Seider doctrine in New York

2019The issue is strikingly similar to the Seider analysis evaluated and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson ( 444 US at 291 ) and Rush v Savchuk ( 444 US at 330-331 ).

2019The issue is strikingly similar to the Seider analysis evaluated and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson ( 444 US at 291 ) and Rush v Savchuk ( 444 US at 330-331 ).

1981It need hardly be stated that plaintiffs in these cases relied on the Seider doctrine; nevertheless, since no jurisdictional objection was available to defendant prior to Rush ( 444 US 320 , supra) it would be inconsistent to say that plaintiffs had a right to rely on Seider ( 17 NY2d 111 , supra) but that defendants should have had the foresight to attack jurisdiction.

1981It need hardly be stated that plaintiffs in these cases relied on the Seider doctrine; nevertheless, since no jurisdictional objection was available to defendant prior to Rush ( 444 US 320 , supra) it would be inconsistent to say that plaintiffs had a right to rely on Seider ( 17 NY2d 111 , supra) but that defendants should have had the foresight to attack jurisdiction.

1978Thus, under the Seider doctrine, "jurisdiction in rem”, limited to the face amount of the liability insurance policy, was acquired over the defendant "by the attachment in view of the fact that the policy obligation [is] a debt to the defendant.” (Simpson v Loehmann, 21 NY2d 305, 310 .) Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the order of attachment and to dismiss the action.

1978Thus, under the Seider doctrine, "jurisdiction in rem”, limited to the face amount of the liability insurance policy, was acquired over the defendant "by the attachment in view of the fact that the policy obligation [is] a debt to the defendant.” (Simpson v Loehmann, 21 NY2d 305, 310 .) Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the order of attachment and to dismiss the action.

2019The issue is strikingly similar to the Seider analysis evaluated and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson ( 444 US at 291 ) and Rush v Savchuk ( 444 US at 330-331 ).

2019The issue is strikingly similar to the Seider analysis evaluated and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson ( 444 US at 291 ) and Rush v Savchuk ( 444 US at 330-331 ).

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981Appellants’ motion for leave to amend, therefore, was properly denied, because of plaintiff’s justified reliance on the Seider doctrine and his inability to bring a timely action elsewhere at the time of appellants’ motion (cf. Kalman v Neuman, supra, p 127 ).

1981Appellants’ motion for leave to amend, therefore, was properly denied, because of plaintiff’s justified reliance on the Seider doctrine and his inability to bring a timely action elsewhere at the time of appellants’ motion (cf. Kalman v Neuman, supra, p 127 ).

1968While Seider remains the law in New York, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Podolsky v. Devinney ( 281 F. Supp. 488 , [Feb. 26, 1968]), held that the Seider rule violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1968While Seider remains the law in New York, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Podolsky v. Devinney ( 281 F. Supp. 488 , [Feb. 26, 1968]), held that the Seider rule violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1978Heretofore, the concern with Seider has been more with substantive than with constitutional infirmity, but where the courts have been called upon to assess the due process implications of the Seider doctrine in actions by New York residents, no constitutional impediment has been found (see, e.g., Minichiello v Rosenberg, 410 F2d 106, rehearing en banc 410 F2d 117, cert den 396 US 844 ).

1978Heretofore, the concern with Seider has been more with substantive than with constitutional infirmity, but where the courts have been called upon to assess the due process implications of the Seider doctrine in actions by New York residents, no constitutional impediment has been found (see, e.g., Minichiello v Rosenberg, 410 F2d 106, rehearing en banc 410 F2d 117, cert den 396 US 844 ).

1978It must take the New York Court of Appeals at its face value, when it states in Donawitz (supra, p 142 ) that "we do not reach or consider the assertion * * * that in restricting Seider-Simpson to resident plaintiffs there is a constitutional inhibition grounded on the denial of equal protection.” The United States Supreme Court in Shaffer (supra, p 212 ) concluded "that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progency.” Chief Judge Fuld, in Simpson v Loehmann ( 21 NY2d 305, 311 ) considered the Internation

1978It must take the New York Court of Appeals at its face value, when it states in Donawitz (supra, p 142 ) that "we do not reach or consider the assertion * * * that in restricting Seider-Simpson to resident plaintiffs there is a constitutional inhibition grounded on the denial of equal protection.” The United States Supreme Court in Shaffer (supra, p 212 ) concluded "that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progency.” Chief Judge Fuld, in Simpson v Loehmann ( 21 NY2d 305, 311 ) considered the Internation

1981In Gager v White ( 78 AD2d 617 ), the court reversed a refusal by Special Term to dismiss the action, even though the plaintiff there was specifically found by Special Term to have relied on the Seider doctrine to her detriment.

