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17 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1971–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violencegreen2 sentences2003Id., 391 U.S. at 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 . {¶ 40} Applying the O’Brien test to O.F.C. 2003Id., 391 U.S. at 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 . {¶ 40} Applying the O’Brien test to O.F.C. | 1 | 3 |
Texas v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007Several of the protestors were arrested and charged under Pennsylvania's lewdness statute. {¶ 22} Upon review, the Egolf court first found that the protestors had engaged in "expressive conduct," see Texas v. Johnson (1989), 491 U.S. 397 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 , rather than "pure speech." 1 The court then applied the O'Brien test finding that the state had the authority to enact regulations relating to the health, safety, and morals of its residents; that the state has a compelling interest to protect order and morality, especially where it pertains to children; that the interest i 2007Several of the protestors were arrested and charged under Pennsylvania's lewdness statute. {¶ 22} Upon review, the Egolf court first found that the protestors had engaged in "expressive conduct," see Texas v. Johnson (1989), 491 U.S. 397 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 , rather than "pure speech." 1 The court then applied the O'Brien test finding that the state had the authority to enact regulations relating to the health, safety, and morals of its residents; that the state has a compelling interest to protect order and morality, especially where it pertains to children; that the interest i | 1 | 2 |
City of Erie v. Pap's A. M.green2 sentences2005See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. (2000), 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 (city ordinance proscribing nudity in public places satisfied O'Brien test). 2005See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. (2000), 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 (city ordinance proscribing nudity in public places satisfied O'Brien test). | 1 | 2 |
State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judgesgreen1 sentence2026Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Sartini v. Yostgreen1 sentence2021Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 37 , 2002-Ohio-3317, ¶ 24 (concluding the fact the judge had "already exercised his judicial power by granting O'Brien's motion" did not preclude the opposing party from "obtaining a writ of prohibition," as prohibition will lie to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions); Roush at ¶ 1 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Kersh v. Montgomery Developmental Centergreen1 sentence2007Kersh , at 62, citing Boehl v. Maidens (1956), 102 Ohio App. 211 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 775878green2 sentences2005See id. {¶ 22} Our analysis now turns to the final prong of the O'Brien test, namely whether the provisions requiring the personal information pose a merely incidental burden on appellants' First Amendment rights that is essential to furthering the city's interests. 2005See id. {¶ 22} Our analysis now turns to the final prong of the O'Brien test, namely whether the provisions requiring the personal information pose a merely incidental burden on appellants' First Amendment rights that is essential to furthering the city's interests. | 1 | 1 |
Drain v. Kosydargreen2 sentences1980See Drain v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, at 56 [ 8 O.O.3d 65 ], Since it cannot be determined from the complaint that plaintiff may not be able to prove a claim against the state based upon the O’Brien test, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1980See Drain v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 49, at 56 [ 8 O.O.3d 65 ], Since it cannot be determined from the complaint that plaintiff may not be able to prove a claim against the state based upon the O’Brien test, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. O'Brien
green
2 sentences2011Id., at 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 . {¶ 19} The zoning resolution in this case satisfies the O’Brien test. 2011Id., at 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 . {¶ 19} The zoning resolution in this case satisfies the O’Brien test. | 4 | 2003–2011 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
green
2 sentences2004In Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), 491 U.S. 781 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 , 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , the Supreme Court rejected the “less restrictive means” argument as inapplicable to O’Brien’s test. 2004In Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), 491 U.S. 781 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 , 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , the Supreme Court rejected the “less restrictive means” argument as inapplicable to O’Brien’s test. | 2 | 2000–2004 |
State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas County Board of Elections
green
