loaned servant doctrine in Ohio

2020The focus is "whether the general employer has retained direction and control over the employee, or whether, with respect to the particular act or acts resulting in tort liability, the control of the employee has passed to the borrowing employer with reference not only to the result reached but to the method of reaching it." Id., citing Ferguson v. Dyer, 149 Ohio App.3d 380 , 2002-Ohio-1442 , ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 25} Crew argues that the loaned-servant doctrine does not apply as Accurate, not AMO, was his employer.

2013Ferguson rejected an appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court “set forth a hard-and-fast rule that for purposes of the loaned-servant doctrine, mere potential [to] control or right of control is sufficient to establish vicarious liability on the part of the borrowing employer.” Id. {¶ 16} In Ferguson, a doctor gave orders regarding the care and treatment of the patient with the expectation that these orders would be generally adhered to by the hospital staff in the doctor's absence; it was undisputed that a nurse negligently failed to notify the doctor or the resident on duty of critical ch

2013Interdyne contends that based on the loaned servant doctrine, it is an employer within the meaning of R.C. 4123.74 and consequently immune from appellants’ claims. {¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this issue in Daniels v. MacGregor, 2 Ohio St.2d 89 (1965).

2002Sinai Hosp. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 21 OBR 292, 487 N.E.2d 588 ; can be invoked to determine whether a specific statutory or common-law immunity springing either from the nature of the general employer or the borrowing employer may apply to bar recovery by a loaned employee injured in the performance of his work, Vandriest v. Midlem (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 183 , 6 OBR 239, 452 N.E.2d 321 ; may be determinative of workers’ compensation issues, Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 89 , 31 O.O.2d 141 , 206 N.E.2d 554 ; and, last, as in the case before us, may serve to attach vicarious

2011Dirksing v. Blue Chip Architectural Products, Inc. (1994), 100 Ohio App. 3d 213, 224 .

2006Dirksing v. Blue Chip Architectural Products, Inc. (1994), 100 Ohio App.3d 213 , 224 .

2025Co., 39 Ohio St.3d 71 (1988). {¶46} Further, "[i]n determining whether an employee became a loaned servant, the inquiry should focus on the question of control." Crew, supra at ¶ 23 .

2020Clinton No. CA2005-10-025, 2006-Ohio-5508, ¶ 32 .

2006We disagree. {¶ 23} In Haldeman v. Cross Enterprises, Inc., Delaware App. No. 04-CAE0-2011, 2004-Ohio-4997 , this Court discussed the loaned servant doctrine.

2006Gilmore, supra, at 316 , 22 O.O.2d 149 , 187 N.E.2d 895 . {¶ 19} Halcore also argues that Stinnett is its employee under the loaned servant doctrine because it was Stinnett’s job to assist with the unloading of the bins.

2006Gilmore, supra, at 316 , 22 O.O.2d 149 , 187 N.E.2d 895 . {¶ 19} Halcore also argues that Stinnett is its employee under the loaned servant doctrine because it was Stinnett’s job to assist with the unloading of the bins.

2006Enderle v. Zettler, Butler App. No. CA2005-11-484, 2006-Ohio-4326 , ¶ 35 .

2002Id.; Harris v. Miller (1994), 335 N.C. 379 , 438 S.E.2d 731 ; Yungtum, the “Captain of the Ship” Sets Sail in Nebraska: Long v. Hacker (1995), 29 Creighton L.Rev. 379.

2002Id.; Harris v. Miller (1994), 335 N.C. 379 , 438 S.E.2d 731 ; Yungtum, the “Captain of the Ship” Sets Sail in Nebraska: Long v. Hacker (1995), 29 Creighton L.Rev. 379.

2002Accordingly, we initially note that Civ.R. 59(A)(9) provides that the trial court may grant a new trial based upon “[e]rror of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court.” Unlike most other instances in which a trial court decides the question of whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, our review of a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(9) is de novo, rather than under an abuse-of-discretion standard: {¶ 11} “Where a new trial is granted by a trial court, for reasons which involve no exercise of discretion but only a decision on a question of law, the ord

2002Accordingly, we initially note that Civ.R. 59(A)(9) provides that the trial court may grant a new trial based upon “[e]rror of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court.” Unlike most other instances in which a trial court decides the question of whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, our review of a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(9) is de novo, rather than under an abuse-of-discretion standard: {¶ 11} “Where a new trial is granted by a trial court, for reasons which involve no exercise of discretion but only a decision on a question of law, the ord

2002While stressing this physical participation and control by the surgeon over the intubation, the court then appeared to drastically expand the scope of potential liability by noting that, “[m]oreover, even if [the surgeon] had failed to exercise control over the intubation, he clearly, as he himself admitted, had the right to control it.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 655 , 23 O.O.3d 532 , 433 N.E.2d 593 . {¶ 23} Appellant in the present case heavily relies on this comment, which on the facts of Baird must be taken as dicta, for the proposition that the Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a hard-and-fa

2002While stressing this physical participation and control by the surgeon over the intubation, the court then appeared to drastically expand the scope of potential liability by noting that, “[m]oreover, even if [the surgeon] had failed to exercise control over the intubation, he clearly, as he himself admitted, had the right to control it.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 655 , 23 O.O.3d 532 , 433 N.E.2d 593 . {¶ 23} Appellant in the present case heavily relies on this comment, which on the facts of Baird must be taken as dicta, for the proposition that the Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a hard-and-fa

2002Sinai Hosp. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 21 OBR 292, 487 N.E.2d 588 ; can be invoked to determine whether a specific statutory or common-law immunity springing either from the nature of the general employer or the borrowing employer may apply to bar recovery by a loaned employee injured in the performance of his work, Vandriest v. Midlem (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 183 , 6 OBR 239, 452 N.E.2d 321 ; may be determinative of workers’ compensation issues, Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 89 , 31 O.O.2d 141 , 206 N.E.2d 554 ; and, last, as in the case before us, may serve to attach vicarious

2002Sinai Hosp. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 21 OBR 292, 487 N.E.2d 588 ; can be invoked to determine whether a specific statutory or common-law immunity springing either from the nature of the general employer or the borrowing employer may apply to bar recovery by a loaned employee injured in the performance of his work, Vandriest v. Midlem (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 183 , 6 OBR 239, 452 N.E.2d 321 ; may be determinative of workers’ compensation issues, Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 89 , 31 O.O.2d 141 , 206 N.E.2d 554 ; and, last, as in the case before us, may serve to attach vicarious

2002Sinai Hosp. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 21 OBR 292, 487 N.E.2d 588 ; can be invoked to determine whether a specific statutory or common-law immunity springing either from the nature of the general employer or the borrowing employer may apply to bar recovery by a loaned employee injured in the performance of his work, Vandriest v. Midlem (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 183 , 6 OBR 239, 452 N.E.2d 321 ; may be determinative of workers’ compensation issues, Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 89 , 31 O.O.2d 141 , 206 N.E.2d 554 ; and, last, as in the case before us, may serve to attach vicarious

2002Sinai Hosp. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 21 OBR 292, 487 N.E.2d 588 ; can be invoked to determine whether a specific statutory or common-law immunity springing either from the nature of the general employer or the borrowing employer may apply to bar recovery by a loaned employee injured in the performance of his work, Vandriest v. Midlem (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 183 , 6 OBR 239, 452 N.E.2d 321 ; may be determinative of workers’ compensation issues, Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 89 , 31 O.O.2d 141 , 206 N.E.2d 554 ; and, last, as in the case before us, may serve to attach vicarious