first potential assignment error in Ohio

2025Attorney Benbow’s evaluation of this potential assignment of error as not meritorious or persuasive is also correct. {¶17} The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and was discussed by this court in Mansfield v. Studer, 2012-Ohio-4840 (5th Dist.): A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.

2000Given, however, that the record demonstrates that the court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) before accepting appellant's no contest plea and given our conclusion under the first potential assignment of error, we fail to see how appellant's trial counsel was ineffective as that term is defined by Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 .

2015A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶ 18} In the first potential assignment of error, appellate counsel asserts that Schall’s convictions for aggravated murder were not supported by sufficient evidence, or alternatively, were against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 19} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

2015A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶ 18} In the first potential assignment of error, appellate counsel asserts that Schall’s convictions for aggravated murder were not supported by sufficient evidence, or alternatively, were against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 19} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

2025Attorney Benbow’s evaluation of this potential assignment of error as not meritorious or persuasive is also correct. {¶17} The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and was discussed by this court in Mansfield v. Studer, 2012-Ohio-4840 (5th Dist.): A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.

2017State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 10.

2017State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 10.

2016Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that the defendant be advised of “the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” In determining whether the defendant was fully informed of his rights, “an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record, including the written

2016Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that the defendant be advised of “the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” In determining whether the defendant was fully informed of his rights, “an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to other portions of the record, including the written

2014The first potential assignment of error identified is “whether the State presented sufficient facts at the plea hearing to support Appellant’s no contest plea.” A plea of no contest in a felony does not require the same fact finding as a trial to the court “because the prosecution does not have the obligation to present evidence proving the defendant guilty beyond a 3 reasonable doubt.” State v. Thorpe, 9 Ohio App.3d 1, 2 , 457 N.E.2d 912 (8th Dist. 1983).

2014The first potential assignment of error identified is “whether the State presented sufficient facts at the plea hearing to support Appellant’s no contest plea.” A plea of no contest in a felony does not require the same fact finding as a trial to the court “because the prosecution does not have the obligation to present evidence proving the defendant guilty beyond a 3 reasonable doubt.” State v. Thorpe, 9 Ohio App.3d 1, 2 , 457 N.E.2d 912 (8th Dist. 1983).

2012“Abuse of discretion” means “‘a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.’ 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 94. * * * The term has been defined as ‘a view or action that no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken.’” Wilms, 144 Ohio St. at 624, 30 O.O. 220 , 60 N.E.2d 308 , quoting Long v. George (1937), 296 Mass. 574, 579 , 7 N.E.2d 149 , quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry.

2012“Abuse of discretion” means “‘a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.’ 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 94. * * * The term has been defined as ‘a view or action that no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken.’” Wilms, 144 Ohio St. at 624, 30 O.O. 220 , 60 N.E.2d 308 , quoting Long v. George (1937), 296 Mass. 574, 579 , 7 N.E.2d 149 , quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry.

2012“Abuse of discretion” means “‘a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.’ 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 94. * * * The term has been defined as ‘a view or action that no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken.’” Wilms, 144 Ohio St. at 624, 30 O.O. 220 , 60 N.E.2d 308 , quoting Long v. George (1937), 296 Mass. 574, 579 , 7 N.E.2d 149 , quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry.

2012“Abuse of discretion” means “‘a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.’ 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 94. * * * The term has been defined as ‘a view or action that no conscientious judge, acting intelligently, could honestly have taken.’” Wilms, 144 Ohio St. at 624, 30 O.O. 220 , 60 N.E.2d 308 , quoting Long v. George (1937), 296 Mass. 574, 579 , 7 N.E.2d 149 , quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry.

2012None has been received. {¶ 6} The first potential assignment of error states: “The trial court abused its –4– discretion when it overruled Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.” “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 , citing Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 , 19 O.O. 148 , 31 N.E.2d 855 .

2012None has been received. {¶ 6} The first potential assignment of error states: “The trial court abused its –4– discretion when it overruled Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.” “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 , citing Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 , 19 O.O. 148 , 31 N.E.2d 855 .

2012None has been received. {¶ 6} The first potential assignment of error states: “The trial court abused its –4– discretion when it overruled Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.” “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 , citing Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 , 19 O.O. 148 , 31 N.E.2d 855 .

2012None has been received. {¶ 6} The first potential assignment of error states: “The trial court abused its –4– discretion when it overruled Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.” “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 16 O.O.3d 169 , 404 N.E.2d 144 , citing Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 , 19 O.O. 148 , 31 N.E.2d 855 .

2012He did not do so. {¶ 5} The first potential assignment of error raised by counsel questions whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(D) in accepting Collins’ plea. {¶ 6} Crim.R. 11(D) sets forth the procedure a trial judge must follow when accepting –3– a plea involving a serious misdemeanor: “In misdemeanor cases involving serious offenses the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and informing the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty and determin

2012He did not do so. {¶ 5} The first potential assignment of error raised by counsel questions whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(D) in accepting Collins’ plea. {¶ 6} Crim.R. 11(D) sets forth the procedure a trial judge must follow when accepting –3– a plea involving a serious misdemeanor: “In misdemeanor cases involving serious offenses the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and informing the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty and determin

2011II {¶ 7} The second potential assignment of error suggests that C.C. may have been denied “his right to phone contact with his father, pursuant to Juv.R. 7(E)(2).” This rule provides that when a child has been admitted to detention or shelter care the admissions officer shall, inter alia, “[a]dvise the child of the right to telephone parents . . .” Id.

2011This concept was reiterated by the Ohio Supreme Court in the applicability of current sentencing statutes in the more recent case of State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , where the court held in the syllabus: “Where none of the individual sentences imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of those sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Accordingly, we cannot say that Maxwell’s aggregate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

2011Penson v. Ohio (1988), 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 . {¶ 3} Appellant’s counsel has identified the first potential assignment of error as “ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel.” {¶ 4} When considering the performance of trial counsel, the performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until it is demonstrated that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation which resulted in prejudice.

2011Penson v. Ohio (1988), 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 . {¶ 3} Appellant’s counsel has identified the first potential assignment of error as “ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel.” {¶ 4} When considering the performance of trial counsel, the performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until it is demonstrated that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation which resulted in prejudice.

2009As appellant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, the court did not err in accepting the plea and the first potential assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶ 19} In his second potential assignment of error, appellant questions whether the trial court gave proper consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 , 2929.12 and 2929.13 , in sentencing appellant and whether the sentence was therefore contrary to law. {¶ 20} Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced after the issuance of the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1

2008We begin with the observation that, even if true, nothing in the record supports appellant's claims that the Wauseon police promised *Page 7 to speak on appellant's behalf at sentencing and to recommend that the trial court place him on community control in exchange for appellant's help. {¶ 23} Further, Ohio law is clear that: {¶ 24} "Police officers have no authority to enter into plea-bargain negotiations with a person accused of crime, and such a plea-bargain agreement is unenforceable and of no effect * * *." State v. Mathews (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 145 , 146 ; see, also, State v. Fulton (19

2005I. {¶ 17} In the first potential assignment of error, counsel proposes that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. {¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4) and 2929.19 (B)(2)(c), to impose consecutive sentences, "a trial court is required to make its statutorily enumerated findings and give reasons supporting those findings at the sentencing hearing." State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 19} As required by Comer, at the sentencing hearing the trial court specifically found: 1) that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect