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17 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1969–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Schwartzmangreen2 sentences2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. 2014Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the | 4 | 8 |
Schwartzman v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. 2014Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the | 4 | 6 |
People v. Crimminsgreen2 sentences2017In any event, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, there is no significant probability that defendant otherwise would have been acquitted, and thus we conclude that any error is harmless (see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). 2017In any event, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, there is no significant probability that defendant otherwise would have been acquitted, and thus we conclude that any error is harmless (see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). | 2 | 3 |
HUFF, YVETTE v. RODRIGUEZ, ANITA L.green2 sentences2016Defense counsel then violated the collateral evidence rule when she not only referred to a lack of evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion, but introduced the drug test result in evidence in an attempt to impeach plaintiff’s credibility (see Badr, 75 NY2d at 635 ; Huff v Rodriguez, 88 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2011]). 2016Defense counsel then violated the collateral evidence rule when she not only referred to a lack of evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion, but introduced the drug test result in evidence in an attempt to impeach plaintiff’s credibility (see Badr, 75 NY2d at 635 ; Huff v Rodriguez, 88 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2011]). | 2 | 3 |
McNeill v. LaSalle Partnersgreen2 sentences2014Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the 2014Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the | 2 | 3 |
People v. Zabrockygreen2 sentences2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. 1987(People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288 , citing Richardson, Evidence § 491, at 477 [Prince 10th ed]; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert denied 396 US 846 .) "It is well established that the party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence or call other witnesses to contradict a witness’ answers concerning collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness’ credibility.” (People v Pavao, supra, at 288-289 ; accord, People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; Richardson, Evidence § 491, at 477 [Prince 10th ed].) As the Court of Ap | 1 | 2 |
People v. Pavaogreen2 sentences2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. 2015Thus, a ‘party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence or call other witnesses to contradict the witness’ testimony concerning collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness’ credibility’ (People v Pavao, supra, at 288-289 ).” (People v Inniss, 192 AD2d 553, 554 [2d Dept 1993], affd 83 NY2d 653 [1994].) Thus, the collateral evidence rule, which is binding upon this court, precludes defendant from now offering the material at issue. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Innissgreen1 sentence2015Thus, a ‘party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence or call other witnesses to contradict the witness’ testimony concerning collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness’ credibility’ (People v Pavao, supra, at 288-289 ).” (People v Inniss, 192 AD2d 553, 554 [2d Dept 1993], affd 83 NY2d 653 [1994].) Thus, the collateral evidence rule, which is binding upon this court, precludes defendant from now offering the material at issue. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Walter E. Herr and William O. Gillentinegreen1 sentence1969Rev. 107 , 111-112 [1965]; cf. United States v. Herr, 338 F. 2d 607, 611 [7th Cir., 1964], cert. den. 382 U. S. 999 .) The reason for this exception to the collateral evidence rule is evident from the policy considerations underlying the general rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Badr v. Hogan
green
2 sentences2016Defense counsel then violated the collateral evidence rule when she not only referred to a lack of evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion, but introduced the drug test result in evidence in an attempt to impeach plaintiff’s credibility (see Badr, 75 NY2d at 635 ; Huff v Rodriguez, 88 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2011]). 2016Defense counsel then violated the collateral evidence rule when she not only referred to a lack of evidence supporting plaintiff’s assertion, but introduced the drug test result in evidence in an attempt to impeach plaintiff’s credibility (see Badr, 75 NY2d at 635 ; Huff v Rodriguez, 88 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2011]). | 7 | 1993–2016 |
People v. Sorge
green
1 sentence2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Inniss
green
