loaned servant doctrine in Tennessee

2018The effect of the loaned servant doctrine is that “[a]n employee of one employer may become the servant of another and shift the liability for his negligent acts to the second -9- employer.” Parker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Richardson v. Russom Crane Rental Co., 543 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975)).

2016Citing Parker v. Vanderbilt University, 767 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1988), Plaintiffs argue that Erlanger remains liable for the acts of its agents pursuant to the loaned servant doctrine.

2018In Winchester v. Seay, 409 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tenn. 1966), Tennessee's seminal case involving the loaned servant doctrine, the Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test to determine if an employee is a loaned servant to make the '"special employer" responsible for benefits: (1) the employee made an express or implied contract with the special employer; (2) the work performed was essentially that of the special employer; and, (3) the special employer had the right to control details of the work.

2013See Bogus v. Manpower Temporary Services, 823 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn. 1992); Winchester v. Shay, 409 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tenn. 1966); Carpenter v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 553 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

2026As such, we have consistently found that “an employee of a temporary manpower service is considered also to be an employee of the company to which the employee is assigned, for workers’ compensation purposes.” Abbott v. Klote Int’l Corp., No. 03A01-9810-CV-00328, 1999 WL 172646 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1999) (finding implied contract for hire between temporary employment agency employee and the agency’s client, such that client was a special employer); see also, e.g., Bennett, 660 S.W.2d at 801-02 (finding the loaned servant doctrine applicable to an employee of a supplier of temporary

2016When a temporary‘worker accepts employment and enters into an employment agreement with a’temporary agency, he or she “necessarily consents to work for the clients of the agency” and enters into “an implied contract with a special employer.” Tedder v. Union Planters Corp., No. W1999-01971-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 589139 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2001) (concluding that’ an employee of a temporary employment agency was a co-employee of the bank where she was assigned- to work, pursuant to the loaned servant doctrine, and therefore, her exclusive remedy against the bank was under the workers’ com

2013See also Armoneit v. Elliott Crane Service, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (determining that a disputed issue of fact existed concerning for whom a negligent crane operator worked under the loaned servant doctrine).

2010In Armoneit v. Elliott Crane Serv., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), this court applied the loaned servant doctrine and further explained that “control is a key element” in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists.

2018The Tennessee Supreme Court articulated a test for the loaned servant doctrine in Gaston v. Sharpe, 168 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tenn. 1943), stating: [A] servant at a particular time may remain under the control of his general employer for some purposes and yet be under the control of a special employer for others.

2018The Tennessee Supreme Court articulated a test for the loaned servant doctrine in Gaston v. Sharpe, 168 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tenn. 1943), stating: [A] servant at a particular time may remain under the control of his general employer for some purposes and yet be under the control of a special employer for others.

2013See Bogus v. Manpower Temporary Services, 823 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn. 1992); Winchester v. Shay, 409 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tenn. 1966); Carpenter v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 553 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

2010See Arrow Elec. v. Adecco Employment Serv., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a temporary employee was the loaned servant of employer, rather than staffing agency, and as such, employer was liable for employee’s negligence in operating a forklift); Catlett v. Indemnity Ins.

2010See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 277 cmt. d (2010) (“If . . . the temporary employer exercises such control over the conduct of the employee as would make the employee his servant were it not for his general employment, the employee as to such act becomes the servant of the temporary employer.”); see also Smartt v. NHC Healthcare/McMinnville, LLC, No. M2007-02026-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 482475 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009) (citing Arrow Elec. v. Adecco Employment Serv., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Parker, 767 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)) (“if an employee