attempted waiver (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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attempted waiver in Pennsylvania

9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1925–2026 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Coxgreen
pa · 1999 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001“Counsel is presumed to be effective, and it is the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 382 , 728 A.2d 923, 929 (1999), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 , 121 S.Ct. 2246 , 150 L.Ed.2d 233 (2001).

2001“Counsel is presumed to be effective, and it is the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 382 , 728 A.2d 923, 929 (1999), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 , 121 S.Ct. 2246 , 150 L.Ed.2d 233 (2001).

11
Commonwealth v. Chaneygreen
pa · 1975 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978In Pennsylvania, a series of decisions has announced that an attempted waiver by a juvenile of his fifth and sixth amendment rights during a custodial interrogation will not be effective “absent a showing that a juvenile had an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed parent or adult or counsel before he waived his Miranda rights . .” Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409 , 350 A.2d 829, 830 (1975). 1 In these cases, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the juvenile waived his rights voluntarily.

1978In Pennsylvania, a series of decisions has announced that an attempted waiver by a juvenile of his fifth and sixth amendment rights during a custodial interrogation will not be effective “absent a showing that a juvenile had an opportunity to consult with an interested and informed parent or adult or counsel before he waived his Miranda rights . .” Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409 , 350 A.2d 829, 830 (1975). 1 In these cases, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the juvenile waived his rights voluntarily.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

2023Id. at 47 n.16.

2023Id. at 47 n.16.

22023–2023
Commonwealth v. Johnson green
pasuperct · 2017
1 sentence

2026“Failing to conduct an on the record colloquy pursuant to Rule 121(C) before allowing a defendant to proceed pro se constitutes reversible error.” Johnson, 158 A.3d at 122 .

12026–2026
Pantoja-Nunez v. United States neutral
scotus · 2001
1 sentence

2001“Counsel is presumed to be effective, and it is the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 382 , 728 A.2d 923, 929 (1999), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 , 121 S.Ct. 2246 , 150 L.Ed.2d 233 (2001).

12001–2001
Cox v. Pennsylvania green
scotus · 2001
1 sentence

2001“Counsel is presumed to be effective, and it is the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 382 , 728 A.2d 923, 929 (1999), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 , 121 S.Ct. 2246 , 150 L.Ed.2d 233 (2001).

12001–2001
Tourville v. Inter-Ocean Insurance green
pa · 1986
2 sentences

1988Co., 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (1986), it noted that the definition of “specific intent to harm” was able to stand alone, regardless of whether one viewed the two Geary exceptions as separate and distinct, or whether one considered specific intent to harm as violative of public policy.

1988Co., 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (1986), it noted that the definition of “specific intent to harm” was able to stand alone, regardless of whether one viewed the two Geary exceptions as separate and distinct, or whether one considered specific intent to harm as violative of public policy.

11988–1988
Pugh v. Holmes green
pasuperct · 1978
2 sentences

1980In Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Superior Ct. 76 , 384 A. 2d 1234 (1978), the Superior Court abolished the common law doctrine of caveat emptor as it applied to residential leases and held that an implied warranty of habitability existed in all such leases.

1980In Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Superior Ct. 76 , 384 A. 2d 1234 (1978), the Superior Court abolished the common law doctrine of caveat emptor as it applied to residential leases and held that an implied warranty of habitability existed in all such leases.

11980–1980
Fair v. Negley green
pasuperct · 1978
2 sentences

1979(Emphasis supplied.) In holding the waiver invalid, the court held: “After considering the bases for our decision in Pugh v. Holmes, the public policy sought to be advanced by the implied warranty of habitability, and the factors to be employed in determining whether an agreement violates public policy, we can conclude only that an attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases is unconscionable and must be held to be ineffective.” Id. at_, 390 A. 2d at 245 .

1979(Emphasis supplied.) In holding the waiver invalid, the court held: “After considering the bases for our decision in Pugh v. Holmes, the public policy sought to be advanced by the implied warranty of habitability, and the factors to be employed in determining whether an agreement violates public policy, we can conclude only that an attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases is unconscionable and must be held to be ineffective.” Id. at_, 390 A. 2d at 245 .

11979–1979
Commonwealth v. Hailey green
pa · 1977
2 sentences

1978Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488 , 368 A.2d 1261 (1977).

1978Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488 , 368 A.2d 1261 (1977).

11978–1978
Bank of Hooversville v. Sagerson green
pa · 1925
1 sentence

1925The court below should have declared the attempted defense to be unavailing as a matter of law (First National Bank of Hooversville v. Sagerson, supra) and directed a verdict for plaintiff; a failure to do so was manifest error.

11925–1925

Where else courts name it

CA 59 (1914–2026) NY 20 (1869–2017) TX 15 (1913–2025) IL 11 (1964–2017) FL 10 (1902–2017) PA 9 (1925–2026) NJ 7 (1989–2021) WA 7 (1931–2023) MO 7 (1910–1984) AL 7 (1893–2009) GA 6 (1878–2016) AR 5 (1975–2020) WI 5 (1972–2013) KS 4 (1986–2017) NM 4 (1929–2024) OR 4 (1887–2026) AZ 4 (2001–2020) MI 4 (1958–2026) DC 4 (1981–2016) VA 3 (1930–2008) LA 3 (1957–2007) MT 3 (1927–1996) OH 3 (2016–2022) MA 3 (1948–2024) NE 3 (1911–2018) ID 3 (1925–2019) CO 3 (1916–1987) SC 2 (1915–1922) WV 2 (1909–2002) MN 2 (1937–1999) SD 2 (1977–1991) OK 2 (1915–1924) IN 2 (1974–1974) TN 2 (1915–2004) VT 2 (1880–1929) NV 2 (2018–2018) DE 2 (1918–1976)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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