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met. 2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2017The elements of an attempted violation of section 405a are (1) an attempt (2) to participate (3) in the taking *558 of another person (4) by means of a riot (5) from the lawful custody of a police officer. ( §§ 405a, 664.) Thus, an attempted violation of section 405a contains all the elements of attempted rescue, along with the additional element that the taking must be "by means of a riot." ( § 405a.) As the court explained in Jones , "Although both sections deal with the taking of persons from lawful custody, the anti-lynch law concerns only the taking by means of riot, which presents greate 2017(See Jones, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at pp. 441-442, 96 Cal.Rptr. 795 [defendant was guilty of lynching based upon his participation in taking a person who had just been arrested from the backseat of a police vehicle].) This element is included in the requirement in both section 4550 and section 405a that the offender take another person who is in "lawful custody." Violation of section 405a is a felony "punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three or four years." (§ 405a.) Under section 664, conviction for an attempted violation of section 405a is punishabl | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Curtis
green
2 sentences2017(See § 834a ["If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest"]; People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347 , 351-353, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 450 P.2d 33 ( Curtis ).) 9 Third, recognizing a mistaken belief about the lawfulness of police custody as a defense to an attempted violation of section 405a would violate public policy. 2017(See § 834a ["If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest"]; People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347 , 351-353, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 450 P.2d 33 ( Curtis ).) 9 Third, recognizing a mistaken belief about the lawfulness of police custody as a defense to an attempted violation of section 405a would violate public policy. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Braslaw
green
2 sentences2017(See People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 , 1244, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 .) Richards claims that the trial court erred in refusing the requested instruction because a belief that Escoe was not in the lawful custody of the police negates the intent element of an attempted violation of section 405a. 2017(See People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 , 1244, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 .) Richards claims that the trial court erred in refusing the requested instruction because a belief that Escoe was not in the lawful custody of the police negates the intent element of an attempted violation of section 405a. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2015This determination of whether the instructions “operate[d] to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency” [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ [Citation.]” ( Bryant, supra, at pp. 460-461 .) “In Gainer, our Supreme Court addressed the instruction commonly called the ‘ “Allen charge” ’ or the ‘ “dynamite charge,” ’ which 2015This determination of whether the instructions “operate[d] to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency” [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ [Citation.]” ( Bryant, supra, at pp. 460-461 .) “In Gainer, our Supreme Court addressed the instruction commonly called the ‘ “Allen charge” ’ or the ‘ “dynamite charge,” ’ which | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Whaley
green
2 sentences2015This determination of whether the instructions “operate[d] to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency” [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ [Citation.]” ( Bryant, supra, at pp. 460-461 .) “In Gainer, our Supreme Court addressed the instruction commonly called the ‘ “Allen charge” ’ or the ‘ “dynamite charge,” ’ which 2014This determination of whether the instructions “operate[d] to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency” [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ [Citation.]” ( Bryant, supra, at pp. 460-461 .) “In Gainer, our Supreme Court addressed the instruction commonly called the ‘ “Allen charge” ’ or the ‘ “dynamite charge,” ’ which | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Bradbury v. Higginson
green
2 sentences1935Whether viewed as a counterclaim or a mere defense, the relief sought being barred by limitation, the plea of the statute as a bar to the attempted defense is just as effective as it might have been in a case where the relief was sought in an independent action. (23 Cal. Jur., p. 234, sec. 12; Bradbury v. Higginson, 167 Cal. 553 [ 140 Pac. 254 ]; Sanders v. Sanders, 117 Cal. App. 231 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 599 ].) The judgment awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,014.70 together with $110 as interest. 1935Whether viewed as a counterclaim or a mere defense, the relief sought being barred by limitation, the plea of the statute as a bar to the attempted defense is just as effective as it might have been in a case where the relief was sought in an independent action. (23 Cal. Jur., p. 234, sec. 12; Bradbury v. Higginson, 167 Cal. 553 [ 140 Pac. 254 ]; Sanders v. Sanders, 117 Cal. App. 231 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 599 ].) The judgment awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,014.70 together with $110 as interest. | 2 | 1917–1935 |
Lyon v. Petty
green
2 sentences1931This court has held that the statute of limitations is applicable to claims asserted in an answer by way of set-off or counterclaim (Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 322 [ 4 Pac. 103 ]; Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 732 [ 91 Pac. 616 ]), and the same reason exists for making the statute apply to defenses based upon an equitable cause of action asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff. 1931This court has held that the statute of limitations is applicable to claims asserted in an answer by way of set-off or counterclaim (Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 322 [ 4 Pac. 103 ]; Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 732 [ 91 Pac. 616 ]), and the same reason exists for making the statute apply to defenses based upon an equitable cause of action asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff. | 2 | 1914–1931 |
Hatch v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2026As explained in Hatch v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170 (Hatch), “[a] defendant is guilty of an attempt when he harbors a specific intent to commit the target crime and does a direct, although perhaps ineffectual, act toward its commission. [Citation.] The act need not be an element of the substantive offense, but only an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design.” (Id. at p. 185.) In Hatch, the defendant was charged with, among other things, an attempted violation of section 288(a) after he began online messaging with an adult posing as a girl 8. under the age o 2026As explained in Hatch v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170 (Hatch), “[a] defendant is guilty of an attempt when he harbors a specific intent to commit the target crime and does a direct, although perhaps ineffectual, act toward its commission. [Citation.] The act need not be an element of the substantive offense, but only an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design.” (Id. at p. 185.) In Hatch, the defendant was charged with, among other things, an attempted violation of section 288(a) after he began online messaging with an adult posing as a girl 8. under the age o | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Keenan
green
1 sentence2026The law is clear, for example, that the court must investigate reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an offending juror with a substitute.’ ” (Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1251 , quoting People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 .) “Penal Code section 1089 gives a trial court authority to discharge a juror, ‘ “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty . . ..” ’ A juror who ‘refuses to follow the co | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Salinas-Jacobo
green
1 sentence2026The law is clear, for example, that the court must investigate reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an offending juror with a substitute.’ ” (Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1251 , quoting People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 .) “Penal Code section 1089 gives a trial court authority to discharge a juror, ‘ “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty . . ..” ’ A juror who ‘refuses to follow the co | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Heim green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Mendoza green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Reed green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Memro green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Weddington green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Dillon green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Collins green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Sivongxxay green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Blancett green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Bailey green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Wetmore red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Moses green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Booker green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Kraft green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Watkins green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Zamani green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| The People v. Hanna green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Lappe v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re JW green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Anderson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Frye green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Manibusan green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Contreras green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Imler green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.