1 sentence2015Thus, a ‘party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence or call other witnesses to contradict the witness’ testimony concerning collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness’ credibility’ (People v Pavao, supra, at 288-289 ).” (People v Inniss, 192 AD2d 553, 554 [2d Dept 1993], affd 83 NY2d 653 [1994].) Thus, the collateral evidence rule, which is binding upon this court, precludes defendant from now offering the material at issue. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Duncan
neutral
1 sentence2015(People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Duncan, 13 NY2d 37, 41 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198, 201 .)” (Pavao, 59 NY2d at 288-289 .) In this context, defendant’s proffer of the ESI material is an attempt to assail the credibility of his victim in violation of the collateral evidence rule precluding such extrinsic documentary evidence material from admission into evidence at trial for impeachment purposes and not a prior inconsistent statement. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Freeland
green
2 sentences1991In such instances the collateral evidence rule is not applicable.” (36 NY2d, supra, at 525.) Applying the standards set forth in Gissendanner (supra) and Freeland (supra) to determine the Brady-Vilardi materiality of the first batch of records, the court’s examination of the records should focus on whether the records contain information which could possibly bear on the complainant’s ability to perceive or recall the events of March 18th; information possibly demonstrating the complainant’s bias or hostility; evidence of a possible motive to fabricate; or other information which, if known to t 1991In such instances the collateral evidence rule is not applicable.” (36 NY2d, supra, at 525.) Applying the standards set forth in Gissendanner (supra) and Freeland (supra) to determine the Brady-Vilardi materiality of the first batch of records, the court’s examination of the records should focus on whether the records contain information which could possibly bear on the complainant’s ability to perceive or recall the events of March 18th; information possibly demonstrating the complainant’s bias or hostility; evidence of a possible motive to fabricate; or other information which, if known to t | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Gissendanner
green
2 sentences1991In such instances the collateral evidence rule is not applicable.” (36 NY2d, supra, at 525.) Applying the standards set forth in Gissendanner (supra) and Freeland (supra) to determine the Brady-Vilardi materiality of the first batch of records, the court’s examination of the records should focus on whether the records contain information which could possibly bear on the complainant’s ability to perceive or recall the events of March 18th; information possibly demonstrating the complainant’s bias or hostility; evidence of a possible motive to fabricate; or other information which, if known to t 1991In such instances the collateral evidence rule is not applicable.” (36 NY2d, supra, at 525.) Applying the standards set forth in Gissendanner (supra) and Freeland (supra) to determine the Brady-Vilardi materiality of the first batch of records, the court’s examination of the records should focus on whether the records contain information which could possibly bear on the complainant’s ability to perceive or recall the events of March 18th; information possibly demonstrating the complainant’s bias or hostility; evidence of a possible motive to fabricate; or other information which, if known to t | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Galletti
green
1 sentence1987(People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 328 ; People v Schwartzman, supra, 24 NY2d, at 246 ; People v Galletti, 55 AD2d 154, 157 .) Parenthetically, it should be noted, this was precisely the substance of the trial court’s instruction to the jury, "A rebuttal witness is [one] who is called in order to rebut testimony that has been introduced by the defense and for that purpose only.” In Schwartzman , the court, after setting forth the rationale underlying the collateral matter rule, went on to limit its scope, explaining: "[T]he objection of confusion of issues is inapplicable if the evidence sought to b | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Wise
green
1 sentence1987(People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 328 ; People v Schwartzman, supra, 24 NY2d, at 246 ; People v Galletti, 55 AD2d 154, 157 .) Parenthetically, it should be noted, this was precisely the substance of the trial court’s instruction to the jury, "A rebuttal witness is [one] who is called in order to rebut testimony that has been introduced by the defense and for that purpose only.” In Schwartzman , the court, after setting forth the rationale underlying the collateral matter rule, went on to limit its scope, explaining: "[T]he objection of confusion of issues is inapplicable if the evidence sought to b | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Herr v. United States
green
1 sentence1969Rev. 107 , 111-112 [1965]; cf. United States v. Herr, 338 F. 2d 607, 611 [7th Cir., 1964], cert. den. 382 U. S. 999 .) The reason for this exception to the collateral evidence rule is evident from the policy considerations underlying the general rule. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.