2 sentences2002Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 592, 594 , 757 N.E.2d 1135 . {¶ 24} Contrary to O’Brien’s argument, the mere fact that Judge Yost had, to a certain extent, already exercised his judicial power by granting O’Brien’s motion to substitute outside counsel for Sartini in the common pleas court case did not preclude Sartini and the county commissioners from obtaining a writ of prohibition. 2002Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 592, 594 , 757 N.E.2d 1135 . {¶ 24} Contrary to O’Brien’s argument, the mere fact that Judge Yost had, to a certain extent, already exercised his judicial power by granting O’Brien’s motion to substitute outside counsel for Sartini in the common pleas court case did not preclude Sartini and the county commissioners from obtaining a writ of prohibition. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2026Fortunately, through Davis, Straley, and Janas, it is clear that the Ohio Supreme Court has moved away from the jurisdictional limitation of Special Prosecutors to ensure that defendants retain this important “safety net,” Davis, 2011-Ohio-5028, at ¶ 37 , even after direct appeal. {¶ 59} For all these reasons, I would find that the trial court had jurisdiction to review O’Brien’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Straley (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026He claimed that his guilty plea was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution would not have been able to prove that he was guilty of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity because it could not prove the essential element of “enterprise.”6 The trial court found that O’Brien’s claims were barred by res judicata and that O’Brien failed to show manifest injustice. {¶ 62} To support his sole assignment of error—that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing—O’Brien challenges both findings of the trial court. {¶ 63} Crim.R. 32. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State ex rel. Davis v. Janas (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026Davis v. Janas, 2020-Ohio-1462 , this court granted O’Brien’s motion for reconsideration, denied his motion to certify a conflict as moot, and granted him leave to file his delayed appeal. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State ex rel. Sartini v. Yost
neutral
1 sentence2021Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 37 , 2002-Ohio-3317, ¶ 24 (concluding the fact the judge had "already exercised his judicial power by granting O'Brien's motion" did not preclude the opposing party from "obtaining a writ of prohibition," as prohibition will lie to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions); Roush at ¶ 1 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed
neutral
1 sentence2021Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106 , 2003-Ohio-2506 , ¶ 14; State ex rel. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids
green
2 sentences2010Sensations, Inc. v. Grand Rapids (C.A.6, 2008), 526 F.3d 291 , 298 C'[I]n accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit treats laws * * * which regulate adult-entertainment businesses, as if they were content neutral”). 2010Sensations, Inc. v. Grand Rapids (C.A.6, 2008), 526 F.3d 291 , 298 C'[I]n accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit treats laws * * * which regulate adult-entertainment businesses, as if they were content neutral”). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Boehl v. Maidens
green
1 sentence2007Kersh , at 62, citing Boehl v. Maidens (1956), 102 Ohio App. 211 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Albertini
green
2 sentences2000“Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the * * * regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ ” Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at 799 , 109 S.Ct. at 2758 , 105 L.Ed.2d at 680 , quoting United States v. Albertini (1985), 472 U.S. 675, 689 , 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2906-2907 , 86 L.Ed.2d 536, 548-549 . 2000“Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the * * * regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ ” Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at 799 , 109 S.Ct. at 2758 , 105 L.Ed.2d at 680 , quoting United States v. Albertini (1985), 472 U.S. 675, 689 , 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2906-2907 , 86 L.Ed.2d 536, 548-549 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler
green
2 sentences1990Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 326 , 59 O.O. 2d 387, 285 N.E. 2d 22 , Natalina contends that the OCRC has no jurisdiction whatsoever to consider O’Brien’s claim and, thus, that the writ should issue notwithstanding the available appeal. 1990Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 326 , 59 O.O. 2d 387, 285 N.E. 2d 22 , Natalina contends that the OCRC has no jurisdiction whatsoever to consider O’Brien’s claim and, thus, that the writ should issue notwithstanding the available appeal. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Conley v. Gibson
red
2 sentences1981(Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 , followed.)” We must assess appellants’ claims -with reference to the O’Brien standard, assuming, as we must for purposes of Civ. 1981(Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 , followed.)” We must assess appellants’ claims -with reference to the O’Brien standard, assuming, as we must for purposes of Civ. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. 1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Joyce v. United States
neutral
2 sentences1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. 1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Hoffman v. United States
green
2 sentences1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. 1971For cases which follow the O’Brien test see Joyce v. U. S. (1969), 259 A. 2d 363 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); Hoffman v. U. S. (1969), 256 A. 2d 567 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals); U. S. v. Ferguson (1969), 302 F. Supp. 1111 (U. S. District Court, N. D. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.