1981In Gager v White ( 78 AD2d 617 ), the court reversed a refusal by Special Term to dismiss the action, even though the plaintiff there was specifically found by Special Term to have relied on the Seider doctrine to her detriment.

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981In Gager , as in Morehouse (supra), the objection to quasi in rem jurisdiction had been timely asserted (see, also, Cirillo v Transportation Vehicles, 78 AD2d 835; Carbone v Ericson, 79 AD2d 551 ).

1981O’Connor was fol lowed in our own Court of Appeals by Baden v Staples ( 45 NY2d 889 , supra) which again upheld the constitutionality of the Seider doctrine, partially on the basis of O’Connor .

1978There is ample authority which asserts that the Seider doctrine is premised upon the quasi in rem jurisdictional rationale of Harris v Balk ( 198 US 215 ), a seminal case wherein jurisdiction was sustained based solely upon the fortuitous presence of the debtor in the forum State.

1978There is ample authority which asserts that the Seider doctrine is premised upon the quasi in rem jurisdictional rationale of Harris v Balk ( 198 US 215 ), a seminal case wherein jurisdiction was sustained based solely upon the fortuitous presence of the debtor in the forum State.

1978It must take the New York Court of Appeals at its face value, when it states in Donawitz (supra, p 142 ) that "we do not reach or consider the assertion * * * that in restricting Seider-Simpson to resident plaintiffs there is a constitutional inhibition grounded on the denial of equal protection.” The United States Supreme Court in Shaffer (supra, p 212 ) concluded "that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progency.” Chief Judge Fuld, in Simpson v Loehmann ( 21 NY2d 305, 311 ) considered the Internation

1978It must take the New York Court of Appeals at its face value, when it states in Donawitz (supra, p 142 ) that "we do not reach or consider the assertion * * * that in restricting Seider-Simpson to resident plaintiffs there is a constitutional inhibition grounded on the denial of equal protection.” The United States Supreme Court in Shaffer (supra, p 212 ) concluded "that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progency.” Chief Judge Fuld, in Simpson v Loehmann ( 21 NY2d 305, 311 ) considered the Internation

1978Indeed, two appellate courts have written thoughtful opinions holding that the Seider doctrine survives the constitutional principles expressed in the Shaffer case (O’Connor v Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F2d 194, 197-202 [Friendly, J.]; Alford v McGaw, 61 AD2d 504, 506-509 , app dsmd 45 NY2d 776 ).

1978Indeed, two appellate courts have written thoughtful opinions holding that the Seider doctrine survives the constitutional principles expressed in the Shaffer case (O’Connor v Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F2d 194, 197-202 [Friendly, J.]; Alford v McGaw, 61 AD2d 504, 506-509 , app dsmd 45 NY2d 776 ).

1978In O’Connor v Lee-Hy Paving Corp. ( 437 F Supp 994 ) it was held that Seider remains viable.

1978In O’Connor v Lee-Hy Paving Corp. ( 437 F Supp 994 ) it was held that Seider remains viable.

1977Suffice it to say that the Court of Appeals has stated that the doctrine explicated in Seider and Simpson should not be extended but, rather, confined to the limits dictated by stare decisis (Donawitz v Danek, supra, p 140; Neuman v Dunham, 39 NY2d 999, 1000 ).

1975It is clear that in the ordinary case involving a nonresident plaintiff and a nonresident defendant where the act complained of as to that individual defendant took place outside the State of New York, in rem jurisdiction of such nonresident defendant may not be usually obtained by attachment of an insurance policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York (Vaage v Lewis, 29 AD2d 315 ; cf. Seider v Roth, 17 NY2d 111 , supra; Minichiello r Rosenberg, 410 F2d 106).

1975It is clear that in the ordinary case involving a nonresident plaintiff and a nonresident defendant where the act complained of as to that individual defendant took place outside the State of New York, in rem jurisdiction of such nonresident defendant may not be usually obtained by attachment of an insurance policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York (Vaage v Lewis, 29 AD2d 315 ; cf. Seider v Roth, 17 NY2d 111 , supra; Minichiello r Rosenberg, 410 F2d 106).